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Abstract
Decision-making is an integral part of everyday life for animals of all spe-
cies. Some decisions are rapid and based on sensory input alone, others rely
on factors such as context and internal motivation. The possibilities for the
experimental investigation of choice behaviour in mammals, especially in hu-
mans, are seemingly endless. However, neuroscience has struggled to define the
neural circuitry behind decision-making processes due to the complex struc-
ture of the mammalian brain.
For this work we turn to the honeybee for inspiration. With a brain com-
posed of approximately 106 neurons and sized at a tiny 1mm3, it may be
assumed that such an insect produces mere ‘programmed’ behaviours, yet,
the honeybee exhibits a rich, elaborate behavioural repertoire and a large ca-
pacity for learning in a variety of different paradigms. Indeed, the honeybee
has been identified as a powerful model for decision-making.
Sequential sampling models, originating in psychology, have been used to
explain rapid decision-making behaviours. Such models assume that noisy
sensory evidence is integrated over time until a threshold is reached, whereby
a decision is made. These models have proven popular because they are able
to fit biological data and are furthermore supported by neural evidence. Addi-
tionally, they explain the speed-accuracy trade-off, a behavioural phenomenon
also demonstrated in bees.
For this work we examine honeybee choice behaviour in different levels
of satiation, and show that hungry bees are faster and less accurate than
partially satiated bees in a simple choice task. We suggest that differences in
choice behaviour may be attributed to a simple mechanism which alters the
level of the decision threshold according to how satiated the bee is. We further
speculate that the honeybee olfactory system may be a drift-diffusion channel,
and develop a simple computational model, based on honeybee neurobiology,
with simulations that match behavioural results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This research aims to unite computational modelling with biological experi-
mentation to examine decision-making in perceptual choice tasks, emphasising
the importance of the widely applicable ‘accumulator’ models of decision-
making and their contributions to understanding choice behaviours. To this
end, the study examines the role of inhibitory circuits within these models
and the impact they have upon decision processes. Additionally, it also exam-
ines the influence of satiation on perceptual decision-making with respect to
the mechanisms of the aforementioned accumulator models. The results here
bring together computational neuroscience with biology and will hopefully
encourage future studies to do the same.
Decision-making has been well studied behaviourally in a wide variety of
different animals and contexts. All animals need to make decisions in their
day-to-day lives and some of these will be inherently more complex than oth-
ers. For example, a foraging animal must continually decide where to search
for food and how to carry out this process efficiently, such that the costs in-
curred are minimised (Marshall et al. 2015). This type of decision-making
often requires discrimination between alternative options. For example, a
foraging bee will need to discriminate between a rewarding flower and the
alternatives which are similar in colour or odour (Dyer and Chittka 2004a).
Foraging is one example which is shared across species, however, other levels
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of decision-making can also be observed. This becomes particularly appar-
ent in human choice behaviour. When instructed to analyse a photograph, a
human will explore differing methods of gathering visual data, implementing
eye saccades in a manner which optimises the analysis (Walker-Smith et al.
2013). For example, asking someone to estimate a subject’s age from a pho-
tograph will invoke initial eye saccades over the face. Deciding to invest in a
long-term commitment, such as a house, involves a longer and more complex
decision-making process, in which emotions and past experiences play a role.
Regardless of the complexity, however, it can be asserted that decision-making
is indeed a process. In ‘Multiple Criteria Decision Making’, Milan Zeleny de-
scribed the process as a ‘dynamic and interrelated unity of predecision, decision
and postdecision stages’ (Zeleny 1998, p. 84), identifying that decision-making
is not simply an act nor is it static nor absolute. Indeed, choice behaviour is
heavily influenced by multiple internal and external factors, such as internal
state and task difficulty. What kind of components make up the decision-
making process? Are we able to identify them from behavioural data? Can
modelling the decision-making process provide any insight?
Fast, robust decision-making between alternative options has been well
studied in laboratory settings, with a heavy focus on accuracy and response
time (Chittka et al. 2009). This type of decision-making has often been mod-
elled using sequential sampling models, which assume that noisy evidence for a
stimulus is accumulated over time until a threshold or boundary is met (Lam-
ing 1968, Smith and Vickers 1988, Usher and McClelland 2001, Ratcliff and
Smith 2004, Bogacz et al. 2006, Ratcliff and McKoon 2008, Brown and Heath-
cote 2008, Purcell and Palmeri 2017). The level of the threshold is variable
and denotes the amount of evidence that is required to trigger a decision. Al-
though there are now many variations of these models which employ different
mechanisms (for example, various forms of inhibition), perhaps the most-well
known of these is the drift-diffusion model, which was developed in 1978 by
Roger Ratcliff and has been proven to be optimal in the sense that, for a
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given accuracy, a decision is reached within the shortest possible time and,
for a given reaction time, the highest possible accuracy is obtained (Ratcliff
1978). Differing choice behaviours can be induced by varying the components
of sequential sampling models, in particular, a mediation of the threshold de-
notes how long a decision-maker should wait before deciding. A low threshold
corresponds to a fast decision which is more likely to be inaccurate due to an
insufficient amount of evidence being integrated, whilst a high threshold allows
for more time for evidence integration, thus the decision-maker will be slower
but more accurate (Bogacz et al. 2010b). This relationship between speed and
accuracy is known as the speed-accuracy trade -off and it is a behavioural phe-
nomenon which has been shown to exist in many animals (Chittka et al. 2009).
Modification of sequential sampling models’ properties such as the threshold
level has been shown to replicate findings from the speed- accuracy trade-
off. As such, these models offer an explanation for certain choice behaviours.
As well as the threshold level, the drift-diffusion model also incorporates the
average rate of accumulation, also known as the drift rate, into the process.
Sequential sampling models have been successfully fitted to behavioural data
obtained from two-alternative forced-choice tasks and so they have seen a rise
in popularity (Ratcliff et al. 2016). It is important to note that these models
are applicable only to fast, perceptual decision-making. Other types of de-
cisions, such as which candidate to vote for in an election, are higher level
and inherently more complex, engaging other mechanisms within the brain to
facilitate consideration over some time (Kanai et al. 2011, Jost et al. 2014).
It might be suggested that the complexity of decision-making and action
selection is attributed to the complexity of an agent’s neural network, but this
is not always the case. A human must innately decide which foot to walk with
first in a similar fashion to a quadruped. However, simpler agents may be
confined to simpler decisions, whilst more complex agents encounter decisions
that require more internal debate. How exactly a process is carried out within
the brain is difficult to pinpoint, due to the inherently intricate design of neural
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circuitry. It is here we might be drawn to study the simpler organisms, the
nematode worm C. elegans for example, with a nervous system consisting of
only 302 or 381 neurons (depending on if the worm is hermaphrodite or male,
respectively) (Bono and Villu Maricq 2005). The connectome (the map or
diagram of the neural connections within the nervous system) of C. elegans was
first completed in 1986 (White et al. 1986), thereafter being studied and built
upon to produce a more complete picture. Analysis of the wiring diagrams
led to the realisation that, functionally, neuronal circuits are dynamic and
subject to change due to the influence of neuromodulators such as dopamine
or serotonin (Bargmann 2012). In addition to C. elegans, other systems such as
that of Drosophila have been examined extensively. For this work, inspiration
is drawn from Apis mellifera, the honeybee.
Honeybees have been shown to have a rich behavioural repertoire with a
robust capacity for learning and memory. They have a remarkable ability to
navigate long distances with a low resolution visual system, and they are able
to solve discrimination problems of varying difficulties (Guerrieri et al. 2005).
Recently, it has become clear that this insect exhibits behaviours widely re-
garded as cognitive (for example, the ability to learn two abstract concepts
simultaneously (Avargue`s-Weber et al. 2012)) and that it may be useful as
a model of decision-making (Menzel 2012, Giurfa 2013). The honeybee has
a relatively simple neural architecture, with simplicity here being defined in
terms of number of neurons. With a brain 1mm3 in size that contains one mil-
lion neurons (Menzel and Giurfa 2001), honeybee neural circuitry is thus far
simpler than that found in mammalian brains (there are approximately 1010
neurons in human brains, for example) but more complex than other model an-
imals such as Drosophila (which has 100, 000 neurons). Since the honeybee has
been physically constrained in terms of its body size, it has needed to survive
with a smaller brain (and thus a smaller number of neurons). Despite this
limitation, the honeybee demonstrates a high capacity for decision-making;
it has evolved to be ‘intelligent’ using a smaller amount of neural circuitry,
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giving rise to adaptive decision-making behaviours which have ensured its sur-
vival. Many behavioural studies have been performed with honeybees, both
in the field and within laboratory settings, and they have demonstrated that
honeybees are capable of many forms of learning and are able to apply their
knowledge to novel stimuli or situations (Zhang et al. 2012b). For example,
bees that were trained to learn the concepts of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ were
able to apply their knowledge to novel stimuli that hadn’t been presented be-
fore, even outside of the sensory domain they had been trained on (Giurfa
et al. 2001). Bees that had been trained on colours were able to perform in
transfer tests which made use of black and white gratings, and bees trained
on the gratings were also able to perform in tests which instead made use of
colours. In a study on maze learning, bees trained to follow certain colours
through a maze were able to apply their training to novel mazes they hadn’t
navigated through before (Zhang et al. 1996). These results demonstrate that
honeybees are not simply hard-wired or preprogramed. Its ability to survive
despite its simplicity is what makes this insect ideal as a model of decision-
making; that these insects also contribute to collective decisions within the
hive makes them even more interesting for study.
Over the past few decades, there have been many turning points in honey-
bee research. The pioneering work of Karl von Frisch in the 20th century was
perhaps the first of these turning points. In 1946, von Frisch published ‘Die
Ta¨nze der Bienen’ which documented how honeybee foragers communicate
the location of resources to other hive mates by means of the now well known
‘waggle dance’ (?). This ground-breaking discovery in honeybee ‘language’
won him the Nobel Prize in 1973. Prior to this, the notion that animals - es-
pecially insects - could be capable of such intricate communication would not
have been entertained. Karl von Frisch’s work shone a much-needed light on
the inner workings of the honeybee hive, demonstrating for the first time the
complexity of the workers within. More recent research has demonstrated that
honeybees make use of other signals for their collective decision-making. One
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example is the stop signal, which was first proposed to be a begging signal by
Harald Esch in 1964 (Esch 1964). After a few decades, research by James Nieh
in 1993 indicated that the signal functioned as a way to halt waggle dancing,
acting as negative feedback (Nieh 1993). This finding was later confirmed in
2005 by Pastor and Seeley; their study also found that the signal encouraged
dancing bees to stop (Pastor and Seeley 2005). To this day research into hon-
eybee communication continues, with many other observed behaviours still
not entirely understood.
Another turning point came from the discovery that honeybees could learn
Pavlovian associations, a significant finding that arose from Kimihisa Takeda’s
development of the ‘proboscis extension reflex’ paradigm in 1961 (Takeda
1961). This paradigm made use of the bee’s natural reflex to extend its pro-
boscis to a rewarding stimulus, such as sucrose solution, and the Pavlovian
conditioning protocol (Pavlov 1927). It was further solidified by an influential
paper by Bitterman and colleagues in 1983 (Bitterman et al. 1983), and the
success of the paradigm resulted in many laboratories using it to address a wide
range of questions (Giurfa and Sandoz 2012). More complex forms of learning
in bees were starting to be discovered in the early 2000’s, a notable study
being that of Giurfa and colleagues in 2001 which demonstrated that bees
are capable of learning abstract properties such as ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’
(Giurfa et al. 2001). The study made use of the delayed-matching-to-sample
task where bees were required to respond to a stimulus which matched the
one shown on the entrance to a maze, and also the delayed-non-matching-to-
sample task where bees were required to choose a stimulus which didn’t match
the one shown. After training, honeybees were shown to transfer what they
had learnt to novel stimuli, indicating learning of the concept itself.
It was once assumed that there were great differences between the ver-
tebrate and invertebrate species, such that insects were inherently useless for
investigating any aspect of mammalian cognition. However, this assumption
began to lose its strength when behavioural studies on honeybees began to
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reveal surprising insights about their nature, noted by James Gould, an evol-
utionary biologist of Princeton University, in the late 1990’s: ‘This picture
has changed over the past decade; honey bees, at least, turn out to be more
like birds and mammals...’ (Gould 1986). More recently, it has been suggested
that the insect central complex and mammalian basal ganglia are homologous,
sharing evolutionary ancestry that results in similar topography and function
within those brain regions (Strausfeld and Hirth 2013). Although a somewhat
controversial claim, research is nonetheless accumulating that points to the
honeybee as being an ideal model for understanding cognition, perhaps cap-
able of crossing the invertebrate border. The honeybee is thus a central theme
throughout this thesis.
1.1 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 gives a detailed liter-
ature review which aims to introduce the core principles which have driven this
work. Discussed is computational neuroscience and a few sequential sampling
models, honeybee neurobiology and the proboscis extension reflex paradigm,
the role of inhibitory signals in decision-making, and how motivation can im-
pact decision-making behaviours. Following this are three results chapters.
Chapter 3 describes an abstract model of decision-making. More specific-
ally, it is a model of behavioural switching which can be applied to foraging
animals looking to balance their nutritional intake. This balance requires the
decision of whether to consume one specific type of nutrient or another. This
model builds upon an older model of behavioural switching and combines it
with an inhibitory neural mechanism which is well known in computational
neuroscience and has been documented heavily in previous research. The in-
troduction of this mechanism is shown to improve decision-making and assist
the modelled animal in foraging efficiently. The model makes the prediction
that animals should switch between alternatives irregularly if they wish to
reduce the costs they encounter.
7
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Chapter 4 presents a behavioural experiment using the famous probos-
cis extension reflex paradigm, which was devised to examine how honeybee
decision- making changes according to motivational state. Differences in be-
haviours, reaction times and accuracies are attributed to differences in the
satiation level of the bees. The behavioural data obtained can be described
by the DDM. This model has been applied to humans as well as other mam-
mals; this chapter shows that it can also be applied to honeybees, suggesting
that simple perceptual decisions in invertebrates may be solved by the use of
mechanisms which also exist within the mammalian brain. This is the first
time the drift-diffusion model has been applied within a motivational context.
Chapter 5 describes a new computational model of decision-making which
is based on the honeybee brain. The model implements the olfactory system
of the bee as a higher-level network, with a particular focus on how groups
of neurons interact and how specific groups contribute to the decision-making
process. This model predicted the behavioural data in Chapter 4 successfully
and indicates what neural circuits may be crucial for decision-making. It builds
upon the neural mechanism discussed in Chapter 3 as well as a previous model
of decision-making which also implemented this mechanism.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the work that has been undertaken here
and discusses the limitations. Future directions of research are also proposed.
At the time of writing, some of the work described in Chapter 3 has been
published (Marshall et al. 2015) and the results of Chapter 4 and 5 have been
combined into a single manuscript, which is in preparation. Some of the ideas
in Chapter 4 and 5 were published in another paper which reviewed inverteb-
rate decision-making in light of vertebrate studies (Barron et al. 2015).
8
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Over the years, computational models have proven to be remarkably valuable
to many fields of research and especially in the area of perceptual decision-
making. Used to make predictions and replicate real world data, models have
provided important insights into how systems work. Indeed, they have been
described as ‘increasingly essential to systems neuroscience’ (Cleland and Lin-
ster 2005, p. 801). A well-known example is the integrate- and- fire neuron
model, which aims to simulate spiking neurons and demonstrates how the
membrane potential of a neuron changes in the presence of excitatory or in-
hibitory inputs (see Burkitt 2006 for a review). When the membrane potential
of the neuron reaches a certain threshold, an action potential (spike) is fired.
The simplicity of this model has made it useful for investigating neural dynam-
ics, as noted in the review by Burkitt: ‘Focusing on the subthreshold membrane
properties and excluding the mechanisms responsible for generating action po-
tentials... has proven to be a powerful tool in understanding the information
processing capabilities of neurons’ (Burkitt 2006, p. 1). Other neural models
of varying complexity exist, such as the biologically plausible Hodgkin–Huxley
model (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952), and a neural model which offers both the
plausibility of the Hodgkin–Huxley model and the efficiency of the integrate-
and-fire model has been proposed (Izhikevich 2003). As with neuron models,
there are numerous models of decision-making that vary in their complexity
9
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and biological plausibility.
2.1 Decision-Making Models
The field of psychophysics is credited to Gustav Fechner and has been tradi-
tionally concerned with the accuracy of decision-makers without considering
other behavioural elements such as reaction time. In particular, experimenters
have been interested in the discrimination capabilities of subjects and how this
changed when stimuli were systematically varied to be increasingly similar or
dissimilar.
For a detailed account of the experiments that were performed before the
rise of sequential sampling models, see the review by Heitz (Heitz 2014). As
noted in this review, the first experimental account of the relationship between
decision time and accuracy was provided by Henmon in 1911 (Henmon 1911),
but it was the work in statistics which really progressed the conception of
the framework of the SAT. Stone (Stone 1960) is credited for the first math-
ematical model model of the decision process, which made use of the SPRT
developed by Wald (Wald et al. 1948) and applied it to the assumption that a
decision-maker will accumulate evidence in a task. Perhaps the most compel-
ling experimental evidence for the sequential sampling framework is the work
of Shadlen and Newsome in the 1990’s; their neural recordings from monkeys
in a visual task heavily suggest that the decision-making process in the brain
resembles sequential sampling (see Chapter Four).
Mathematical models known as sequential sampling models (which imple-
ment the non- probabilistic sampling technique sequential sampling as their
underlying principle (Gold and Shadlen 2001, Busemeyer and Johnson 2004,
Usher and McClelland 2004, Teodorescu and Usher 2013) thus assume that
decision-making is a process whereby noisy evidence is accumulated over time.
They have been used to explore the underlying neural mechanisms of decision-
making and the consequences of such mechanisms on an animal’s speed and
accuracy. For example, evidence is assumed to be integrated to a boundary
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or threshold, and a change in threshold level has been taken to be ‘the basis
of speed-accuracy trade-off ’ (Ratcliff 1978, p. 65). These models originate
from psychology, the most well-known of them being the drift-diffusion model
(DDM) which was pioneered by Roger Ratcliff in the 1970’s (Ratcliff 1978).
Since then there have been many different models proposed which vary in their
biological plausibility and can be divided into certain categories such as linear
integrators, race models or non-linear attractor models (Stone 1960, Vickers
1970, Link and Heath 1975, Ratcliff 1978, Smith and Vickers 1988, Ratcliff
and Rouder 1998, Van Zandt et al. 2000, Usher and McClelland 2001, Wang
2002, Mazurek et al. 2003, McMillen and Holmes 2006, Ratcliff et al. 2007,
Brown and Heathcote 2008, Niwa and Ditterich 2008, Ratcliff and McKoon
2008, Wang 2008, Albantakis and Deco 2009, Bogacz 2009, Ditterich et al.
2010, Krajbich and Rangel 2011). Indeed, sequential sampling models have
proven to be popular for modelling choice behaviour. As noted by Smith and
Vickers, ‘the attraction of sequential sampling models is that they provide a de-
scription of the relationship between sampling time and performance accuracy,
and hence are natural candidates for modeling speed-accuracy tradeoff effects’
(Smith and Vickers 1988, p. 135). Many of these models have been shown to
fit certain experimental data well, however, many have failed to explain (and
in some cases, have even predicted the opposite of) the results of other exper-
iments (Teodorescu and Usher 2013). Due to the broad scope of models that
have been proposed, it is difficult to differentiate between them and ascertain
what properties or mechanisms are indeed crucial for the decision process. The
schematics of some well-known classical models are given in Fig 2.1.
Usually, these models are designed to fit the two-alternative forced-choice,
or 2AFC, paradigm. Here, a subject is presented with two options simultan-
eously, one of which is the ‘correct’ choice, and must choose one. The two
options can also be presented sequentially (in which case the paradigm be-
comes the two-interval forced-choice or 2IFC). In the free-response paradigm,
a decision is reached in the decision-maker’s own time, which corresponds to
11
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Figure 2.1: Schematics of several accumulator models. A: the race model (Vickers
1970) with uncoupled pathways. B: feed-forward inhibition (Ditterich et al. 2003).
C: leaky competing accumulators (Usher and McClelland 2001). D: pooled inhibition
(Wang 2002). Circles denoted with ‘A’ and ‘B’ are the neural populations which are
integrating noisy sensory evidence. These are known as the decision populations as
their activity determines whether or not a decision is triggered. ‘IA’ and ‘IB ’ are
the sensory populations which present the initial evidence. Note that these models
make use of inhibition in varying ways. Black arrows denote excitatory connections,
red dotted lines with circles denote inhibitory connections. Figure from Barron et al.
2015.
the decision threshold being reached. In the interrogation paradigm, the de-
cision threshold is typically thought of as being discarded, and the decision
is dependent on the accumulator that has integrated the most evidence when
the trial ends. The development of the 2AFC and indeed the field of psycho-
physics is attributed to experimental psychologist Gustav Theodor Fechner.
The 2AFC paradigm can be used to test the discrimination abilities of a sub-
ject and can be made harder by presenting two stimuli which are perceptually
more similar. It has been observed that a focus on decision-making in the
binary domain is a simplification of real world decision- making, which will
undoubtedly present more than two alternatives at a time. However, it has
been argued that two-alternative forced-choice tasks are still representative
of the choices that animals will make in their everyday lives (Bogacz et al.
2006) and, furthermore, they can be well studied in laboratory studies. In
an attempt to generalise sequential sampling models to a broader range of
12
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tasks, some multi-alternative models have been developed (Bogacz et al. 2007,
Tsetsos et al. 2011), however, they are not covered in this literature review.
We here instead focus on binary decision-making tasks as they are simpler
to model and, as mentioned, sequential sampling models have mostly been
developed with the 2AFC in mind (Bogacz et al. 2006). In the following sec-
tion, the models are presented in order of their complexity, starting with the
one-dimensional (single integrator) Drift-Diffusion Model.
2.1.1 Drift-Diffusion Model
Remarked as being ‘one of the cornerstones of modern psychology’ (Milosavljevic
et al. 2010, p. 437), the drift-diffusion model (DDM) is a statistically op-
timal (Laming 1968) model of decision-making (Ratcliff 1978, Stone 1960)
that demonstrates the trade-off between accuracy and decision-speed. The
DDM is an implementation of the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT),
which has been shown to implement optimal decision-making (Wald et al.
1948) in the sense that, for a given accuracy, a decision can be made within
the shortest possible time. In the same way, for a given decision-speed, the
model will achieve the greatest possible accuracy. The behavioural task de-
termines whether speed or accuracy will be optimised; if the optimisation of
speed is required, the decision-maker’s accuracy will decrease, demonstrating
the speed-accuracy trade-off (likewise, if accuracy needs to be optimised, the
decision-maker’s speed will decrease).
Other models which are more complex and are able to be reduced down to
the DDM are thus optimal in this sense (Bogacz et al. 2006). This particular
model has kindled some interest recently as it has been shown to better fit
reaction time data than other non-optimal models (Ratcliff and Smith 2004),
and, furthermore, it can be applied to value-based decision tasks (Milosavljevic
et al. 2010, Krajbich and Rangel 2011). Conversely, other researchers propose
that the model is too simple to be useful and put forward experimental data
that the model cannot account for, thus highlighting its limitations (Pirrone
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et al. 2014).
The DDM is a one-dimensional decision-maker, viz. it has one integrator
which accumulates the noisy difference between two alternatives over the dur-
ation of a trial. A decision is made when the accumulated difference crosses
one of two thresholds; the value of these thresholds being set by the experi-
menter (but they are generally thought to be positive and negative in value,
since the point of equal evidence is at zero). Varying the decision thresholds
can demonstrate the trade-off between speed and accuracy; a threshold that
is closer to the initial integration point induces a shorter reaction time and
a threshold that is further away induces a longer reaction time, as a higher
amount of evidence accumulation is required to reach it. Generally, accuracy
is decreased and increased respectively. The decision-maker itself can be set
to be more accurate (more experienced) or less accurate (less experienced);
the former is able to make correct decisions more quickly, the latter tends to
make more mistakes.
An alternative implementation of this model is known as the single bound
drift- diffusion model, and this can represent go/no-go tasks instead of 2AFC
tasks (see Cohen-Gilbert et al. 2014 for a recent example with human par-
ticipants). In go/no-go tasks, the subjects are required to either respond or
not respond to a stimulus, as such the negative threshold (representing the
response to an alternative stimulus) is removed or set to zero. The process
of evidence accumulation remains the same. A simulated example of a single
bound DDM is given in Fig. 2.2. In this figure, the lower threshold is set
to zero; in each simulation, the modelled animal can either respond to the
presented stimulus or instead refrain from responding.
Whilst the single bound variant of the drift-diffusion model remains to be
useful for the examination of decision-making in go/no-go tasks, its imple-
mentation generates a problem with ambiguity. It is not possible to ascertain
whether the subject has refrained from responding due to the fact that it was
not able to reach a decision in the given time (i.e, was still deciding), if the
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Figure 2.2: An example of a one-dimensional DDM simulation, with absorbing
boundaries (author’s own simulation). Here, the lower decision threshold has been set
to zero and the higher decision threshold has been set to one. Over five individual tri-
als, the decision-maker has made two correct choices (shown by the integrator reaching
the top threshold twice) and has remained undecided for the other three trials (where
the integrator has not reached a threshold within the time limit). The integrator’s
preference for an alternative demonstrates the strength of the drift as the difference
in the evidence is integrated, with small fluctuations towards each threshold. The
bias of this decision-maker is slightly towards being accurate (with a drift of 0.5 de-
noting no bias), however, this can be increased or decreased via alteration of the drift
parameter (see main text).
subject had specifically chosen not to respond, or if the subject refrained from
responding for some other reason, such as uncertainty or disengagement. As
such, it is not possible to define whether or not the subject has made an error
in each simulation.
Mathematically, the drift-diffusion model is defined by the following dif-
ferential equation (Bogacz et al. 2006):
dx = Adt+ cdW, x(0) = 0 (2.1)
where x represents the difference in evidence that has been accumulated, Adt
represents the average evidence increase and cdW represents noise, with dW
representing a Wiener process (a continuous, stochastic diffusion process, also
called Brownian motion). The initial amount of evidence integrated is usually
set to zero, but it can be set to a non-zero value in order to encode a pre-
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experimental bias towards one of the alternatives, thus making the likelihood
of choosing one alternative higher than the likelihood of choosing the other.
This can alter the accuracy of the decision-maker, and in such situations, the
decision-maker is usually able to choose an option within a shorter time.
A variant of the DDM, known as the attentional drift-diffusion model
(aDDM) applies the model to a task involving attentional fixation (Krajbich
et al. 2010, Krajbich et al. 2012). As such, evidence accumulation is entirely
dependent on the visual attention of the decision-maker. In this way, evidence
for an alternative can only be integrated when the subject is looking at said
alternative. When an alternative is out of focus, evidence is not accumulated
or accumulated to a lesser extent. Consequently, a subject spending a lot of
time looking at an alternative is integrating a lot more evidence for that al-
ternative, as such, it is more likely to be chosen. The aDDM was found to be
predictive of reaction times within a purchasing task (which combined visual
stimuli with numerical) (Krajbich et al. 2012).
2.1.2 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) model is a variant of the DDM (Busemeyer and
Townsend 1993). The OU process itself was proposed many decades before
(Uhlenbeck and Ornstein 1930), originally as an alternative to the diffusion
process model. It introduces the additional term λ , which controls the mag-
nitude of how dependent dx is on the current value of information accumulated.
Mathematically, it is defined in the following way (again using the equations
derived from Bogacz et al. 2006):
dx = (λx+A)dt+ cdW, x(0) = 0 (2.2)
with the parameters as before for the drift-diffusion model. The parameter λ
alters the rate of accumulation; setting this to zero thus reduces the OU model
to the DDM as the rate would be equivalent to that of the DDM. As such,
this model is also statistically optimal. Setting λ 6= 0 accelerates x towards
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one of the two thresholds, dependent on the value of λ.
2.1.3 Race Model
The DDM and OU models both incorporate one accumulator to integrate evid-
ence. In contrast to this, the race model (Vickers 1970) assumes that evidence
for each alternative is being integrated by independent accumulators. As such,
evidence for n alternatives is being integrated separately by n accumulators.
The accumulators are not coupled in any way and are not leaky, and they
‘race’ to reach the decision threshold. Thus, the outcome of the decision is
determined by which accumulator reaches the threshold first. The race model
cannot be reduced to the DDM (Bogacz et al. 2006) and as such it is not
an optimal decision- maker. Despite this limitation, race models have been
praised for their biological plausibility: ‘they offer a parsimonious, generic
and neurobiologically plausible mechanism by which actions can be selected on
the basis of either a cued single action (specified) or a cued choice between
actions’ (Rowe et al. 2010, p. 893). Formally, the race model is defined as:
dy1 = I1dt+ cdW1
dy2 = I2dt+ cdW2 (2.3)
where In denote input strengths and cdWn denote noise, as with the DDM,
however, the noise is independent for each accumulator. Here, there is no
‘drift’, A. The likelihood of the alternatives is typically equal and the decision-
maker is assumed to have no initial preference for either, i.e., y1(0) = y2(0) =
0.
The race model has been used to predict perceptual and behavioural
decision-making and has also been tied in with action selection (Rowe et al.
2010). In the study of Rowe and colleagues, an experiment with humans was
coupled with the development of a race model with competitive accumulators.
Human subjects were asked to select actions without any indication of which
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actions were correct, a paradigm based on an earlier one using monkeys. Us-
ing fMRI scans, brain activity of the subjects was recorded and the activity of
certain areas correlated with the model predictions. Thus, the race model was
used in determining parts of the human brain associated with action selection.
Recently, the race model has also been applied to a behavioural exper-
iment which explored the role of confidence in value-based decision-making
(De Martino et al. 2013), where confidence was defined as the ‘degree of sub-
jective certainty in having made the best choice, which equates to choosing the
higher valued item’ (De Martino et al. 2013, p. 105). In their behavioural
experiment, twenty human participants chose between food items that they
would eat later, and indicated their confidence in their choice. The model
predicted that an increase in confidence would result in a decrease in reaction
time, and this was indeed found to be the case. The results showed that the
race model was able to describe the relationship between confidence, reaction
time and the difference in value of the alternatives and matched the observed
behavioural data.
2.1.4 Pooled Inhibition
The pooled inhibition model (Wang 2002) was proposed as a more biologic-
ally plausible accumulator, originally introduced as a model for the posterior
parietal cortex, an area in the mammalian brain which guides saccadic eye
movement. For a TAFC task there are two pools of decision neurons which
accumulate evidence for each alternative. These pools of neurons compete
with each other (with the activity of one pool directly influencing that of the
other pool) and have self-excitatory recurrent projections (see Fig 2.1), such
that the neurons are able to maintain activity without stimulus input for some
time, and also decay in activity at a slow enough rate for integration to take
place (Bogacz et al. 2006).
In addition to these decision neurons there is also a pool of shared inhibit-
ory neurons. Both pools of decision neurons are able to excite these inhibitory
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neurons, and the inhibitory neurons in turn inhibit the decision neurons via
recurrent connections (Bogacz et al. 2006). This was introduced as a way of
inhibiting the decision neurons’ activity without them inhibiting each other
directly. With these three pools of neurons, the pooled inhibition model is a
three-dimensional model and is formally defined in the following way (Bogacz
et al. 2006):
dy1 = (−ky1 − wy3 + vy1 + I1)dt+ cdW1
dy2 = (−ky2 − wy3 + vy2 + I2)dt+ cdW2
dy3 = (−kinhy3 + w′(y1 + y2))dt (2.4)
with dy1 and dy2 representing the decision neurons, dy3 representing the inhib-
ition neurons, v denoting the self-excitatory recurrent projections, w′ denoting
the weights between the decision neurons and inhibition neurons and k denot-
ing the decay of activity (with kinh representing the decay of activity in the
inhibition neurons). I1 and I2 denote input units with strength I. Finally,
cdW1 and cdW2 denote white noise.
2.1.5 Limitations
The classical computational models of decision-making, although incredibly
useful, are not without their flaws. Taking the DDM as an example, whilst
this model can quite elegantly show the trade-off between speed and accuracy,
it fails to demonstrate reasonable behaviour under certain conditions. For
instance, given a choice between two alternatives, both of which are equivalent
(and assuming that the decision-maker is not biased towards either alternative
if value is taken into account), the model will be reduced to simply integrating
noise over time until randomly ending up at one decision threshold or the
other. A real world decision-maker would be expected to instead immediately
choose either at random (Pais et al. 2013). This limitation prompted the
development of more complex models which were able to solve this problem
19
Literature Review
(Brown and Holmes 2001, Pais et al. 2013).
2.2 The Honeybee as a Model of Cognition
It was noted by James McConnell in his 1966 review on invertebrate learning
that ‘man is generally more interested in man than in any other animal...’
(McConnell 1966, p. 107) and the decision-making abilities of human subjects
has been thoroughly studied within a wide range of tasks. Over the years, it
has been heavily debated whether or not invertebrates are capable of learning,
however, the accumulation of research to date heavily suggests that they are.
Recently, it has become clear that the honeybee in particular has a rich behavi-
oural repertoire. Research has shown that this insect is not merely hardwired;
that is to say, it is able learn and adapt its behaviour to new situations. This
capacity for plasticity was noted in Randolf Menzel’s recent review on honey-
bee research: ‘Honeybees contradict the notion that insect behaviour tends to
be relatively inflexible and stereotypical ’ (Menzel, 2012, p. 758). Indeed, recent
studies into honeybee learning and memory have shown that this insect may
be an ideal candidate as a model for learning. They are able to rapidly learn
Pavlovian associations (for example, Bitterman et al. 1983) and are capable of
other types of non-elemental learning such as contextual learning (see Giurfa
2003b for a detailed review).
Karl von Frisch was famous for his work on honeybee behaviour and his
discovery of the intricate waggle dance, which honeybee foragers use to com-
municate to other bees within the hive the location of food sources (Von Frisch
1967). Indeed, the honeybee is a eusocial creature which is required to make
decisions both independently and as part of a group, with one example of
collective decision- making being house hunting (Seeley et al. 2012). Foraging
requires the bee to navigate several kilometres in search of flowers, thus it must
not only find its way to food sources once outside the hive but must also return
safely; and it is for this reason that honeybee navigation and spatial learning
has been so greatly studied (for example, see Srinivasan et al. 1996), along
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with other invertebrates that demonstrate such learning, such as the digger
wasp (Tinbergen 1972) and desert ant Wehner 2003. Furthermore, honeybees
see in colour and have demonstrated impressive feats in visual learning and
memory (for a detailed review see De Ibarra et al. 2014 as well as Zhang et al.
2012b). Additionally, they are able to sense odours acutely and they per-
form remarkably well in discrimination tests (Guerrieri et al. 2005). For their
everyday success and ability to survive despite their limited neural circuitry,
‘the insect brain must therefore provide intelligent solutions to a wide range
of ecologically relevant problems...’ [p. 62](Menzel and Giurfa 2001) and, as
such, they function well as models of decision-making and learning.
2.2.1 The Proboscis Extension Reflex
Classical or Pavlovian conditioning, originally studied through behavioural
experiments with dogs, was pioneered by Ivan Pavlov back in the late 1920’s
(Pavlov 1927). It is used to train an animal to associate an initially neutral
stimulus (the conditioned stimulus or ‘CS’) with another stimulus which is
naturally rewarding (usually, some kind of food reward, referred to as the
unconditioned stimulus or ‘US’). After a single reinforced trial, the animal
begins to associate the reward with the neutral stimulus, and, as a consequence
of this, it will display behaviours towards the neutral stimulus which otherwise
would not have been invoked (in the case of the original experiments, salivating
at a bell when no food was present). Today, this form of conditioning remains
an important tool in the study of animal behaviour, and it has been adapted
to suit many different experimental tasks within different sensory modalities.
Indeed, it has also been applied in the invertebrate realm.
Work on classical conditioning with honeybees started in the late 1950’s
when Matsutaro Kuwabara discovered that they could be trained to associate
coloured lights with a sugar reward (Kuwabara 1957). This discovery was
made by use of the Proboscis Extension Reflex (PER) paradigm, an accessible
approach to the study of honeybee learning which requires bees to be har-
21
Literature Review
nessed rather than free-flying (Kuwabara 1957, Takeda 1961, Bitterman et al.
1983, Felsenberg et al. 2011, Giurfa and Sandoz 2012). In this paradigm, an
experimenter gently touches the antennae of a bee with a toothpick or similar
object which has sucrose solution on. This will invoke the proboscis extension
reflex from the bee, which is a behavioural response whereby the bee extends
its proboscis (tongue). After a few trials of classical conditioning, where a
stimulus is presented just prior to the presentation of the sugar, the bee will
extend its proboscis to the neutral stimulus alone. Unfortunately, using the
PER paradigm with stimuli in the visual domain has proven difficult as it re-
quires the bees’ antennae to be cut. For quite some time this was overlooked;
consequently the results from Kuwabara’s work were unreproducible (Giurfa
and Sandoz 2012). Furthermore, cutting the antennae for visual conditioning
results in a drop in learning performance, as shown by the experiments con-
ducted by Hori and colleagues (Hori et al. 2006; 2007). This is a result thought
to arise from a reduction in bees’ responsiveness to sucrose (de Brito Sanchez
et al. 2008). Furthermore, in order for the bees to learn the association, the
training phase needed to be extended to span across two days.
A popular alternative to visual stimuli in PER conditioning is olfactory
stimuli. In 1961, Kimihisa Takeda developed the PER protocol which used
odourants instead (Takeda 1961) and it was later built upon by Bitterman and
colleagues who implemented proper controls (Bitterman et al. 1983). Experi-
ments over the years have shown that bees are able to perform well in olfactory
conditioning trials, rapidly learning the association between odour and sugar
reward after a single trial and reaching high performance rates after around
five trials. For this reason, PER is usually performed using olfactory as op-
posed to visual stimuli. However, recent studies have shown that conditioning
with visual stimuli is possible in bees, but a change in harnessing is required
(Dobrin and Fahrbach 2012). Another study examined the role of motion cues
in visual conditioning and found that the performance of bees improved when
the trained colours were presented along with visual stimuli (Balamurali et al.
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2015). Interestingly, this study also found that intact bees performed equally
as well as bees that were deprived of their antennae. Another study in visual
PER demonstrated that bees are capable of learning visual associations but
that they are unable to discriminate between colours well, even though the
colours used in the experiments had shown to be discriminable by bees in
free-flying experiments (Niggebru¨gge et al. 2009).
The protocol for olfactory PER conditioning has now been standardised
(Felsenberg et al. 2011). Standardisation is important for ensuring that signi-
ficant differences found between results have not arisen due to differences in
experimental protocol. In addition, results derived from studies making use of
the standardised protocol should be directly comparable. PER conditioning
has enabled researchers to examine honeybee decision-making and discrimin-
ation behaviours with a high degree of control over the experimental subjects,
to the point where neural recordings can be made as they respond to odours
(Smith and Menzel 1989). For example, an individual’s level of satiation can
be manipulated precisely in PER studies; this sort of control is not possible
in free-flying experiments. A very thorough study by Guerrieriand colleagues
serves as an example of how discrimination behaviours can be evaluated in
great detail using PER (Guerrieri et al. 2005). In this study, the paradigm
was used to evaluate honeybee discrimination using sixteen different odours.
The odours were classified in terms of their functional group (alcohols, alde-
hydes and ketones) and chain length (between six and nine carbon atoms),
which made task difficulty very easy to manipulate systematically. For ex-
ample, odours within the same functional group will have a higher degree
of similarity between them. Odours with closer chain lengths will also be
more similar to each other. Thus, an aldehyde of chain length six (Hexanal)
is more similar to an aldehyde of chain length seven (Heptanal) than eight
(Octanal). In their experiment, the authors used a total of 1,457 bees to pro-
duce a behavioural matrix which demonstrated how the bees were generalising
across odours. The bees were each trained to a single odour using the PER
23
Literature Review
paradigm and then tested with four alternatives, one of which might have been
the trained odour. The more bees that responded to the alternatives, the more
perceptually similar to the trained odour the test odour was considered. The
full generalisation matrix shows the percentage of proboscis extensions recor-
ded across all sixteen odours and demonstrates that, whilst the bees mainly
responded to the trained odourant, they also responded to perceptually similar
ones. Furthermore, the authors went on to show that the perceptual distances
of the odours were correlated with those found from neural recordings: ‘The
correlation between both datasets was highly significant, thus indicating that
odours that are encoded as physiologically similar are also perceived as similar
by honeybees’ (Guerrieri et al. 2005, p. 719).
Despite the attractiveness of the PER paradigm, it does not come without
its limitations due to how it has been applied across different labs. Over the
years, researchers have adapted the methodology to suit their own experi-
ments and introduced small changes in inter-trial interval (ITI), the length of
time the odour is presented for, and a multitude of other parameters, which in
turn may impact experimental results. This was noted by Giurfa and Sandoz:
‘...subtle modifications in experimental parameters such as inter-trial intervals
... among others, may lead to radically different conclusions, some of which
may be misleading ’ (Giurfa and Sandoz 2012, p. 58). In a recent review on
visual conditioning in bees, Avargue`s-Weber and Mota also write: ‘...the liter-
ature provides results obtained with different visual conditioning protocols that
are rarely comparable and sometimes conflictive.’ (Avargue`s-Weber and Mota
2016, p. 108). The recent standardisation of the procedure is a step towards
minimising this drawback. Other influences on PER results, such as the ef-
fects of the season, ITI and the number of trials used in training, have been
considered and discussed thoroughly in a publication by Frost, Shutler and
Hillier (Frost et al. 2012).
Despite its limitations, the PER paradigm has proven to be invaluable to
honeybee research, especially in the evaluation of learning and memory (for
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example, see Scheiner et al. 1999). Since its establishment in 1961, it continues
to be widely used to date and has even been adapted for use in experiments
with other insects such as ants (Guerrieri and d’Ettorre 2010). It is a paradigm
well suited for the examination of olfactory discrimination behaviours and is
here used in our behavioural experiments with bees.
2.2.2 The Speed-Accuracy Trade-off
In decision-making tasks, the accuracy of an individual under different experi-
mental conditions has been studied extensively. In humans, it has been shown
that there is a relationship between the time taken for a person to complete
a decision- making task and their accuracy. Subjects who make quicker de-
cisions are more prone to error whilst those who take longer are more accurate.
This result has also been found in other animals, and more generally it sug-
gests that the sampling time required to solve a decision task is related to the
accuracy of an agent. This is known as the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT).
It has also been shown that there is a relationship between the difficulty of a
decision-making task and the time taken by a subject to complete it, though
this is not always the case. In a task where accuracy is critical and errors
are penalised, an animal will sacrifice speed in order to make a more reliable
decision, however, within a different task this sacrifice may be costly, as such
sampling time depends heavily on both the individual and the context of the
task. The speed-accuracy trade-off has recently been shown to exist in bees
within a variety of different contexts such as foraging and house hunting. In-
deed, according to the theory behind the drift-diffusion model, the SAT is an
unavoidable phenomenon for optimal decision-makers.
In 2003, Chittka, Dyer and Dornhaus demonstrated that bumblebees ex-
hibit a speed-accuracy trade-off (Chittka et al. 2003). Within their experi-
mental paradigm, a colour discrimination task using projected virtual flowers,
bees that made decisions quickly made more errors whilst bees that were
slower were more accurate. Furthermore, bees were shown to have consistent
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individual differences in how quickly they made a decision, which indicates
that bees have their own individual foraging strategies. Interestingly, it has
been shown that faster bees collect nectar more efficiently than slower bees,
though this holds only when foraging patches have a higher proportion of
flowers that are rewarding (Burns 2005, Burns and Dyer 2008). It has been
suggested that these individual differences are beneficial to a colony as mul-
tiple foraging strategies will reduce the variability in nectar collection rate and
in turn promote colony fitness (Burns and Dyer 2008). If the natural diversity
of a colony’s environment is taken into account, it is perhaps logical that hav-
ing individuals employing their own foraging behaviours will be beneficial as
they will be targeting different patches of flowers. Thus, individual differences
in foraging strategies are an important factor when designing discrimination
tasks; such differences will have an impact on an animal’s accuracy (Burns
2005).
The experiment by Dyer and Chittka in 2004 built upon the premise that a
colour discrimination task becomes increasingly difficult as colour differences
are reduced, with colour difference defined as ‘the Euclidean distance between
stimuli loci in colour space’ (Dyer and Chittka 2004b, p. 761). They investig-
ated how bees decided to forage on certain flowers with relation to how hard
they perceived the task to be, also supporting the hypothesis that bees alter
the time they take to make decisions depending on task difficulty.
In their visual discrimination task, bees were trained to forage from artifi-
cial flowers (plastic discs), with distractor flowers delivering water as opposed
to sugar water. Task difficulty was controlled by colour distance from the tar-
get stimulus; distractor flowers that were more similar in terms of colour thus
corresponded to a harder decision task. They found that bees very quickly
learned to discriminate flowers that were low in similarity, needing fewer vis-
its to flowers in order to solve the task. For harder tasks, there was a sharp
drop in accuracy and bees needed more visits to flowers before they could
begin to learn to discriminate between them. Their experiment confirmed
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that between individuals there is a speed-accuracy trade-off; for harder tasks,
bees that made decisions more quickly were also less accurate. Additionally,
they analysed the bees as a group and found that they were slowing down to
complete harder tasks.
The results from these studies suggest that there exists a speed-accuracy
trade- off in bees; difficult discrimination tasks result in longer sampling times
for the animal, which suggests that assessment of stimulus characteristics in
the brain improves over time, perhaps due to noise averaging (Wright et al.
2009). Moreover, bees can be trained to perform better and discriminate more
effectively in harder tasks by using differential conditioning.
In discrimination tasks it has often been assumed that an animal will
desire to perform exceptionally well, and, as a consequence of this, errors have
been taken to show the limit of an individual’s capabilities. As stated by
Chittka and colleagues, ‘It is not clear whether low accuracy actually reflects
the limits of discrimination’ (Chittka et al. 2003, p. 388). Indeed, this is
often not the case (Chittka et al. 2009, Chittka et al. 2003, Giurfa 2004).
In particular, discrimination tasks using differential conditioning have shown
that an increase in cost for errors will often result in the animal slowing down
to accumulate more evidence in tasks. For example, when foraging induces
a risk of predation, bees take longer to inspect flowers and ensure that they
are safe before landing (Ings and Chittka 2008). In an experiment by Chittka
and colleagues, distractor flowers were developed to deliver aversive quinine
solution as a punishment and in response to this the bees improved their
accuracy (Chittka et al. 2003). When the punishment was removed from
the task the accuracy of the bees decreased, indicating that the improved
performance was not due to experience. The results suggest that an animal’s
discrimination capacity is not static, rather, it depends on both the individual
as well as the context. As such, how bees are trained becomes an important
contributing factor when examining their behaviour in discrimination tasks.
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2.3 Honeybee Neurobiology
Advances in digital technology have encouraged the formation of 3D brain
atlases, and there has been a rise in research studying invertebrate brains in
an attempt to create complete neural maps. Perhaps the most well mapped
invertebrate brain is that of Drosophila. The connectome or neural map of this
insect has recently been constructed using a database of 23,579 neuron images
(Shih et al. 2015). The honeybee brain has also been studied in great detail,
and a computational atlas known as the Honeybee Standard Brain (HSB) has
been developed (Brandt et al. 2005, Rybak et al. 2010). The HSB was created
from the data of twenty individual worker honeybees, consisting of twenty-
two neuropils, and serves as a representation of the average honeybee brain.
It is a virtual, 3D map which is widely accessible, and it contains detailed
information about the locations of specific neurons within the bee brain.
The olfactory system of the honeybee has been well studied (for example,
see Zwaka et al. 2016), along with other brain regions which are suggested to
play a role in learning, memory, decision-making or action selection. Here, the
focus is on the olfactory regions but other higher order regions are briefly dis-
cussed. Where gaps are apparent in the honeybee literature, research in other
insects such as Drosophila is substituted, if available, instead. It is argued that
this is acceptable because the basis of decision-making and action selection,
i.e., the convergence of competing motor commands for execution at a spe-
cific neuropil, is assumed to be conserved between the different species (Perry
and Barron 2013b). Considering that action selection is an evolutionarily ‘old’
problem, this assumption should indeed hold. Strausfeld noted the similarities
of the higher order regions, the mushroom bodies, in his paper: ‘comparisons
between insect groups suggest that within an order there are highly conserved
features of the mushroom body shape and lobe arrangements’ (Strausfeld et al.
1998, p. 15). Indeed, in Shih and colleagues’ recent paper on the Drosophila
neural map, the authors suggested that, even for this simplistic insect, ‘...the
overall organizational scheme showed fundamental similarities to the network
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structure of the mammalian brain’ (Shih et al. 2015, p. 1249). Strausfeld
and Hirth recently suggested that vertebrate and invertebrate action selection
centres (the basal ganglia and central complex, respectively) may be homolog-
ous, however, this suggestion has been seen as controversial (Strausfeld and
Hirth 2013). If similarities exist between Drosophila and mammalian brains,
these similarities are expected to be found in honeybee brains. Undoubtedly
however, there will be specific differences in the differing brain morphologies
that may determine behavioural differences between similar insects. Thus, it
can be argued that a review of the literature for multiple insects is a worthwhile
cause, as common traits or mechanisms as well as species-specific differences
can be identified. Indeed, the importance of ‘comparative connectonomics’,
the ‘quantitative study of cross-species commonalities and variations in brain
network topology ’, has very recently been brought to light (van den Heuvel
et al. 2016, p. 345). It is worth mentioning that previous models of insect
neurobiology have also used data from more than one inveretebrate (for ex-
ample, see Smith et al. 2008 and Cope et al. 2016).
Due to a vast number of researchers publishing neurobiological data from
many different arthropods, conflicting or otherwise confusing terminology has
arisen as an unfortunate consequence. As such, different names have been
given to equivalent brain regions across species. For example, the fan-shaped
body and ellipsoid body are also referred to as the central body upper division
and central body lower division, respectively. Recently, a group of researchers
known collectively as the ‘Insect Brain Name Working Group’ have attempted
to define a standard that can be applied across insect species (Ito et al. 2014),
This nomenclature will no doubt help to ensure that future studies use the
same terminology.
2.3.1 The Honeybee Olfactory System
In the honeybee, there are around 60,000 olfactory receptor neurons (ORNs)
which provide the olfactory system with information about a presented odour’s
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identity. The ORNs then innervate the antennal lobes (AL), sites of olfactory
processing (Galizia 2014), via four different tracts, which are named T1 - T4
(Abel et al. 2001, Kirschner et al. 2006, Nawrot 2012). The antennal lobes are
structures composed of around 160 glomeruli. Each glomerulus collates odour
information from ORNs which express the same olfactory receptors. Within
the glomeruli, local interneurons (LNs) project to multiple other glomeruli but
are constrained within the antennal lobes. Also within the antennal lobes are
dendrites of projection neurons (PNs). Both excitatory and inhibitory PNs
(ePNs and iPNs, respectively) output processed neural signals to higher order
brain centres such as the lateral protocerebrum (LP) (Galizia 2014). The LP is
an understudied site of convergence for processed olfactory input; it is thought
to be pre-motor in nature and is indicated to play a major role in action
selection (Galizia 2014, Barron et al. 2015). Projection neurons innervate
these higher order brain regions via five different antennal lobe tracts, which
are named the median (m-ALT), the lateral (l-ALT) and the medio-lateral
(ml-ALTs) tracts (of which there are three) (Abel et al. 2001, Kirschner et al.
2006). A schematic diagram of the honeybee brain is given in in Fig 2.3, where
the m-ALT, l-ALT and ml-ALT1 tracts are shown.
Some of the projection neurons receive olfactory signals from one glom-
erulus and are thus referred to as uniglomerular. There are estimated to be
around 900 of these neurons, from both the m-ALT and l-ALT (Zwaka et al.
2016). Other projection neurons collate neural signals from several glomeruli
and are thus referred to as being multiglomerular. These multiglomerular PNs
have been shown to be mostly GABAergic (thus, inhibitory). These inhibitory
projection neurons, the iPNs, project from the antennal lobes directly to the
lateral horn (LH - a sub-region of the lateral protocerebrum indicated to play
a role in innate decision-making (Heimbeck et al. 2001, Gupta and Stopfer
2012) via the three ml-ALTs, bypassing the mushroom bodies entirely. The
uniglomerular, excitatory projection neurons (ePNs) innervate the mushroom
bodies as well as the lateral horn via the m-ALT and l-ALT tracts. The former
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Figure 2.3: Schematic of the honeybee brain from the frontal position. Shown
in colour are three antennal lobe (AL) tracts: ml-ALT1 (where projection neurons
innervate the lateral horn (LH) from the antennal lobes), m-ALT (where projection
neurons innervate the mushroom bodies and then the lateral horn) and l-ALT (where
projection neurons innervate the lateral horn and then the mushroom bodies). Local
interneurons within the antennal lobes are not shown. Antennal lobe tracts ml-ALT2
and ml-ALT3 are also not shown. It should be noted that the projections shown here
are bilaterally symmetrical. Figure adapted from (Perry and Barron 2013b).
tract innervates the MB first before heading to the LH; the latter does the re-
verse and innervates the LH before the MB. Recently, some of the differences
between the m-ALT and l-ALT neurons have been observed. For example,
they differ in volume as well as in neural length (Zwaka et al. 2016). It should
also be noted that the l-ACT and m-ACT neurons differ in latencies, with
l-ACT neurons being quicker to respond to stimuli but also being ‘unspecific’
(Mu¨ller et al. 2002). As the l-ACT neurons project to the LH first, it might
be that these neurons are for innate responses or attention. Additionally, l-
ACT neurons have been shown to habituate faster. The slower responding
m-ACT neurons project to the mushroom body calyces (cup shaped struc-
tures that have been identified as input regions to the mushroom bodies, with
inner regions termed as the basal ring, the collar and the lip (Mobbs 1982))
first, perhaps encoding odours specifically for identification (Mu¨ller et al. 2002,
Galizia 2014). It has been suggested that the l-ACT neurons may be involved
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with learning (Mu¨ller et al. 2002).
Within the invertebrate literature, the paired neuropils known as the mush-
room bodies were first brought to light in 1850 (Dujardin 1850). Since their
discovery, they have been the primary point of focus in many experiments
on learning, memory and cognitive abilities in insects (for a recent review,
see Menzel 2014). The discovery that honeybees do not simply exhibit pre-
programmed behaviour led to a rise of experiments focusing specifically on
learning and memory, which arose in the 1970’s and 1980’s (for example, Men-
zel and Erber 1978, Erber 1981, see also Menzel and Muller 1996 and Giurfa
2007 for more heavily detailed reviews); this coupled with the result that the
cooling of the mushroom bodies impaired memory has led to research mostly
focused on these regions (see Heisenberg 1998). The mushroom bodies have
been suggested to be involved with decision-making (Mizunami et al. 1998b,
Gru¨newald 1999, McGuire et al. 2001, Schro¨ter and Menzel 2003, Akalal et al.
2006). Indeed, they have been found to integrate multiple forms of sensory
information (Menzel and Muller 1996). That they are sites which take input
from more than one sensory domain adds strength to the hypothesis that they
play an important role in decision-making.
It was found in the early 1980s that cooling the lateral protocerebrum had
no effect on memory (Menzel 1983) and as such this neuropil (and the ml-ALT)
has been heavily overlooked, despite the fact that it exists as a pre-motor area
(i.e., Gupta and Stopfer 2012, Galizia 2014) and seems therefore to be crucial
in decision-making processes too (Barron et al. 2015). It is within the lateral
protocerebrum that evidence accumulating pathways are hypothesised to con-
verge (Barron et al. 2015), and the activity of this region is thus suggested to
determine motor output. The convergence of evidence pathways is of particu-
lar interest as it may be comparable to the action selection circuit of the basal
ganglia.
As mentioned before, recently proposed by Strausfeld and Hirth (Strausfeld
and Hirth 2013) was the idea that the vertebrate basal ganglia and invertebrate
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central complex (another region thought to be important to action selection,
see Plath and Barron 2015) are homologous, based on comparisons of gene
expression and anatomical similarities, for example. Although a controversial
suggestion, these similarities are nonetheless worthy of investigation.
We have seen that an animal’s performance in a choice task is dependent
upon how sensory information processed by the brain. There are many factors
which affect this, one such example being task difficulty. However, it is also
the case that behaviour can be influenced by internal state, indeed, without
this perhaps we would not see behaviour at all: ‘The field of motivation is
concerned with what animates living organisms, that is, what makes them go’
(Wright 2016, p. 16). What the term ‘motivation’ precisely describes is still
being debated upon. In humans, three categories of motivation have been pro-
posed, one of which is the motivation to survive (Reeve 2016). Evidently, this
category of motivation does not just apply to humans. Within this category
is hunger, which undoubtedly also plays an important role in laboratory ex-
periments where subjects are responding to food rewards (for example, in the
PER paradigm). As such, we next explore how an animal’s level of satiation
can influence its behaviour.
2.4 The Impact of Satiation
Studies in animal decision-making have shown that choice behaviours are ro-
bust and can be influenced by the internal state of the animal. Hunger is
perhaps the most well studied of all the possible motivational influences as
it is somewhat simpler to control. Indeed, an animal’s level of satiation has
been shown to mediate certain behaviours, especially those associated with
feeding. The influence of hunger is crucial to study, as animals being observed
within choice tasks are often responding to food rewards, as such, differences
in their motivational levels could cause differences in their behaviours. For
humans, hunger has been termed as one of multiple ‘visceral factors’ which
have the ability to influence and impair rational decision-making (Loewenstein
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1996), which suggests that starvation or extreme hunger can heavily impact
an individual’s decision-making process.
The impact of satiation level can be well studied for a variety of anim-
als. Indeed, starvation has been shown to produce behavioural switching and
induce searching behaviours in insects (Bell 1990). The sea slug, Hermis-
senda, was shown to consume food faster when starved (Avila et al. 1998). In
threespine sticklebacks, extreme hunger caused fish to invest in more ‘risky’
behaviours, showing an increased tendency to perform inspections on possible
predators (Godin and Crossman 1994). As with the sea slug, threespine stickle-
backs were also found to feed at an increased rate. In crucian carp, hungry
fish were more likely to sacrifice safety than satiated fish, again demonstrat-
ing more ‘risky’ behaviours (Pettersson and Bro¨nmark 1993). Rather than
opting for safety, the fish showed a preference for open, unsafe habitats which
offered a feeding area. Moreover, the carps’ foraging behaviour was shown
to impact predator-avoidance, demonstrating that several internal states may
be interacting during the time a decision is made. Indeed, starvation has
also been shown to alter mating behaviours. In Microvelia austrina, a semi-
aquatic insect, starving males were shown to mate for shorter periods of time
than satiated males (Travers and Sih 1991). In Mesocyclops edax, a genus
of crustaceans, starving organisms were shown to alter their prey preference
(Williamson 1980). It was shown that satiated organisms initially avoided
Bosmina, a type of water flea. However, after several days of starvation,
Mesocyclops edax began to demonstrate a preference for Bosmina instead. In
the crayfish Orconectes virilis, starved animals demonstrated an increase in
activity (Hazlett et al. 1975). Furthermore, animals that had been starved for
one week tended to be more aggressive. After being starved for two weeks,
both the physical activity and the aggressiveness of the starved animals de-
creased, most likely because the animal has undergone extreme starvation and
has either reached a critical point wherein it is no longer able to function
or is dying. Recent studies into the unicellular slime mould, Physarum poly-
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cephalum, show that even this brainless organism exhibits behaviours that are
mediated by internal state (Latty and Beekman 2011). Again, as with the
sea slug and threespine sticklebacks, starving slime moulds displayed more
‘risky’ behaviours and ventured into well lit (aversive) environments in order
to reach a more plentiful food source, whilst non-starving organisms preferred
to remain in darker environments despite less food being available.
Taken together, all these studies demonstrate how internal state, in this
case more specifically the level of satiation, can alter animal behaviours. This
research also suggests that the driving force of hunger can even interact with
other internal states, demonstrating that multiple internal states can have an
impact on behaviour. Indeed, it is clear that an animal’s hunger will have a
profound impact on its decision-making, especially if the animal is responding
to a food reward.
With honeybees, it has already been shown that sucrose responsiveness has
an impact on learning performance. Individuals which show a high sucrose re-
sponsiveness demonstrate a higher level of acquisition than individuals with
a low responsiveness (Scheiner et al. 2004) and it has been shown that food
intake can mediate sucrose responsiveness (Pankiw et al. 2001). It can be in-
ferred from this result that food intake can impact learning and decision- mak-
ing as a whole. Furthermore, food intake has been shown to impact memory
formation. Using the Proboscis Extension Reflex paradigm, Friedrich and
colleagues showed that learning performances were highly dependent on when
individuals were fed (Friedrich et al. 2004). Their study linked the cAMP-PKA
cascade with satiation and demonstrated that memory formation is depend-
ent on satiation level; it was found that feeding individuals four hours prior to
conditioning would impair memory formation. These studies heavily suggest
that there is a link between satiation, learning and memory, which in turn
suggests that the mushroom bodies may play a crucial role. Additionally,
the latter study measured the basal PKA activity from the central brain, as
such this higher order centre may also play a role in conveying satiety sig-
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nals: ‘Only satiation status, not sucrose responsiveness, affects the basal PKA
activity in the brain tissue’ (Friedrich et al. 2004, p. 4464). Notably, a single
interneuron ‘VUMmx1’ has been shown to respond heavily to sucrose and
learnt CS presentations in another study which used the PER paradigm; this
neuron innervates the lateral protocerebrum as well as the lips and basal rings
of the mushroom bodies (and the glomeruli of the antennal lobes) (Hammer
1993b).
We have now covered how decision-making and action selection can be in-
fluenced and how this can be observed at the behavioural level (for example,
animals are riskier when hungry and are less accurate in more difficult dis-
crimination tasks). Another topic of interest is how the brain processes stimuli
during decision-making and how this processing can be influenced by neural
mechanisms. As such we now proceed to investigate an inhibitory mechanism
which is employed by the brains of both vertebrates and invertebrates, which
has been hypothesised to aid in decision-making tasks.
2.5 Lateral Inhibition
Research into the existence of lateral inhibition in arthropods can be traced
back to studies on horseshoe crab visual processing in the 1950’s. One study
demonstrated that optic nerve fibres within the eye could be inhibited by the
activity of neighbouring fibres: ‘...the frequency of the discharge of impulses in
a single optic nerve fiber is decreased and may even be stopped by illuminating
areas of the eye in the neighbourhood of the sensory element from which the
fiber arises’ (Hartline et al. 1956, p. 651). Lateral inhibition has also been
shown to exist in the fly (Zettler and Ja¨rvilehto 1972, Kirschfeld and Lutz
1974, Strausfeld and Campos-Ortega 1977) and cat, through an experiment
which examined orientation detectors (Blakemore and Tobin 1972). By the
1970’s, lateral inhibition in the visual system was referred to as a ‘common
phenomenon’ (Kirschfeld and Lutz 1974).
These experiments all conclude that lateral inhibition exists within the
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visual system. Research has also been performed on other systems within the
brain, and some studies have found that a similar mechanism exists for the
olfactory system. Indeed, lateral inhibition has been shown to exist within
the olfactory bulb as well as the antennal lobe (Urban 2002, Mori et al. 1999).
Importantly, some of these studies suggested that lateral inhibition was not
static and could be modified by the inputs presented. For example, a study
using Drosophila found that the strength of lateral inhibition between glom-
eruli scales with ORN strength, such that it is reduced in the case of weak
ORN input (Olsen and Wilson 2008).
A study by Wilson and Laurent suggests that temporal patterns in neur-
ons are dependent on what odour has been presented (Wilson and Laurent
2005). The study focused on Drosophila and demonstrated that GABAergic
inhibition increases the differences between neural representations of odours,
essentially acting as a decorrelator. Importantly, the authors note that two
different odours can induce very similar activation levels in a projection neuron
initially, but that this similarity decreases later on with GABAB-mediated in-
hibition. It was suggested that inhibition arises due to the activation of other
glomeruli. The study also shows that temporal patterns are not present in
ORN responses to odours, thus it has been hypothesised that they arise due
to antennal lobe processing.
The temporal differences in neural responses prompted another study to
examine how this might be happening within the brain. The research conduc-
ted by Linster and colleagues (Linster et al. 2005) built on older studies both
in mammalian olfactory bulb and insect antennal lobe, where, as mentioned
before, it has been shown that inhibitory networks are important for olfact-
ory processing. The authors raised the point that the exact mapping of these
inhibitory networks had not been clearly defined or organised. Their work
suggests that it is the response profiles of the glomeruli that determine the
lateral connectivity between these neural structures. Indeed, their computa-
tional model of the honeybee antennal lobes points to lateral inhibition being
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mediated by the response profiles of the glomeruli; their network wherein lat-
eral inhibition is proportional to the similarity of the response profiles was able
to reproduce experimentally derived results (namely the output of PNs). The
study reiterates the point that odour representations in the brain are both spa-
tially and temporally defined since representations are more dissimilar when
leaving the antennal lobes than when entering them as ORN input. Here, it
is proposed that the antennal lobes are not merely suppressing a lesser activ-
ated glomerulus and that lateral inhibition is not based on spatial location or
proximity, rather, it is a function of glomerulus response profiles.
The publication by Linster and colleagues was cited in a recent review
by Galizia, in which the processing of the antennal lobes is discussed heavily
(Galizia 2014). Here, the results of the study are reinforced and it is again sug-
gested that lateral inhibition within the antennal lobes is not uniform. Galizia
also cited a study by Chou and colleagues which focused on Drosophila and
showed that glomeruli with narrower tuning properties are less innervated by
other glomeruli LNs. The fact that some glomeruli have narrower tuning also
suggests that they have less overlap with the response profiles of other glom-
eruli, which in turn may highlight a decrease in lateral inhibition necessary
for the discrimination of odours (and hence less innervation).
In 2007, Schmuker and Schneider inferred that ‘insect and vertebrate ol-
factory systems can be subdivided into three stages of functional organization’
(Schmuker and Schneider 2007, p. 20285). They argue that the initial stage
is where stimulus attributes are encoded by neurons into neural signals, the
second is where the stimulus representations are decorrelated, and in the third
stage the signals are associated with specific qualities. They then asked if such
a system could be generalised. In their publication, they were able to design
a computational model that could process chemical information using only
these three computational principles. They too support the hypothesis that
the decorrelation of neural signals in the second stage assists in stimulus classi-
fication. In their model, they implemented correlation-based lateral inhibition
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and agreed that processed output should be more dissimilar as a result.
A study in Drosophila in 2008 also suggested that neural responses to odour
stimuli have both spatial and temporal properties, however, they did not find
evidence for ‘response-sharpening’, which may be attributed to experimental
limitations (the odours they used activating fewer glomeruli, for example) or a
difference in the olfactory processing systems of bees and fruit flies (Silbering
et al. 2008).
It is important to mention that behavioural evidence of lateral inhibition
has even been found in honeybee collective decision-making. It was shown that
lateral inhibition - implemented via headbutts which are referred to as stop
signals - functioned as a deadlock breaker which allowed the swarm to make a
choice as a whole (Seeley et al. 2012). A computational model of value sensitive
decision-making reinforced the results from this study, whereby the strength
of lateral inhibition was the deciding factor in whether or not a decision was
made (Pais et al. 2013). The model was also sensitive to the relative value of
the alternatives; if the options were equally poor then the model would wait
in case superior alternatives were presented later, whilst if the options were
equally good, one would be chosen at random. Taken together, we can see that
lateral inhibition exists as an important mechanism not only in the brain, but
also in collective decision-making behaviours.
2.6 Summary
In this literature review, the fundamentals of various different topics have been
covered. Though quite broad, all these topics have contributed to this work. In
particular, the impressive abilities of honeybees have been highlighted, along
with their efficient neural circuitry. Additionally, the motivation for modelling
the decision process as an accumulation of evidence as has been presented, and
a range of classical decision-making models described. The impact of satiation
on choice behaviour was covered briefly, emphasising that decision-making
processes are highly influential. Finally, the importance of lateral inhibition
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was introduced. This inhibitory mechanism is explored in the next chapter,
which presents an abstract model of action selection where a modelled animal
needs to choose between two alternatives whilst foraging. The mechanism
of lateral inhibition is adapted from one classical decision-making model in
particular, the leaky competing accumulator model, and is applied to this
model of foraging to demonstrate how this mechanism is beneficial to choice
behaviour.
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The Role of Inhibition in
Decision-Making
During its lifetime an animal will need to make important decisions, some of
which will be critical for its survival. Taking the honeybee as an example, this
animal must decide not only where to forage but also which flowers it should
target. There will be various factors that will influence these decisions, such
as context (for example, the time of day), environmental or social information
(for example, choosing to forage in a location that has been communicated
by a hive mate), and internal motivational state. If a honeybee, or indeed
any animal, is presented with two alternatives, how do the motivations of the
animal contribute to its choice? The question perhaps invokes the paradox of
Buridan’s ass, wherein a donkey finds itself exactly halfway between food and
water. The donkey is equally hungry as it is thirsty, and since its motivational
drives are equivalent it should choose the closer option. Stuck in an infinite
loop which can never be resolved, the animal remains undecided and eventually
dies.
The question of how foraging animals solve the problem of choosing between
alternatives remains to be fully answered. Previous research has indicated
that foraging behaviours can be modelled using the ‘geometric framework’
(Simpson and Raubenheimer 1993, Simpson et al. 2004), whereby an animal
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attempts to balance its nutritional intake. The animal moves through n-
dimensional nutritional space and acts so as to bring its current nutritional
state closer to that of a target state. This target has been defined as the
nutritional state that will ensure the highest reproductive success for the an-
imal (Houston et al. 2011) but it could also be defined as the state which
maximises growth rate and development (Helm et al. 2017), dependent on the
developmental state of the animal. The foraging problem thus becomes how
the animal decides to move through nutritional space in order to reach the
target, with performance determined by the distance from its current state to
that of the target. When the nutrients the animal is consuming do not interact
in any way, this can be found simply by taking the Euclidean distance.
Behavioural switching, defined here as moving from the consumption of
one type of nutrient to another, is a crucial aspect of this problem as it allows
an animal to reach the target state. Choosing between food and water, with
the assumption that both of these options offer only one nutrient, can thus
be imagined in two dimensional space, and the decisions of the animal should
move it closer to the target point. How might it choose to move through
this nutritional space? The motivation of the animal, here defined as ‘the
tendency to eat or drink’ (Marshall et al. 2015), will sway it one way or
another: an animal that is more hungry than thirsty will be expected to forage
for food as opposed to water. Upon finding nourishment the animal should
then feed until its corresponding motivation has been reduced sufficiently. As
the animal becomes satiated it will experience the motivation to drink; as
such the animal will, eventually, switch from feeding to instead seeking water.
As the animal consumes one type of nutrient, it reduces its deficit for that
nutrient. In previous work, a deficit has been defined as ‘the quantity of food
or water that the animal will ingest, under ad libitum conditions, until it is
satiated’ (Sibly 1975). Here, a food or water deficit is thus the shortage of the
respective nutrient from the target. Consuming one type of nutrient will move
the animal along a linear path through nutritional space, as such switching
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from one behaviour to another can be imagined as a series of linear foraging
bouts.
With this scenario in mind, it could be assumed that an animal will
simply act on its strongest motivation, however, there are costs associated
with decision-making that should first be considered. Depending on the en-
vironment, food and water resources may not be in nearby locations, thus
switching from one activity to another will incur costs in terms of using re-
sources to travel from one location to another. It becomes apparent that there
is a trade-off between an animal reducing its motivations and reducing the cost
of behavioural switching. Of course, in real world foraging situations there are
other costs to consider. In the case of the honeybee, a novel rewarding flower
may hide a predator; as such choosing to forage on it would increase the risk
of predation. Here, a model of animal choosing between two nutrients is im-
plemented to address the question of how the cost of behavioural switching
can be reduced.
A foraging animal choosing between two alternatives is comparable to a
two- alternative forced-choice task (2AFC), a paradigm originating from psy-
chophysics which was developed to analyse a subject’s choice and discrimina-
tion behaviours (Fechner 1966). The subject is presented with two alternatives
and is required to choose one of the two (as such, choosing neither is not an op-
tion). Usually implemented within a laboratory setting, this paradigm allows
for a thorough analysis of the subject’s reaction time, among other behavi-
oural traits, and can be easily manipulated such that the task is easier or
harder. Although a simplification of real world decision-making tasks, the
2AFC paradigm is useful as it is analytically simple and is still representative
of some of the decision problems that could be made by an animal. Perhaps
one of the main differences between real foraging situations and a 2AFC task
is the cost of switching between options. Due to time and energy investments,
a foraging animal will incur a cost if it chooses to switch from one alternative
to the other. However, in 2AFC tasks, the cost of switching will either be
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minimal or the animal will not be given such an option. In some 2AFC tasks,
once the animal has made a decision the task ends and another is presented, as
such switching is not possible. Nevertheless, the foraging task modelled here
can perhaps be described as an ecological 2AFC task with switching costs.
Due to the simplicity of the 2AFC paradigm, recent advances in computa-
tional neuroscience have provided insights into what types of neural circuitry
may give rise to certain behaviours in binary decision-making tasks. Indeed, a
variety of decision-making models, known as sequential sampling models, have
been described and analysed in great detail (Ratcliff and Smith 2004, Bogacz
et al. 2006) and are able to fit data obtained from behavioural experiments,
making the underlying theories behind them applicable to other models, such
as the foraging model discussed here. One of the main findings from these
models is that the coupling of evidence accumulation pathways is beneficial
for decision-making. The mechanism of lateral inhibition, or cross-inhibition,
whereby the competing accumulators inhibit one another mutually, has been
shown to be especially beneficial. Within the sequential sampling models, this
was a prominent feature of the leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model,
discussed in more detail below. This mechanism is here adapted and applied
to the motivations of the modelled animal, as such, the benefits of inhibitory
coupling is examined within a foraging context which can be comparable to a
2AFC with switching costs.
It is important to note that, for this particular model, lateral inhibition
is not being applied between neurons or neural units. Although comparisons
can be made between the LCA model and this model of foraging (they both
apply lateral inhibition as a form of coupling to benefit decision- making, for
example), they are not equivalent. Here, the benefits of lateral inhibition are
examined by analysis of how the animal reduces its deficits over time and
its ability to reduce the costs it incurs as it switches from one alternative to
another. Despite these differences, lateral inhibition as a form of coupling has
been well explored within the realm of sequential sampling models, as such a
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brief overview of the LCA is given here.
3.1 The Leaky Competing Accumulator
The leaky competing accumulator (LCA) is a biologically-inspired model of
decision-making (Usher and McClelland 2001). This model is notably different
from earlier decision-making models such as the race model (Vickers 1970) due
to the nature of the way that the accumulators interact. In the race model,
evidence accumulating pathways are independent, such that they never inter-
act, and are ‘racing’ towards a joint decision threshold; when one accumulator
reaches this threshold, a decision will be made. However, it has been shown
that this implementation is suboptimal (Bogacz et al. 2006). The race model
is outperformed by other models which make use of coupled pathways, and
these models may furthermore be more neurally plausible. Indeed, the race
model is unable to approximate the well-known drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff
1978), another sequential sampling model which has been shown to be optimal
(optimality here is achieved by obtaining the highest accuracy for a given re-
action time, or the fastest reaction time for a given accuracy). Under certain
parametric conditions, however, the LCA can approximate the drift-diffusion
model and so exhibit optimality (Bogacz et al. 2006).
The LCA model couples the evidence accumulation pathways through a
mechanism known as ‘mutual inhibition’ or ‘cross inhibition’. Here, accumu-
lators are connected so that they inhibit each other, which introduces com-
petition into the network. After the model is allowed some time to integrate
sensory evidence, the end result is that one accumulator will have a very high
firing rate whilst the other will not, which is beneficial to a decision-maker
(note that the higher its activity, the more it suppresses the alternative accu-
mulator). This mechanism has been shown to aid decision-making previously
(Bogacz et al. 2006, Marshall et al. 2009) and, remarkably, it has also been
documented in insect collective decision-making (Seeley et al. 2012, Pais et al.
2013, Reina et al. 2015). The LCA model furthermore incorporates a leak or
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decay to the accumulated evidence; as such the removal of sensory evidence
will cause a drop in accumulator activity and the firing rate will return to the
baseline. Recently, cross-inhibition has been shown to aid decision-making in
a model of animal foraging (Marshall et al. 2015), the methodology and results
of which will be presented in this chapter.
Formally, the dynamics of the LCA model are described by two coupled
differential equations:
dy1 = (I1 − ky1 − wy2)dt+ c1dW1
dy2 = (I2 − ky2 − wy1)dt+ c2dW2 (3.1)
where yi denotes the activity levels of the accumulators, Ii denotes the mean
activity of the sensory neurons, k denotes the strength of the neural leak,
w denotes the strength of the mutual inhibition and dWi denotes Gaussian-
distributed noise with zero mean and root-mean-square strength ci (Bogacz
et al. 2006).
For a two-alternative forced-choice task, the LCA is a two-dimensional
model with two accumulators, each integrating evidence in support of one
alternative or the other. The model can also be extended for multiple al-
ternatives (Usher and McClelland 2004, McMillen and Holmes 2006) however,
this is not discussed here. This model can be applied to decision tasks within
both the free-response and interrogation paradigms (Bogacz et al. 2006). In
the former, the accumulators continuously integrate evidence until one crosses
a decision threshold. The first accumulator to reach this threshold is the
accumulator that determines the final decision. In the latter paradigm the
accumulators are allowed to integrate evidence for a certain amount of time,
which is decided by the experimenter. At decision time, the trial ends and
the accumulator with the highest integrated evidence determines the decision.
Both of these experimental paradigms were made use of in a recent experi-
ment using a biomimetic robot (Lepora et al. 2012). For the task, the robot
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was required to identify the shape and location of a presented object using a
biologically inspired sensing system: artificial ‘whiskers’ which imitate those
of rodents. Within the free-response paradigm, the robot was able to make a
decision in its own time, once it had accumulated enough evidence. Within
the interrogation paradigm, the robot was expected to make a decision after a
pre-set number of whisks. The study found that the robot was able to obtain
similar decision accuracies in both of these paradigms.
3.2 Materials and Methods
The LCA mechanism of lateral inhibition is here applied to a previous model
of behavioural switching (Houston and Sumida 1985) in which an agent is
deciding between seeking water or seeking food. This model attempted to
solve the problem whereby an animal services one motivation (for example,
thirst) such that its ‘drive’ is reduced to a value just below that of the al-
ternative drive. This would result in the animal switching to the alternative
activity and then servicing the alternative motivation for a short time before
switching again (since the two competing motivations will be unequal but in
close proximity to each other). This behaviour was referred to as ‘dithering’
or ‘chattering’ and is an example of costly behavioural switching (Houston
and Sumida 1985). The model implements the notion of positive feedback,
such that performing an activity would not only reduce its associated drive
but also increase its motivation. The rise occurs quickly after the agent has
switched to a new activity and is mediated by an upper bound. This way,
a drive is pushed to its maximum when the animal switches and is not close
to the value of the other. This solution prevents the problem of dithering,
and also the problem whereby the drives are equivalent and the model cannot
choose between them, akin to the paradox of Buridan’s ass.
Since the mechanism of lateral inhibition, as described with the LCA
model, has been shown to improve decision-making, it is here applied such
that the two motivations of the animal are coupled. Unlike the LCA model,
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the model here is deterministic (as such noise has been removed). These mo-
tivations are formally described by a pair of partial differential equations, as
with the original LCA model:
dv1 := (c1dx1 + c2x1 + c3v1 + c4v2)dt
dv2 := (c1dx2 + c2x2 + c3v2 + c4v1)dt (3.2)
where vi denotes the level of the i-th motivation (for example, seeking food),
xi is the level of the i-th deficit and dvi and dxi denote their rates of change.
Additionally, c1 denotes the influence of dxi on dvi, c3 denotes the strength
of motivational decay and c4 denotes the strength of cross-inhibition. To see
the equivalence between this model and the LCA, note that the first two
terms of the equation denote the sensory information (Ii), the third denotes
the leak of the accumulators (k) and the fourth denotes the strength of in-
hibition (w). Here, cross-inhibition is introduced by setting c4 < 0; setting
c4 > 0 thus removes it. It should be noted that this model, unlike the LCA
model, is deterministic (without noise). Under certain parametric conditions
(c2 > 0, c3 = −c2, c4 = 0) the model is equivalent to the original model of Hou-
ston and Sumida (Marshall et al. 2015). Thus it is intuitive that using these
parameters and setting c4 < 0 is equivalent to introducing cross-inhibition into
the original model.
In each simulation, the agent initially begins equidistant from two loca-
tions which offer either food or water. The agent then moves to the location
corresponding to its strongest motivation. An agent motivated by hunger will
thus move towards the location where food is present. There, it reduces its
corresponding deficit (feeds) until the strongest motivation changes. Whilst
the agent is performing action i, the corresponding deficit (xi) decreases at the
rate of dxi = −(g − h)dt, where g is the rate of reduction of the deficit and h
is the rate of increase of the deficit. When the agent is not performing action
i, the deficit xi increases at the rate of dxi = h. As in the original model, the
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dynamics of increasing deficits are ignored and it is assumed that h = 0 (Hous-
ton and Sumida 1985). Once the agent is more strongly motivated by another
deficit, it ceases its current activity and moves from its current location to the
other. Whilst moving, it cannot reduce either of its deficits. This behavioural
pattern continues until the agent has fully reduced its deficits. It is assumed
that the animal will be interrupted during foraging, and the probability of this
interruption per-unit-time is set to λ. After interruption, the agent is scored
on its performance according to a penalty function, which is defined as the
following:
p := x21 + x
2
2 (3.3)
A lower penalty thus determines a higher performance score for the agent.
From the model simulations, parameters were identified which generated the
optimal performance of the agent, for various switching costs and interrup-
tion probabilities. Additionally, c1 was systematically varied with the cost of
switching between two alternatives, τ . In order to maintain equivalence with
the original model of Houston and Sumida, only c1, c3 and c4 were varied,
leaving c2 = −c3 and with the constraint that c3 < 0. Performance variations
due to λ and τ were deemed to construe a sensitivity analysis.
3.3 Results
It should be noted that these results are presented in Marshall et al., (2015)
and that they are the work of the other co-authors of this publication. The
analysis of the foraging bouts of the animal (presented in Fig 3.6) is original
work and was used as supplementary material for the publication. Addition-
ally, the non-linear extension of this model and the results that are presented
in Section 3.4 are also original work and feature an adapted version of the
model.
Simulations of the model were carried out whereby the cost of switching
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and the rate of interruption parameters were varied. For each of these different
set-ups, parameters c3 and c4 were varied systematically. At the end of each
simulation, the penalty score was determined along with the foraging bout
durations. Furthermore, the model dynamics were analysed in order to show
how the deficits and motivations of the animal changed as time progressed.
Taken together, these results ascertained which parametric set-ups gave the
optimal performances. The penalty scores shall first be discussed. A low
penalty is derived when the modelled animal is able to reduce frequent, costly
behavioural switching, thus moving its nutritional state to that of the target
without incurring costs. An example 2D plot of the penalty scores is given in
Fig 3.1.
Figure 3.1: A 2D slice which shows the penalty scores obtained for the given values
of λ (interruption probability), τ (switching cost) and c1 (influence of dx1 on dvi).
Parameter c2 was set to −c3, and parameters c3 and c4 are both varied systematically.
Darker blues denote the lower penalty scores and thus a better performance from the
animal. From Marshall et al. 2015.
The best penalty scores are obtained when the animal is modelled with
cross- inhibition (i.e., where c4 < 0) and also when |c4| > |c3|, as shown by
the dark blue areas of the graph. Setting c4 > 0 results in an increase in the
penalty score. This was the case for all the examined variations of interruption
rate and switching cost, demonstrating that the relationship between the ci
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parameters is conserved across parametric space. A more complete sensitivity
analysis for the model is shown in Fig 3.2, where penalty scores are shown for
different values of λ and τ , as well as c1.
Figure 3.2: The full sensitivity analysis which shows the derived penalty scores for
varying switching costs and interruption rates. As in the previous figure, darker blue
areas denote lower penalties and thus better performance. From Marshall et al. 2015.
The full sensitivity analysis makes it clear that cross-inhibition generates
the lowest penalties for the entire parameter space, again shown by the dark
blue areas. As before, the dependence on c3 is highlighted; when |c4| > |c3|
the decision penalties are greatly reduced. Furthermore, the result is held
for changing values of c1, λ and τ , demonstrating the importance of cross-
inhibition and rate of decay on the model performance. The reason why these
two parameters impact the penalty scores can be determined by analysis of the
modelled animal’s motivations and deficits over time. The results of the model
show that the foraging behaviour changes when cross-inhibition is introduced.
This is shown in Fig 3.3. Time in these plots begins at the top- right (as
such, when t = 0 the motivations are at their highest) and increases along the
x-axis. The original publication also makes use of these plots (Houston and
Sumida 1985).
In the top-left plot of Fig 3.3, the motivational state of the animal without
cross-inhibition fluctuates regularly across the behavioural switching line (dashed
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Figure 3.3: The animal’s motivations and deficits in two different parametric situ-
ations. The top row depicts the motivations, vi, and the bottom row the deficits,
xi, of a modelled animal with cross-inhibition (right) and without (left). Without
cross-inhibition, the animal frequently switches between the two activities. The
introduction of inhibitory coupling induces irregular foraging bouts and a reduc-
tion in behavioural switching. Time begins at the top-right of plots where motiv-
ations and deficits are highest, and ends at the bottom-left, as in (Houston and
Sumida 1985). Parameters: c1 = −1, c3 = −1. Left (without cross-inhibition):
c4 = 0. Right (with cross-inhibition): c4 = −1. Initial deficits and motivations:
x1(0) = v1(0) = 10, x2(0) = v2(0) = 10.1. From Marshall et al. 2015.
line in the figure, where v1 = v2), which corresponds to the animal frequently
switching back and forth between the two activities. In the top-right plot,
the motivations are far more irregular and they allow for the animal to spend
more time attending to a single nutrient. This is also shown in the bottom
plots which depict the deficits. The introduction of cross- inhibition results in
irregular foraging bouts so that the animal spends less time switching. This
behaviour in turn produces a lower penalty score. The dynamics of the mo-
tivations and deficits can be examined in more detail with regard to the decay
parameter c3. This is shown in Fig 3.4.
It is obvious that the relationship between c3 and c4 produces differences in
the animal’s motivations and consequent deficit reduction. As demonstrated
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Figure 3.4: The animal’s motivations and deficits for different combinations of c3
(strength of decay) and c4 (strength of cross-inhibition). Deficits are given on the
left, motivations on the right. When |c3| > |c4|, the animal switches between the
two activities frequently. If |c3| ≤ |c4|, the animal instead exhibits irregular foraging
bouts and a reduction in frequent switching. Top row: c3 = −5, c4 = −5, middle row:
c3 = −10, c4 = −2, bottom row: c3 = −5, c4 = −20. All plots: c1 = −5.
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Figure 3.5: Plot to show how the dynamics of the modelled motivations change ac-
cording to variations in the c3 (strength of decay) and c4 (strength of cross-inhibition)
parameters. When |c3| < |c4|, the motivations of the animal end up in a state where
one is suppressed whilst the other is not, which is beneficial to decision-making.
Stable points in motivational states are denoted by black filled (semi) circles, un-
stable points are shown by open circles. Parameters: c1 = 0, c3 = −2. Left: c4 = −3.
Right: c4 = −1.
in the previous figure, when |c3| > |c4| the performance of the animal is im-
paired due to frequent switching, shown in the middle row. Setting |c3| ≤ |c4|
drastically improves performance, especially when |c3| < |c4|. An explanation
as to why the motivations of the animal change in such a way can be attrib-
uted to the model dynamics. To give further insight into these dynamics, we
show them graphically in Fig 3.5.
The dynamics of the model are very different according to the relationship
between c3 and c4. When |c3| < |c4|, the motivational states converge onto
one of two stable points wherein one motivation is high whilst the other is
suppressed. The motivations are accelerated to this state due to the single
unstable point between them. However, when |c3| > |c4|, the motivations
instead converge onto a single stable point where the they are very similar to
each other (right plot in Fig 3.5). This in turn causes the animal to switch
frequently.
In addition to the penalty scores, the animal’s foraging bout durations
were analysed over the running time of each simulation, in order to ascertain
whether or not the derived behavioural data were plausible. In previous studies
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Figure 3.6: The full results for the foraging bouts analysis for systematically varied
values of c1, c3 and c4. The matrices show the proportion of bouts that are being
consistently decreased over the simulation time, as such, the best performance is 100%,
shown in darker red. If this result is obtained, the agent has successfully decreased the
length of each foraging bout following the previous one, spending less time consuming
nutrient i as deficit xi decreases. The results are given for each deficit individually, on
the left is the result for the x2 deficit, on the right, the x1 deficit. The results indicate
that the best performances are derived when cross-inhibition is present within the
model (c4 < 0). The consistency of foraging bout reduction is also dependent on the
c3 parameter (strength of decay), as with previous results.
examining animal ‘vilgilance’, defined as alertness to stimuli (Dukas and Clark
1995), it has been found that such alertness cannot be sustained over long
periods of time. In a model of foraging which incorporates vigilance as a
parameter, it was found that vigilance should decrease over time as the animal
forages and that the length of the animal’s foraging bouts should decrease
accordingly (Dukas and Clark 1995). As such, the modelled animal here should
be reducing its bout durations as time progresses and its deficits are reduced.
Hence, a more successful parameter setup will result in the agent being able to
consistently reduce its bout durations over the entire period of the simulation.
Fig. 3.6 shows the full results matrices whereby c1, c3 and c4 are being varied.
It is apparent that the agent is able to fully decrease its bout lengths in
some simulations for the x1 deficit, however, it is unable to fully decrease
its bout lengths for the other deficit. Despite this difference in performance,
a similar pattern can be noted in both matrices. When cross-inhibition is
introduced (where c4 < 0), the proportion of bout length durations being
reduced increases. As the strength of inhibition grows, the agent is able to
fully reduce its bouts in a greater number of simulations. This indicates that
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cross-inhibition not only improves decision-making but also is necessary for
the agent to implement rational foraging behaviour.
3.4 The Non-linear Model
The model described thus far is a deterministic linear model, however, decision-
making is a non-linear process (Bogacz et al. 2007). As such, a non-linear
extension to the model was developed which builds upon the original model
by altering the formal dynamics, such that the interaction between the mo-
tivations is no longer linear. The extension was originally planned to be non-
deterministic, however, preliminary results suggested that the introduction of
noise was not beneficial for the model. As such, even though noise would make
the model more biologically plausible, it remains deterministic.
The non-linear model functions in precisely the same way as the linear
model, where the modelled animal must choose between two alternative nu-
trients and act so as to minimise the distance between its current nutritional
state and that of the target state. With the entirety of the model parameters
being held constant, the only change is in the formal definition of the model.
Like the linear model, it is defined by two coupled differential equations:
dv1 := c1dx1 + c2x1 + c3v1 + c4(v2 − (1/(v1)2))
dv2 := c1dx2 + c2x2 + c3v2 + c4(v1 − (1/(v2)2)) (3.4)
Here, there is an additional coupling present in the inhibitory pathways. A
single accumulator’s activity is still inhibited by the other accumulator, how-
ever, this inhibition itself is stunted by a small amount of the accumulator’s
own inhibition. This coupling is demonstrated diagrammatically in Fig. 3.7.
This introduces additional competition in the inhibitory pathways as well as
the decision pathways. Thus, the strength of cross -inhibition is modulated
or regulated by the agent’s own motivations. This change was hypothesised
to be beneficial to the model. In the original model, one motivation would
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be accelerated and would inhibit the other accordingly; as such a very mo-
tivated animal would perhaps supress the competing motivation too rapidly.
Mediation, however, would ensure that the inhibition is never too high.
Figure 3.7: Schematic of the non-linear extension of the original model. Here, lateral
inhibition between accumulating units is mediated by inhibition. Excitation denoted
by arrows, leak denoted by dashed arrows. Inhibitory connection to competing units
denoted by small blue circles, inhibition of lateral inhibition denoted by small red
circles.
3.5 Results
As described before with the linear model, simulations were carried out where
the model parameters were varied and the penalty scores determined. In
addition, we also analysed the model dynamics and foraging bout durations of
the animal to contrast with the results of the linear model. The full sensitivity
analysis for the penalty scores is given in Fig. 3.8, where λ, τ and c1 are varied
along with c3 and c4.
It is apparent that the penalty scores for the non-linear model are very sim-
ilar to those which were derived previously; the lowest penalties are obtained
from simulations where cross-inhibition is introduced (c4 < 0) and |c4| < |c3|.
This result is not surprising. However, when cross-inhibition becomes particu-
larly strong, there is a slight degradation in the performance of the agent and
higher penalties are derived, dependent on the value of λ. Despite this, the
‘wedge’ of best performance is consistent with the linear model and is retained
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Figure 3.8: Full sensitivity analysis for the non-linear model for varying switching
costs and interruption rates. As with the linear model, darker blue areas denote lower
penalties and thus a better performance.
throughout the various parametric set-ups. This suggests that the motivations
and deficits are changing in a manner very similar to that of the linear model.
Indeed, Fig. 3.9 indicates that the dynamics are very similar.
Here, the same result is obtained. With cross-inhibition, the motivations
of the agent are irregular and allow for the agent to spend a longer amount of
time reducing its deficits earlier on in the trial, with foraging bout durations
clearly decreasing in length as time progresses. Without cross-inhibition, the
agent again fluctuates across the switching line and so switches between the
two nutrients frequently. To build upon this result, a parameter analysis was
also carried out to show more clearly how the motivations and deficits changed
according to the c3 and c4 parameters. This is shown in Fig. 3.10.
As shown before, having |c3| > |c4| results in frequent behavioural switch-
ing. Instead, setting |c3| ≤ |c4| results in irregular motivational states. When
|c3| is particularly smaller than |c4|, the motivations are initially very high
before being reduced quite quickly. As this result is also similar to that of the
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Figure 3.9: The animal’s motivations and deficits for two different parametric situ-
ations. The top row depicts the motivations, vi, and the bottom row depicts the
deficits, xi, of the modelled animal with cross-inhibition (right) and without (left).
As with the linear model, the introduction of cross-inhibition reduces costly behavi-
oural switching. Again, time begins at the top-right where the deficits are at their
maximum level. The parameters used for this figure are the same as those for Fig. 3.3.
linear model, it is implied that the same holds for the model dynamics. These
are given in Fig 3.11.
The dynamics are equivalent to those that were found before. When |c3| <
|c4| the motivations are pushed to one of the two stable points, separated by
the unstable point. When |c3| > |c4| there is only one stable point where the
motivations converge, and at this point the two motivations are very similar
to each other.
Finally, the agent’s foraging bout durations were analysed. The full results
for this are shown in Fig. 3.12.
Here, the agent exhibits foraging behaviours that are similar to that of
the linear model. The agent is able to fully reduce its x2 bout durations in
some simulations but not its x1 deficit bouts. The pattern seen before can be
noted again; when c4 < 0 the proportion of bouts being consistently reduced
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Figure 3.10: The animal’s motivations and deficits for different combinations of
c3 (strength of decay) and c4 (cross- inhibition). Deficits are shown on the left,
motivations are shown on the right. As with the linear model, when |c3| > |c4| the
modelled animal frequently switches. Parameters used for these plots are the same
as those used in Fig. 3.4.
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Figure 3.11: As with the linear mode, the changes in the dynamics are dependent
on the c3 (strength of decay) and c4 (strength of inhibition) parameters. Again, when
|c3| < |c4|, the motivations of the animal end up in a state where one is suppressed
whilst the other isn’t. Stable points in motivational states are denoted by black filled
(semi) circles; unstable points by open circles. The parameters used are as in Fig 3.5.
Figure 3.12: The full results for foraging bouts analysis for the non-linear model. The
matrices show that proportion of bouts that are being consistently decreased over the
simulation time. Again, the best performance that may be obtained is 100%, denoted
by the red areas of the plots. The results are given for each deficit individually, on
the left is the result of the x2 deficit, on the right is the result for the x1 deficit. The
results show that the best performances are derived when cross-inhibition is present
within the model (c4 < 0). Parameters used are the same as those used in Fig. 3.6.
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increases, and as the strength of inhibition grows the number of simulations
where the agent is able to reduce 100% of its bouts also increases. When
c4 > 0, the agent is unable to consistently reduce its bouts over the course
of a simulation, indicated by the blue areas of the matrices. The relation-
ship between cross-inhibition and agent performance is perhaps highlighted
to a greater degree in the non-linear extension, as the agent is able to reduce
100% of its bouts in more simulations when c4 < 0. This indicates that the
introduction of secondary competition in the inhibitory pathways improves
the behavioural performance of the agent, allowing it to reduce its bouts to a
further extent (compare results from Fig. 3.6 with Fig. 3.12).
3.6 Discussion
The model presented in this chapter examines an animal’s decision-making
in a foraging task wherein the animal must choose to consume one nutri-
ent or the other. The model builds upon a previous model of behavioural
switching developed by Houston and Sumida (Houston and Sumida 1985) and
introduces cross-inhibition as proposed in the leaky competing accumulator
model of Usher and McClelland (Usher and McClelland 2001). The results
suggest that cross-inhibition improves decision-making, allowing the agent to
reduce costly behavioural switching and also reduce its bout length durations
over time. Interaction between motivations thus produces more optimal for-
aging behaviours. Although cross-inhibition has been shown to be beneficial to
decision-making models before, it was here shown for the first time in a model
of behavioural switching, originally proposed to minimise switching via the
positive feedback mechanism. The introduction of cross-inhibition improved
the original model by improving the modelled animal’s foraging efficiency and
reducing frequent switching (Marshall et al. 2015).
There are a few limitations to this model. Firstly, it makes the assumption
that each resource will only provide a single type of nutrient, however, in many
cases this assumption will not hold (Marshall et al. 2015). As an example,
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many food sources will also provide water as well. Secondly, the original
model made use of linear dynamics, however, decision-making is not a linear
process. As a possible solution to this limitation, a non-linear extension was
proposed whereby the interactions between the agent’s motivations are not
linear. This model made use of the inhibition of lateral inhibition and was
able to produce similar results to that of the linear model, with improvements
to the agent’s trajectories in nutrient space. However, there was also a slight
degradation in penalty scores for certain parametric set-ups.
We hypothesise that although the dynamics of the non-linear model were
shown to be almost equivalent to those of the linear model, they are such that
for particularly large values of |c4|, the agent returns to switching frequently,
although it begins the simulation by spending more time at one location before
switching to another. As such, the correctness of the behavioural data (where
the agent is reducing the duration of its foraging bouts as time progresses)
comes with the reintroduction of some costly switching, for certain paramet-
ers. Such a result indicates that the non-linear model needs some revision.
Alternatively, it could also indicate a trade-off.
Under certain parametric conditions, the interactions of the agent’s two
competing motivations gave rise to an increase in its penalty score. The dy-
namics of the interactions were analysed over the course of several simulations.
The analysis revealed that, at the beginning of these simulations, one motiva-
tion was very large whilst the other had been supressed and was much smaller.
Shortly after the initial stage, the motivations decreased to the point where
one was only just larger than the other. Finally, the motivations converged
to a point where they were almost equivalent and they remained in this state
until the end of the simulation, which resulted in the reintroduction of behavi-
oural switching. These dynamics are only present when |c4| becomes too high.
Nonetheless, both linear and non-linear models predict that an animal should
exhibit irregular foraging bouts in order to forage optimally.
Can a model of behavioural switching be applied to honeybees? Recently,
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the geometric framework has been used to examine honeybee worker nutrition
and gives some insight into how honeybees need to balance protein and carbo-
hydrate intake (Paoli et al. 2014). Furthermore, the framework has also been
applied to larval honeybee nutrition, and it has been demonstrated that the
ratio of protein and carbohydrate levels impact the growth rate and develop-
ment of honeybees in their larval state (Helm et al. 2017), indicating that there
is a nutritional balance that optimises larval growth and minimises mortality.
The framework has also been applied to adult worker bumblebees (Stabler
et al. 2015) and Drosophila larvae (Rodrigues et al. 2015). Furthermore, the
geometric framework may also be applied to collective decision-making in hon-
eybee colonies (Bose et al. 2017) as it has been in ant colonies (Dussutour and
Simpson 2009). Taken together, all these studies suggest that invertebrates are
working to optimise their nutritional intake and that switching from the con-
sumption from one nutrient to another is necessary. In which case, irregular
foraging bouts from honeybees is predicted.
To conclude, although this model of behavioural switching may be simpli-
fied, it can be applied to many foraging contexts and demonstrates the need
for irregular foraging bouts to optimise nutritional intake. Furthermore, the
model reiterates the need for coupling in decision-making pathways; a foraging
agent without cross-inhibition between its motivations was shown to be unable
to reduce costly behavioural switching. The geometric framework has proven
very valuable in predicting an animal’s decision-making behaviours in light
of its motivational state. Indeed, the level of satiation may have a profound
impact on an animal’s foraging strategies and its ability to choose between
two alternatives. This is explored experimentally in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Is Honeybee Decision-Making
Described by a
Drift-Diffusion Process?
Fast, robust decision-making in response to sensory input has typically been
studied using the two-alternative forced-choice task. Originating from psycho-
physics, this paradigm involves the presentation of two different stimuli to a
subject that must discriminate between them. The similarity of the stimuli is
experimentally controlled such that they are quite disparate or almost indis-
tinguishable, corresponding to an easy or hard task, respectively. A classical
example of such a task is that of the random-dot paradigm, where a monkey is
trained to observe a group of moving dots on a screen and indicate the overall
direction of their movement by an eye saccade (Shadlen and Newsome 1996,
Kim and Shadlen 1999, Shadlen and Newsome 2001, Roitman and Shadlen
2002, Huk and Shadlen 2005).
Shadlen and Newsome identified the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area of the
mammalian brain as a higher-level region which may play a role in the decision
process (Shadlen and Newsome 1996). They used the random-dot paradigm
to determine whether or not this was the case, recording from neurons in LIP
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Figure 4.1: The random-dot paradigm. Left: 0% coherence where all the dots move
in random directions. Middle: 50% coherence where half the dots move in the same
direction (filled black circles). Right: 100% coherence where all the dots move in the
same direction.
whilst a monkey made its decision. They found that the responses of the LIP
neurons could be used to predict what the monkey would decide, so much so
that ‘an experimenter could generally predict decisions “on the fly” during an
experiment simply by listening to the neuron’s activity on the audio monitor ’
(Shadlen and Newsome 1996, p. 630). They also found that the predictions
became increasingly reliable as time progressed; the neural responses were
indicative of a system that integrated sensory evidence over time in order to
make a decision. Furthermore, it was later found that the neural accumulation
process stopped when it reached a certain threshold (Roitman and Shadlen
2002, Huk and Shadlen 2005). These experimental findings are in agreement
with the evidence accumulation theory applied in sequential sampling models:
noisy sensory evidence is integrated over time (as such, a higher integration
time allows for a greater build-up of evidence and thus a higher degree of
accuracy from the animal) until a threshold level is met, at which point a
decision is made. These results suggest that for simple perceptual decisions,
mammals may be using a drift-diffusion process in order to make a choice.
Indeed, the drift-diffusion model (DDM) of decision-making (Ratcliff 1978;
1988, also see Chapter 2 for an overview) has been fitted successfully to ex-
perimental data (for example, see Ratcliff and Rouder 1998). Furthermore
it can explain the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT), a behavioural phenomenon
whereby faster decision makers are less accurate. Recently, the speed-accuracy
trade-off has been described as the benchmark of the decision process (Heitz
2014). Since it is so prevalent within so many species, and even within group
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decision- making (Franks et al. 2003, Passino and Seeley 2006, Marshall et al.
2009), it may be inferred that the drift-diffusion process - which is statistically
optimal - may capture general features of sensory evidence accumulation. If
this is the case, we would expect the phenomenon of the speed-accuracy trade-
off to be demonstrated in most decision-making systems, including those of
non-mammalian model systems. Indeed, this has already been shown to be
the case for honeybees (Burns and Dyer 2008, Wright et al. 2009) as well as
bumblebees (Chittka et al. 2003, Dyer and Chittka 2004b, Ings and Chittka
2008, Riveros and Gronenberg 2012) (also see Chittka et al. 2009). As such, we
here hypothesise that the drift-diffusion model is able to describe perceptual
decision-making behaviours in honeybees. We furthermore hypothesise that
changes in motivational state impact the process of evidence accumulation,
and are translated as changes in the decision threshold of the drift-diffusion
model, as shown in Fig 4.2.
If honeybees approximate a drift-diffusion process in their decision-making,
a change in motivational state should thus correspond to a change in accuracy
and reaction time, as predicted by the drift-diffusion model. We here test
this hypothesis by observing how the choice behaviour of honeybees differs
according to two different levels of satiation, using the proboscis extension
reflex (PER) paradigm. We first present the PER paradigm in detail before
discussing the expected behavioural changes.
4.1 The Proboscis Extension Reflex
The proboscis extension reflex paradigm (Takeda 1961, Bitterman et al. 1983,
Felsenberg et al. 2011, Giurfa and Sandoz 2012) makes use of classical Pavlovian
conditioning (Pavlov 1927) in order to train honeybees to associate an initially
neutral stimulus (known as the conditioned stimulus or ‘CS’) with positive
or negative, biologically relevant, reinforcement (known as the unconditioned
stimulus or ‘US’). The US will invoke an innate behavioural response and,
after training, the animal will exhibit this response to the CS. Touching the
67
Is Honeybee Decision-Making Described by a Drift-Diffusion Process?
Figure 4.2: Diagram to show a theoretical evidence accumulation process during a
decision-making trial. The two dashed horizontal lines depict decision thresholds at
two different levels; these levels have been determined by the internal state of the
decision maker. Vertical dashed lines indicate when an agent shows a behavioural
response. If the evidence accumulated is crossing from below the threshold to above,
the decision maker will reach a decision and respond to the stimulus. In our case, a
bee will extend its proboscis. If the evidence accumulation is crossing from above to
below the threshold, this corresponds to the withdrawal of the proboscis. Here, we
can see that a satiated animal should take longer to respond and should also spend
less time responding, either in the event of an error or if the stimulus is removed. The
lower threshold has been removed since the task given in this experiment is more of
a go/no-go task.
antennae of a bee with sucrose solution will elicit the proboscis extension reflex
(where the bee extends its proboscis); olfactory conditioning will result in the
bee showing this same response to trained odours. Experimental results have
shown that honeybees are very efficient learners, with high learning rates after
two to five associative trials (Bitterman et al. 1983).
This paradigm has given experimenters the chance to implement a decision-
making task that is suitable for invertebrates with a high degree of control over
the animal. Although many mammalian choice tasks use visual stimuli, PER
conditioning with honeybees requires moving from the visual to the olfactory
domain. Previous studies in olfactory PER conditioning have shown that
honeybees perform very well and are able to discriminate between odours
(Guerrieri et al. 2005). Using visual stimuli with PER is only possible if
the antennae of the bees are cut, however, this results in drastically reduced
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learning rates (Hori et al. 2006; 2007). This may be attributed to the fact that
bees with removed antennae are less responsive to sucrose (de Brito Sanchez
et al. 2008). Even after an extensive number of learning trials, many more than
what is required for olfactory conditioning, performance is heavily impacted.
Furthermore, the ability to discriminate colours, even those which should be
easily distinguishable, is diminished (Niggebru¨gge et al. 2009). Interestingly, a
recent study has reported success in honeybee visual conditioning by using an
alternative method of restraint (Dobrin and Fahrbach 2012), however, since
we here use the classical method of individual tubes and tape to hold the bee
in place (see Materials and Methods), it is more desirable to use odours in
our conditioning (for a review of visual conditioning protocols, see Avargue`s-
Weber and Mota 2016).
The PER paradigm has now been standardised (Felsenberg et al. 2011) and
it has proven to be popular in honeybee research over the last few decades,
especially for the examination of choice behaviour and discrimination ability
(e.g., Guerrieri et al. 2005) and also for the analysis of learning and memory.
We here use it to ascertain honeybee discrimination ability within different
motivational settings, and furthermore compare the behavioural results with
predictions from the drift-diffusion model of decision-making. Since the PER
paradigm allows for a high degree of experimental control, motivational state
(more specifically, the level of satiation) is rendered easy to manipulate. Once
restrained, bees can be fed with measured amounts of sucrose solution and
then held without food for precise intervals of time.
4.2 The Impact of Motivation
Decision-making is a cognitive process which can be influenced by both ex-
ternal and internal states. An example state is that of hunger, which has been
shown to cause observable changes in animal behaviour (for example, Susswein
et al. 1978, Weiss et al. 1982, and also see Marshall et al. 2015, a model of
behavioural switching with a motivational element). This particular internal
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state plays a vital role in PER conditioning studies because the animals are re-
sponding to food rewards; a fully satiated animal is unlikely to respond to the
conditioning phase of the paradigm as it will have no motivation to extend its
proboscis to sucrose. Experimental studies which examine specific behaviours
of animals, but do not ensure that the subjects are equivalent in terms of their
hunger states, may encounter differences in the behavioural results obtained.
When considering how a bee’s satiation level may impact the way it makes
choices, it is first necessary to review the components of the hypothesised
decision process. Since we view this from a drift-diffusion perspective, we thus
find that a change in motivation could alter the following properties:
• the level of sensory noise
• the rate of evidence accumulation (drift)
• the level of the decision threshold
Within a foraging context, a starving bee (or indeed, any animal) will need
to act quickly in order to ensure its survival; as such it will make decisions rap-
idly and perhaps respond to alternatives it might not have if it were satiated,
including options which introduce a higher chance of predation (Pettersson
and Bro¨nmark 1993, Godin and Crossman 1994, Latty and Beekman 2011).
This could be translated as ‘risky’ behaviour. Within a two-alternative forced-
choice task, the bee may respond to unrewarded or punished odours, which
would be deemed as being inaccurate. This is intuitive from the drift-diffusion
perspective, as faster decision-making results in a higher proportion of errors.
Theoretically, the component to control the speed of the decision-maker is the
decision threshold. We then hypothesise that, if honeybees are indeed using a
drift-diffusion process to make perceptual decisions, then hungry bees should
implement a lower decision threshold than satiated bees (corresponding to
faster and more inaccurate decision-making). A lower decision threshold de-
termines that the evidence accumulation process will trigger a motor output
within a shorter amount of time, thus the discrimination abilities of hungry
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bees should be reduced. Within the PER paradigm, we expect to see that
hungry bees will respond positively (extend their proboscis) to neutral or neg-
atively reinforced odours and will exhibit a faster response time than satiated
bees.
4.3 Materials & Methods
The first PER experiment was conducted between July 2016 and August 2016
at Paul Sabatier University in Toulouse, France. Honeybee foragers, both de-
parting and returning from the hive, were caught from the hive entrance in
the morning (using a BioQuip bee vacuum) then chilled on ice until immobil-
ised. Each individual was placed within a small tube and restrained using the
classical method of harnessing, such that it could only move its proboscis and
antennae. This was implemented using two strips of tape. One strip covered
the front and back of the tube so that the body of the bee was secure. Another,
thinner strip ran underneath the neck and held the head in place. Groups of
twenty to twenty- five individuals were harnessed each day, fed until satiated
on 30% sucrose solution and then left to rest for three hours.
Thirty minutes before conditioning, the harnessed bees were tested for their
sucrose responsiveness by gently touching their antennae with 50% sucrose
solution on the end of a toothpick. Individuals that did not extend their
proboscis in response were discarded from the experiment. Each day, the fif-
teen individuals that showed sucrose responsiveness proceeded to the training
phase of the experiment. If there were more than fifteen individuals available,
the first fifteen of these were chosen.
The olfactory version of the PER paradigm uses odourants as the condi-
tioned stimuli (CS) and sucrose solution as the unconditioned stimulus (US).
Odourant molecules that are within the same chemical group or that have sim-
ilar carbon chain lengths are generalised more often by bees (Guerrieri et al.
2005). The two odours chosen were Hexanal and 1-Heptanol; these differ in
both their carbon chain length and chemical group and should thus be easy to
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discriminate (Guerrieri et al. 2005). Hexanal was chosen to be the rewarded
odour and 1-Heptanol the unrewarded. During conditioning, presentations
of the rewarded odour were paired with the US (50% sucrose solution) and
presentations of the unrewarded odour were not reinforced (and as such the
odour remained a neutral stimulus). During training, the bees were exposed
to each odour five times, resulting in a total of ten trials, which were in a
pseudo-random sequence with an inter-trial interval (ITI) of eight minutes
(Drezner-Levy et al. 2009). In each trial, individual bees were placed in front
of an olfactory stimulus controller (shown in Fig 4.3), which provided a clean
airflow, and were allowed to familiarise with the set-up for fifteen seconds. An
extractor fan was also positioned behind the bee in order to remove lingering
odours. After familiarisation, if the trial was a rewarded trial, the CS was
presented alone for four seconds and then presented with the US for a fur-
ther two seconds. For unrewarded trials, the CS was presented alone for four
seconds but no US was present in the following two seconds, as such it was
presented alone for a total of six seconds. Finally, the CS was removed and
replaced with clean air by the controller, allowing the US to be presented alone
for one second (for rewarded trials). Finally, the bee remained exposed to the
clean airflow until its trial ended, whereby it was removed from the set-up. In
total, a single trial lasted for thirty-two seconds.
After conditioning, an individual was judged to have learnt the associations
if they responded correctly in either the last two trials (trials nine and ten) or
trials six, seven and eight (see Appendix B for the data sheets that were used
for the training). A rewarded odour was presented in trial nine and an unre-
warded odour in trial ten, thus if an individual showed a proboscis extension
in trial nine and no response in trial ten, they were judged to have learnt. If
an individual failed to perform correctly in these two trials, performance in
trials six, seven and eight was examined. Trials six and seven were rewarded
trials and eight was unrewarded, as such if an individual extended its probos-
cis in trials six and seven and showed no response in eight, it was judged to
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Figure 4.3: Some of the apparatus used for the PER experiment. Shown is the
rig which provides a constant, clean airflow during experimental trials; this device
is attached to a programmable computer which controls the timing of the odour
presentations (not shown). Also shown is the chamber wherein a harnessed bee is
held, behind this is an extractor fan which removes lingering odours from the set-up.
have learnt. If an individual did not fulfil either of these two criteria, it was
classified as a non-learner and discarded from the experiment. Preliminary ex-
periments showed that some individuals were quicker to learn the associations
than others and demonstrated that they had learnt from trial six onwards.
Some individuals were slower to learn and demonstrated the correct responses
in the final two trials. Some individuals showed they had learnt in trials six
to eight but then became unresponsive to the rewarded odour on the ninth
trial, however, this did not mean that they had not learnt. It was hypothes-
ised that these individuals had either become demotivated (perhaps due to
being gradually satiated throughout the training phase where they were given
small amounts of sucrose solution) or perhaps fatigued, and so they were taken
through to the testing phase. In this way, the criteria implemented here for
learning allows for both slower and faster learners. Spontaneous responders,
individuals which responded to the first rewarded trial in the training phase,
remained in the experiment. In total, there were three of these (one from the
satiated group and two from the hungry group).
After all fifteen bees had undergone the training procedure, those which
had demonstrated learning were split into two different motivational groups,
hungry and satiated. Both groups were allowed to rest for another three hours
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and were then tested on the learnt odours in order to assess their discrimina-
tion abilities. The hungry group received no further food whilst the satiated
group received a further 5µL of 30% sucrose solution one hour before the
testing phase using an Eppendorf pipette. The bees were placed nearby, but
not at, the experimental site. Bees that were fed demonstrated good sucrose
responsiveness, however the responsiveness of the hungry bees was not tested.
If a bee within the satiated group did not show PER when required to feed
prior to the testing phase, it was discarded from the experiment.
During testing, bees were once again placed individually before the airflow
and presented with Hexanal and 1-Heptanol over two sequential trials. The
bees’ responses to the two odours were recorded; bees showing a proboscis
extension to the rewarded odour and no response to the unrewarded odour
were marked as having perfect accuracy. Bees that failed to respond to the
rewarded odour, responded to the unrewarded odour, or responded to the
airflow before the odours had been presented, were all marked as incorrect.
As such, here an ‘error’ is defined as an incorrect response in either (or both)
of the two test trials. Bees which did not respond in both of the trials were
discarded from the experiment. To determine the response time of each of the
bees, video footage was recorded during the testing phase and analysed frame
by frame. The response time was determined as the length of time between
the odour onset (which is determined by a small beep from the olfactory
stimulus controller) and the first full proboscis extension exhibited by the bee.
The reaction time was measured in the same way for both the rewarded and
unrewarded test trials.
Bees responding to the airflow are here marked as incorrect as it is more
likely that they are responding to the contextual evidence (that they are within
the experimental setup, which itself is not rewarding) rather than the odour
presentations. As such, they may be responding randomly. If this is the case,
this result aligns with the drift-diffusion model as random responses are more
likely when a lower decision threshold has been implemented.
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The total number of bees used for this experiment and the analysis of the
results is 84 (41 of which were in the satiated group and 43 of which were in
the hungry group). A total of fifteen bees were excluded from the analysis
of the results due to being completely unresponsive in the testing phase (nine
satiated, six hungry), as such the total number of bees successfully trained was
99. Bees faced exclusion from the experiment primarily at five points: post-
harnessing (if they did not show PER after being harnessed and could not be
fed to satiation), prior to training (if they did not show PER just prior to the
training phase), post- training (for being unable to learn the associations), at
feeding (if they did not show PER to receive sucrose solution) and post-testing
(if they remained completely unresponsive).
For this experiment, we made the following predictions:
• hungry bees will be more inaccurate than satiated bees (or satiated bees
will be more accurate than hungry bees).
• hungry bees will have faster reaction times than satiated bees (or satiated
bees will have slower reaction times than hungry bees).
These predictions are inferred from the single-bound drift-diffusion model,
which predicts that behaviour will be dependent upon the ‘positive’ threshold
(the animal can either respond or not respond). We hypothesise that the level
of this threshold can be altered by hunger. More specifically, we hypothesise
that a hungry animal will lower their decision threshold. This in turn indic-
ates that they will reach a decision within a shorter amount of time and will
consequently become more inaccurate in their decision-making. On the other
hand, satiated bees should implement a higher threshold and thus spend more
time accumulating evidence before making a decision, as such they will have
slower reaction time but will be more accurate.
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4.4 Results
Since the odours chosen for the experiment are quite dissimilar, we presented
the honeybees with what should have been an easy discrimination task. We
first demonstrate that the learning curves for the two groups was similar from
the training phase, such that differences in behaviour cannot be attributed to
any differences in learning. The acquisition curves are presented in Fig 4.4.
Figure 4.4: The acquisition curves for both groups of bees from the training phase.
Trial numbers denote the presentations of the rewarded odour and do not refer to the
actual trial numbers in the experiment. All bees were treated the same upon being
caught from the hive (i.e., fed until satiated and left to rest) and were given the same
training, as such it should be the case that these curves are similar.
During the testing phase, we found that the majority of bees from both
groups responded to the rewarded odour presentation (all the hungry bees
and 39 of the 43 satiated bees) and that there was no significant difference
between the responses. For the unrewarded odour presentation, responses were
recorded from 22 of the 41 hungry bees and only 6 of the 43 satiated bees.
There was a significant difference between the responses of the two groups
(2-sample proportion test, p < .001), thus we can conclude that hungry bees
were significantly more responsive to the unrewarded odour than the satiated
bees. These data are shown in Fig 4.5.
The full data for the testing phase are shown in Fig 4.6. A total of 9
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Figure 4.5: Graph to show the percentage of bees from each motivational group that
responded to each of the test odours.
satiated bees and 6 hungry bees were discarded for not responding in any
of the test trials and are thus not included in the results. We found that
most satiated bees were able to discriminate between the two odours correctly,
with around 73% of bees completing the choice task without error. However,
the hungry bees were not able to discriminate as well, and often mistakenly
extended their proboscis to the clean airflow before the odour was presented.
Only 30% of bees in the hungry group were able to discriminate without
making a mistake (that is to say, the bees both responded to the rewarded
odour and did not respond to the unrewarded odour). We found that the
difference in accuracies of the two groups was statistically significant (2-sample
proportion test, p < .001), as such we can conclude that hungry bees are
more error prone than satiated bees. For completeness, we also analysed the
accuracies of the groups when the bees that responded to the airflow were
not marked as incorrect. In this case, only the bees that responded to the
punished odour were marked as making an error. This analysis is shown
in Fig 4.7. We further analysed the response times of the two groups to
determine whether or not hungry bees were responding to the presented odours
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quicker than satiated bees. Analysis showed that, for the unrewarded odour
presentation, hungry bees were, on average, significantly quicker in extending
their proboscis (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p < .05). Although we did not
find significance for the rewarded odour, the average response time for hungry
bees was still less than that of satiated bees. The result for the unrewarded
trial, taken together with the results for the accuracies, is indicative of a speed-
accuracy trade-off: the hungry bees were quicker in making their decisions for
the unrewarded odour presentation and suffered a reduction in their accuracy.
This result suggests that the bees were not making mistakes due to some
other factor; if bees are indeed approximating a drift-diffusion process in their
decision-making, a reduction in decision accuracy must be accompanied by a
reduction in reactionctime, and these behavioural changes should arise from a
reduction in the level of the decision threshold. The results here, in terms of
the decision accuracies and the reaction times for the rewarded odour, support
the theory that hungry bees are limiting their evidence accumulation by means
of a reduced decision threshold.
4.5 Discussion
We used the proboscis extension reflex paradigm to test the discrimination
abilities of honeybees in two different motivational states, keeping the training
protocol for the groups equivalent and instead focusing on how internal state
can impact decision-making processes. Our experiment showed that hungry
honeybees are significantly more prone to error than satiated bees. We also
found that hungry bees were more likely to extend their proboscis to the airflow
upon being placed in front of the PER rig. This implies that hungry bees
may be completing their evidence accumulation even before the odour onset,
and consequently reaching the decision threshold before they could identify
which odour was presented. This also indicates that hungry bees were making
quicker decisions. Another interpretation of this result is that the hungry
bees were responding randomly, however, randomness is also indicative of a
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Figure 4.6: Honeybee decision-making analysis. Left: percentage of bees from each
group that were able to discriminate without making an error. Right: response
times for both the rewarded and unrewarded odours. Medians are denoted by white
lines, averages are denoted by white crosses, and outliers are denoted by red crosses.
Asterisks denote significance values. *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001. Statistical
test used for decision accuracies: 2-sample proportion test. Statistical test used for
reaction times: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
lower decision threshold (fluctuations below and above the threshold due to
noise causing extensions and retractions, which is more likely to happen when
the threshold is at a lower level, see Fig 4.2). As such, either behavioural
explanation (that hungry bees were more random or that they had reached
a decision before the odour onset) can align with inferences from the drift-
diffusion model.
In addition, we compared the response times of hungry bees to satiated
bees after the odour had been presented. We found that hungry bees took
less time to extend their proboscis than satiated bees (had a quicker response
time). For the unrewarded odour, this result was significant. This behavi-
oural result supports the hypothesis that honeybees may be implementing a
drift-diffusion process for simple perceptual decisions, where the level of sati-
ation mediates the decision threshold and consequently the level of evidence
that is accumulated before a decision is reached. The results suggest that a
hungrier animal will have a lower decision threshold allowing it to respond to
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Figure 4.7: Honeybee decision-making analysis with the definition of error adjusted
to no longer count bees responding to the airflow as incorrect. Graph shows the
percentage of bees from each group that were able to discriminate without error.
Asterisks denote significance values; ***: p < .001. Statistical test used: 2-sample
proportion test.
stimuli more quickly, even if a speed-up in response time will result in more
errors. This result, taken together with the decision accuracies, demonstrates
a speed-accuracy trade-off (hungry bees made more mistakes and were faster
in responding to odours). It should be noted, however, that there was no
significant difference for the rewarded odour presentation. There may be sev-
eral reasons for this, including an insufficient sample size or an insufficient
difference in the hunger levels of the two groups. These limitations provide
options for future work; this experiment could be replicated but with more
than 40 bees in each group, and an additional hour (or more) could be ad-
ded to the resting time for the bees so that hunger is more pronounced. It
should be noted that bees in the hungry group should not be starved to the
point wherein their health is impacted as this would undoubtedly change the
behavioural results.
We have here used the drift-diffusion model to make inferences about the
behaviours of the bees in different internal states. For one of the presented
odours, the satiated bees are significantly slower in responding than hungry
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bees and this was explained by the mediation of the decision threshold. An-
other explanation is that satiated bees are slower due to their using energy for
digestion. This is unlikely to be the case, since they were given a small amount
of sucrose solution when fed before the testing phase and were also given one
additional hour to rest after this feed (as such, they had already had one hour
for digestion). Additionally, although we have here attributed a change within
internal state to a change in the level of the decision threshold, it is possible
that the rate of acccumulation (drift) is being altered instead. To explain the
slower response times, satiated bees would need to be accumulating evidence
at a slower rate than hungry bees, as such it would take them longer to reach
a static threshold. At this stage, it is not possible to ascertain whether the be-
havioural changes observed are due to a change in the decision threshold level
or the drift. In order to clarify, the mechanism that implements the threshold
within the brain of the bee would need to first be identified and then neural
recordings taken.
Another explanation of the behavioural differences found could be that
the hungry bees became disengaged from the task, which in turn made them
more prone to error or more prone to showing PER to stimuli other than the
rewarded odour. As mentioned above, if it was the case that hungry bees
became disengaged and more ‘random’ than satiated bees, this behavioural
difference still fits the predictions of the drift-diffusion model and the inference
that hunger should lower the decision threshold. However, this is unlikely, as
all bees were tested for sucrose responsiveness before the testing phase and
were seen to be motivated and in good health, as such it is most likely not
the case that they were too hungry. However, since this experiment was a
go/no-go task, it is impossible to distinguish between a bee that has chosen
not to respond from a bee which did not reach a decision. As such, it would be
beneficial to translate this experiment into a true two-alternative forced-choice
task, such that an error can be properly differentiated from disengagement or
a lack of choice. This is yet another opportunity for future work.
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4.6 Experiment Two: Materials & Methods
We theorised that the large number of bees extending their proboscis to the
airflow in the first experiment may have been caused by the training protocol.
During conditioning, 1-Heptanol was an unrewarded CS, as such there was
no negative consequence for bees that extended their proboscis to it. Further-
more, it has been shown that aversive conditioning can improve discrimination
in free- flying bees (Avargue`s-Weber et al. 2010), as such, it may have been the
case that conditioning with an aversive stimulus was impacting the discrim-
ination abilities of the bees. We therefore decided to replicate the experiment
and alter the training protocol such that 1-Heptanol was instead punished.
The second behavioural experiment was conducted between January 2017
and February 2017 at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. It mirrors the
first experiment closely and aims to examine the same hypothesis, however, we
implemented a few changes that were hypothesised to make the results more
concrete. Firstly, we altered the conditioning protocol such that 1-Heptanol
was punished as opposed to unrewarded. During training, presentations of
1-Heptanol were paired with saturated salt solution, which was delivered to
the bee in the same way as the sucrose solution (on the end of a toothpick,
first touching the bees’ antennae and then the proboscis). This change was
hypothesised to stop the bees from responding to the clean airflow prior to
the odour onset.
Additionally, we incorporated a change to the testing protocol. As well
as presenting the two odours that were used during conditioning, we made
three different compound odours which were composed of ratios of the trained
odours (referred to in terms of their ratios; Hexanal:1-Heptanol). As such, the
compound mixtures would present the trained odours simultaneously but also
introduce a novel component. How exactly bees process compound odours has
been debated. Two main theories have been proposed, ‘elemental’ processing
(whereby a compound is regarded as the sum of its parts, XAB = XA +XB)
and ‘configural’ processing (whereby a compound is an entirely novel stimu-
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lus) (Rescorla 1973, Giurfa et al. 2003, Deisig et al. 2003). It has been found
that bees use a combination of both (Meyer and Galizia 2012); as such a
compound is processed as the sum of its parts, but with the addition of a
unique component (XAB = XA +XB +XC) (Deisig et al. 2003). Thus, com-
pound mixtures are excellent for controlling precisely how similar or dissimilar
an odour should be to the rewarded stimulus; they present both learned and
novel features, and they furthermore negate the need to use alternative odours
(that differ in chemical group and carbon chain length). Whilst it is expected
that the presence of a greater amount of CS+ within a compound odour will
generate more responses from bees (as it is chemically more similar to the
rewarded odour), the presence of the CS- (and the novel component) indic-
ate that the odour is still not equivalent with the rewarded odour and that a
response is thus a mistake. We used five test odours in total:
• the rewarded odour, Hexanal (100:0)
• a compound composed mostly of the rewarded odour (70:30)
• a compound composed with equal amounts of the trained odours (50:50)
• a compound composed mostly of the punished odour (30:70)
• the punished odour, 1-Heptanol (0:100)
The introduction of the compound odours meant that the bees would ex-
perience multiple presentations of the trained stimuli without reward. As
such, the bees may have, at some point during the testing phase, undergone a
type of learning whereby the reinforced CS become neutral again due to the
retraction of reinforcement. This type of learning is known as ‘extinction’.
Thus, the rewarded odour is no longer perceived as rewarded, and the pun-
ished odour as no longer punished. Previous experiments have shown that
total extinction can occur within as little as five trials and can begin on the
second trial (Bitterman et al. 1983), following a conditioning protocol com-
posed of five positive trials. As such, after the first odour presentation during
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the testing phase, bees may become less responsive. Additionally, the pos-
sibility of extinction makes the order in which the test odours are presented
important. For this experiment, the five test odours were arranged into the
following pseudo-random sequence: (1) 0:100, (2) 70:30, (3) 50:50, (4) 100:0,
(5) 30:70. The odours were presented in this order to each bee, such that each
individual encountered the odours in the same sequence. This was to ensure
that any observed differences in behaviour were not due to encountering the
odours at a different time.
As with the first experiment, the bees’ responses to the five odours were
recorded. Bees that showed a proboscis extension to the rewarded stimulus
(Hexanal, or 100:0) only were marked as discriminating without error. Bees
that failed to respond to the rewarded stimulus, responded to any of the
compound mixtures of the punished odour, or responded to the airflow before
the odour onset, were marked as incorrect. Since there were more chances
to make an error and involved the presentation of compound mixtures that
would be very similar to the rewarded stimulus (i.e., 70:30), this choice task
was harder than the one presented in the first experiment. However, this
experiment aimed to examine the choice behaviour of the bees more closely
and determine if hungry bees would mistake the compound mixtures as the
rewarded odour more than satiated bees.
Video footage of the bees was again recorded during the testing phase.
Frame-by- frame analysis was carried out to determine the bees’ response time
(calculated as before), as well as several other additional response character-
istics that were thought to differ between the two groups. We also examined
the number of proboscis extensions, or bouts, that the bees exhibited during
their trials. For example, a full extension followed by a retraction and then
another extension would count as two bouts. We furthermore observed that
some bees differed in which direction they extended their proboscis; many bees
would extend level to the plane of their head, others would try to extend above
the plane. We thus recorded if bouts were at or above the plane. Finally, we
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analysed how much time each bee spent with an extended proboscis, and cal-
culated how much of this time was spent before the odour onset or after the
odour onset.
The total number of bees used for this experiment and the analysis of the
results is 81 (41 of which were in the satiated group and 40 of which were in
the hungry group). A total of 23 bees were excluded from the analysis of the
results due to being completely unresponsive in the testing phase (18 satiated,
5 hungry), as such the total number of bees successfully trained was 104. As
the methodology for the second experiment remains the same (asides from the
changes to the test odours and that the unrewarded odour is now punished)
the bees can be excluded from the experiment within the same points as listed
in Materials & Methods. A total of 15 bees were noted to be spontaneous
responders (8 satiated and 7 hungry) and these were kept in the experiment.
Our final predictions for this experiment are as follows:
• from the first experiment, hungry bees will be more inaccurate than
satiated bees (or satiate bees will be more accurate than hungry bees).
• from the first experiment, hungry bees will have faster reaction times
than satiated bees (or satiated bees will have slower reaction times than
hungry bees).
• the closer a compound odour is to the rewarded odour (chemically), the
more bees will respond to it. As such, the more similar compound odours
should induce more errors in both the hungry and satiated bees.
• hungry bees will spend more time extending their proboscis to an odour
than satiated bees (or satiated bees will retract their proboscis more
quickly than hungry bees).
The first two predictions are inferred from the drift-diffusion model, as
with the first experiment, and are described in the Materials & Methods of
that experiment. Additionally, we hypothesise that compound odours that
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incorporate more of the rewarded odour than the punished odour are more
likely to be responded to than other compound odours (i.e., the 70:30 com-
pound will see more bees responding to it than the 50:50 compound). This
is due to the fact that odours which are chemically more similar to a trained,
rewarded odour will induce bees to generalise more, as seen in the work of
Guerrier and colleagues (Guerrieri et al. 2005). Here, an error is defined as a
response to any odour other than the rewarded odour (as such, PER to any of
the compound odours or the punished odour will be recorded as a mistake).
This is due to the way bees are hypothesised to process compound odours
(Meyer and Galizia 2012), however, an alternative theory (which concludes
that PER to compounds should not be marked as mistakes) is presented in
the Discussion. The fourth prediction is again inferred from the single-bound
drift-diffusion model. Since hungry bees are implementing a lower decision
threshold, the accumulated evidence should remain above the threshold for a
longer amount of time, as such the hungry bees should prolong their responses
to the odour presentations.
4.7 Experiment Two: Results
We presented honeybees with a discrimination task that was slightly more
difficult than that of the first experiment, however, it should still have been
easy to solve. As before, we first show that the acquisition curves for the two
groups are similar. This is given in Fig 4.8.
The proportion of bees responding to each of the test odours is shown
in Fig 4.9. We found that hungry bees were consistently more responsive
to the odours than satiated bees, with a higher proportion of hungry bees
extending their proboscis in each case. For three of the odours, the differences
in responsiveness between the two groups was significant; analysis showed
that significantly more hungry bees extended to the punished odour (2-sample
proportion test, p < .001), the 70:30 compound mixture (2-sample proportion
test, p < .05) and the 50:50 compound mixture (2-sample proportion test, p <
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Figure 4.8: The acquisition curves for the two groups of bees from the training
phase. As in Fig 4.4, the trial numbers here denote the presentations of the rewarded
odour and do not refer to the actual trial numbers in the experiment. As in the first
experiment, all bees were given equivalent training and were treated the same upon
being taken form the hive.
.05). Bees responded similarly to the rewarded odour and the 30:70 compound
mixture. The majority of bees from both of the motivational groups responded
to the rewarded odour, and the compound mixtures that were composed of a
higher ratio of the rewarded odour invoked a higher proportion of responses.
The compound mixtures were more similar to the rewarded odour than the
punished odour, as such these should have been more likely to invoke incorrect
responses from the bees, depending on the ratio of the odour’s components.
Indeed, analysis of Fig 4.9 indicates that more bees responded incorrectly to
the 70:30 mixture than the 50:50 mixture, and more to 50:50 than 30:70. The
number of responses for the punished odour is quite high, especially for the
hungry bees. A theory as to why is presented in the Discussion. Since the
compound mixtures were indeed similar to the rewarded odour, but not en-
tirely equivalent, bees that responded to them were noted for making an error.
We calculated the percentage of bees from each group that had responded to
the rewarded odour only (i.e., obtained perfect accuracy) and then compared
this result to that of the first experiment. The accuracy comparison is shown
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Figure 4.9: Line graph to show what percentage of bees from each motivational
group responded to the test odour presentations. Satiated n = 41, hungry n = 40.
in Fig 4.10.
The accuracies obtained from the two motivational groups are very similar
for both experiments. In the second experiment, the satiated bees are slightly
less accurate, however, this is not significant. This result confirms that we
were able to replicate the first experiment even with slightly different training
and testing protocols. In both experiments we found that satiated bees are
significantly more accurate than hungry bees (2-sample proportion test, p <
.001). This can also be seen in Fig 4.9, as less satiated bees respond to the
compound mixtures and punished odour. After confirming that the decision
accuracies were comparable, we then compared the response times. Since the
first experiment only used the rewarded and punished odours in the testing
phase, we here only include response times for these two odours from the
second experiment. These data are shown in Fig 4.11.
As with the decision accuracy data, we found that both experiments resul-
ted in similar response times for the bees. Hungry bees were again significantly
faster in responding to the rewarded odour presentation than satiated bees (2-
sample t-test, p < .05). Hungry bees were also faster in responding to the
punished odour, however, this result was not significant. Nonetheless, of the
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of average honeybee decision accuracy from the first (left)
and second (right) experiments. A correct decision corresponds to a proboscis exten-
sion to the rewarded odour only. For the second experiment, the given accuracy refers
to those bees which responded to the rewarded odour but not the punished odour.
In both experiments, there was a significant difference in the accuracies of the two
groups (2-sample proportion test, p < .001 in both cases.
two reaction time comparisons that were made in each experiment, one in
each was found to be significant: hungry bees were faster than satiated bees
in responding. These significant results taken with the accuracy data (which
show that hungry bees are more error prone) are suggestive of a speed-accuracy
trade-off and fit the predictions of the drift-diffusion model of decision-making.
We additionally analysed the response times for the novel compound mixtures;
the full data are presented in Fig 4.12. Of the 41 satiated bees, 4, 32, 8, 5
and 2 of these responded to the punished, rewarded, 70:30, 50:50 and 30:70
compound odours, respectively. Of the 40 hungry bees, 16, 36, 16, 12 and 5 of
these responded to the punished, rewarded, 70:30, 50:50 and 30:70 compound
odours, respectively.
We found that hungry honeybees were, on average, faster decision makers
for every test odour except for the 30:70 compound. In this case, hungry bees
were almost equivalent. We found that one test odour shows a significant
result. However, the data show that hungry bees are indeed consistently re-
sponding quicker than satiated bees, for both the trained odours and novel
compounds. This is not the only behaviour that was consistently different in
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of average honeybee response time from the first (left) and
second (right) experiments. See Appendix A for statistical tests used.
hungry bees, however. We performed a more in-depth analysis of the honey-
bees proboscis extension behaviours to determine whether or not hunger would
cause any other behavioural modifications. From here on we thus separate the
data in terms of the test odours and present the results for each one. Firstly,
we present the full data for the rewarded odour in Fig 4.13.
We first analysed how many times honeybees extended their proboscis to
the odour and in which direction. This analysis highlighted no differences
in the behavioural response of the bees; both groups extended, on average,
an equivalent number of times, with hungry bees extending above the plane
of the head slightly more than satiated bees. However, this result is non-
significant. As discussed before, hungry bees were responding quicker than
satiated bees. We then looked at how much time the bees were spending
responding to the odour. We found that hungry bees were spending slightly
more time in total extending their proboscis to the odour, however, the result
was non-significant. We found that, despite the presence of the punished odour
during the conditioning, some bees were still extending their proboscis to the
airflow. Bees from the hungry group spent significantly more time extending
before the punished odour onset than satiated bees (2-sample t- test, p < .05).
This may suggest that, for some bees, the decision threshold is sufficiently low
enough that evidence accumulation stops before the stimulus presentation.
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Figure 4.12: Response time data for all test odours. Medians denoted by white
lines, averages denoted by white crosses, outliers denoted by red crosses. Odours are
given in the order they were presented in during the experiment. See Appendix A for
statistical tests used.
Finally, we found no difference in the time bees took extending their proboscis
after the odour onset. This result is perhaps expected as both groups will
recognise this as the rewarded odour. Following this, we analysed the data for
the compound mixtures. The results are shown in are shown in Fig 4.14.
The vast majority of honeybees did not respond to the 30:70 compound
mixture (bottom plot in Fig 4.14, hungry n = 5, satiated n = 2). We found
that, for the bees that did respond, hungry bees showed more proboscis exten-
sions both at the plane of the head and above. No satiated bees displayed any
extensions above. Both motivational groups were roughly the same in their
response times, however, there is a very notable difference in how much time
they spent with their proboscis extended, despite the lack of significance. No
bees extended before the odour presentation, however, hungry bees spent far
more time than satiated bees responding to the presented odour.
A small number of bees responded to the 50:50 compound mixture (middle
plot in Fig 4.14, hungry n = 12, satiated n = 5). We found that, as with the
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Figure 4.13: Complete data analysis for both motivational groups responding to the
rewarded odour. Left: average number of proboscis extensions, in total and separated
by the direction. Right: average response time, average total time that honeybees
extended their proboscis for during the trial, average time honeybees extended their
proboscis before the odour was presented, and average time honeybees extended their
proboscis after the odour was presented.
30:70 compound, there were no significant results. Bees from both groups
showed a similar number of proboscis extensions, in total and in both direc-
tions. Hungry bees had a slightly quicker response time, but the result is non-
significant. For this odour, bees spent more time responding before onset.
Interestingly, satiated bees spent slightly more time responding than hungry
bees. After the odour onset, hungry bees were again spending more time dis-
playing a proboscis extension, although this result isn’t as strong as that of
the 30:70 mixture.
The 70:30 compound mixture generated the most responses out of all three
mixtures, an expected result as this odour was the most similar to the rewar-
ded odour (top plot in Fig 4.14, hungry n = 16, satiated n = 8). We found
several significant results here. Firstly, hungry bees showed significantly more
proboscis extensions than satiated bees (2-sample t-test, p < .05). Strikingly,
hungry bees also showed more proboscis extensions above the plane of the head
than satiated bees (2-sample t-test, p < .05). Hungry bees were slightly faster
in their decision-making than satiated bees, and spent more time extending
their proboscis after the odour had been presented. Hungry bees spent signific-
antly more time extending before the odour onset (Wilcoxon-Mann -Whitney
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test, p < .05, no satiated bees showed this behaviour for this compound) and
also more time extending in total (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p < .05).
This result indicates that satiated bees that made the error in responding to
this odour withdrew their proboscis significantly quicker than hungry bees.
Finally, the full data for the punished odour are given in Fig 4.15.
Significantly more hungry bees than satiated bees responded to the pun-
ished odour (2-sample proportion test, p < .01). We found that hungry bees
displayed more proboscis extensions than satiated bees, both above the plane
of the head and at the plane, however, nothing of significance was found.
Hungry bees responded faster to this odour than satiated bees, but again
this was not significant. However, hungry bees were spending significantly
more time extending their proboscis, both before odour onset, (2-sample t-
test, p < .05), after odour onset (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p < .05), and
in total (Wilcoxon-Mann -Whitney test, p < .05)
4.8 Experiment Two: Discussion
Honeybees are required to solve discrimination problems every day of their
lives, and many of these will be more difficult than others. They will no doubt
encounter these tasks within different internal states, and how their motivation
impacts their decision-making is understudied. We here used the proboscis
extension reflex paradigm in order to carry out differential conditioning with
honeybees and examine their discrimination behaviours in different states.
As in the first experiment, we separated the trained bees into two different
motivational groups, hungry and satiated, and examined how their internal
state impacted their decision performance. We observed honeybee decision-
making behaviours and analysed them in a high amount of detail, going further
than just obtaining data for accuracy and response time. The results of the
experiment highlighted several behavioural differences between hungry and
satiated bees.
We noted from our first experiment that the testing phase was more akin
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to a go/no-go task as opposed to a two-alternative forced-choice task. The
ideal experimental set-up for the latter would involve the presentation of two
odours simultaneously, perhaps from either side of the bees’ head, such that
each odour contacts one individual antenna. Additionally, the set-up would
need to allow the bee to move its head from one side to another. The equip-
ment we used (the olfactory stimulus controller and individual tubes) were not
compatible with such an experiment. Instead, we tried to incorporate some
changes into the testing phase in our second experiment, and included odours
that were composed of components of both the trained odours. In this way,
although still not a true two-alternative forced-choice task, the two odours
used for training would be presented simultaneously.
We were able to replicate some of the results from the first experiment
despite altering the training protocol and introducing novel compound odours
to the testing phase. We again found that satiated bees are significantly more
accurate than hungry bees (even when the responses to the compound odours
are not taken into account and thus not marked as errors) and are also, on
average, slower decision makers. However, the difference in response times
was only significant for the rewarded odour presentation. This result, taken
together with the difference in accuracies, is indicative of a speed-accuracy
trade-off, however, four of the five test odours showed no statistical significance
for response times. The reason for this may be due to the same problems
encountered in the first experiment: insufficient sample sizes or the hungry
group not being sufficiently hungrier than the satiated group. We can conclude
that one result from the response time data fits the inferences of the drift-
diffusion model of decision-making and is indicative of the SAT.
Hungry bees were, on average, faster decision-makers than satiated bees
in each of the test odour presentations (asides from the 30:70 compound,
however, there were only 2 satiated bees that responded to this odour). This
observation is reassuring and we hypothesise that a larger sample size together
with a possible change to how hungry the bees are allowed to become (i.e.,
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resting them for four or five hours instead of three) will emphasise what has
been observed here and will further produce more significant results. For a
particularly hungry animal, acting quickly will be of great importance in order
to avoid mortality. Responding quickly and making the wrong choice will
perhaps be less costly than not acting at all. It is thus intuitive that a simple,
efficient mechanism can control decision-making behaviours and alter them
according to motivational state. A simple change in the decision threshold
can cause a ‘cautious’ animal to become more ‘risky’.
In the first experiment, we noted that hungry bees were more likely to
show a response prior to the odour onset. Here, we examined how much time
the bees were spending with their proboscis extended both before and after
the odours had been presented. We found that, for several odours (rewar-
ded, 70:30 compound, punished), hungry bees spent significantly more time
responding to the airflow before odour onset. This result gives some insight
into the evidence accumulation process. For some bees, this process begins
upon being placed in front of the olfactory stimulus controller, and hungry
bees were more likely to come to a decision before the odour was even presen-
ted, even though an extension may have resulted in punishment, depending
on the odour. This behaviour, which perhaps could be seen as ‘risky’ as it is a
response to an unknown, possibly negative stimulus, also fits the theory that
hungry bees are implementing a lower decision threshold. Rather than wait-
ing for the odour onset, the bee begins to accumulate contextual evidence as
soon as it is placed in front of the airflow, and the implementation of a lower
decision threshold results in extensions of the proboscis. For satiated bees,
which should be implementing a higher decision threshold, a higher amount
of evidence is required to trigger a response. Therefore, even if satiated bees
begin evidence accumulation as soon as they are placed within the airflow,
they are more likely to refrain from responding than hungry bees.
We also found behavioural differences in the amount of time bees spent
extending their proboscis after the odour onset. For all odours except the
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rewarded odour, hungry bees spent much more time extending their proboscis
than satiated bees. For the punished odour, this difference was significant.
This result suggests that evidence accumulation continues after an initial de-
cision has been made, which gives the animal a chance to change its mind
or correct an error. For satiated bees with a higher decision threshold, the
evidence accumulated has a greater chance to fall below it, and is more likely
to do so if, for example, the bee has identified that the stimulus presented
is not the rewarding stimulus. Behaviourally, this would correspond to sati-
ated bees withdrawing their proboscis after a shorter amount of time. On the
other hand, with lower decision thresholds, hungry bees are far more likely
to continue responding once they have reached their decision, as the evid-
ence accumulation will take more time before it drops back below the decision
threshold. Indeed, fluctuations (due to noise) or a reduction in the presen-
ted evidence will remain above a lower decision threshold for longer. This is
represented visually in Fig 4.2.
The significant results found (hungry bees more inaccurate, hungry bees
faster in responding to the rewarded odour, hungry bees spent more time
responding to the 70:30 compound, hungry bees spent more time responding
before the odour onset for the 70:30 compound, hungry bees showing a greater
number of bouts to the 70:30 compound, hungry bees spending more time
responding to the punished odour and to the airflow before the odour onset)
are all compatible with the drift-diffusion model of decision-making. Whilst
there are many results which are non-significant, none have been found that
conflict with the inferences of this model and the hypothesis that hungry bees
are implenting a lower decision threshold. We also discovered significance
in a result not predicted: for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees were
making a significantly greater number of proboscis extensions than satiated
bees, and also displayed significantly more ‘above the plane’ extensions than
satiated bees. Thus, internal state has shown to cause a difference not only
in the decision accuacy and response time but also the total time responding
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(before and after odour onset), the total number of proboscis extensions and
even the direction in which bees will extend. Here, it is proposed that bees
are extending upwards as, during conditioning, the toothpick with rewarding
sucrose solution would come from above their head, touch their antennae and
finally touch their proboscis. As such, the bees are extending in the direction
the reward should be coming from.
In our first experiment, we theorised that the introduction of the punish-
ment during training would stop bees from responding to the clean airflow
before the presentation of the odour. The results show that this is not entirely
the case, as many bees (mostly from the hungry group) still extended their
proboscis. For the rewarded odour presentation and 70:30 compound, hungry
bees spent significantly more time responding to the clean airflow. Interest-
ingly, discrimination performance was not enhanced despite the fact that we
introduced the punishment. This may be because the testing protocol was
also made more difficult than that of the first experiment, and perhaps if we
had used this testing protocol originally, the decision accuracies would have
been reduced there.
An unusually large number of bees responded to the punished odour (mostly
bees from the hungry group, but also a few satiated). This may have been be-
cause this odour was presented first in the testing phase. The 30:70 compound
mixture was presented last, following the rewarded odour, and this generated
the fewest responses. Since this odour was presented last, extinction may have
had an effect, and this would explain why more bees responded to the punished
odour than the 30:70 compound odour, even though the 30:70 compound had
components of the rewarded odour and was thus more similar to it than the
punished odour. This result also further indicates that the sequence in which
odours are presented is very important. The first odour presented may gener-
ate more responses than usual as it will be the first time the bees experience
the experimental set-up post conditioning. For both groups, bees were more
likely to respond to the 70:30 compound than the 50:50 compound. These
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two odours were presented in the middle of the sequence and the responses
to these odours were predicted, as the former is more similar to the rewarded
odour than the latter. We have seen in previous experiments that more similar
odours invoke a higher amount of generalisation (Guerrieri et al. 2005) and
this is indeed the case here.
Many of our results were consistent but insignificant. An example is re-
sponse time; although hungry bees were, on average, faster than satiated bees,
only in one case was this a significant difference. We also found this in the first
experiment. We propose two reasons for this lack of significance despite con-
sistency and sometimes quite large differences between groups (for example,
see the bottom plot in Fig 4.14. There is quite a big difference in the total
time the bees were responding, as well as the total number of proboscis exten-
sions they exhibited). Firstly, in most cases, we lacked statistical power due
to small sample sizes. As many of the bees didn’t respond to the punished or
compound odours (especially 30:70), we only had data from a few bees. To ob-
tain more significant results, this experiment would need to be performed with
n > 80 bees. Secondly, bees may need to be made hungrier and thus starved
for a longer period of time. In this experiment, hungry bees went three hours
without food before they were tested. If this interval is lengthened to perhaps
six or more hours, we expect that the results will be more exaggerated (al-
though it will be important not to starve bees to the point where they become
unhealthy, as this will be an unfair comparison).
As mentioned before, the testing protocol used here is more akin to a go/no-
go task than a two-alternative forced-choice task. Even with the simultaneous
presentation of the trained odours in the compound mixtures, the honeybee
can only either respond or not respond. Can the drift-diffusion model account
for this sort of task? Indeed, the process of evidence accumulation should
remain the same. There is a theoretical difference in terms of the thresholds
used to trigger motor responses, however. A two-alternative forced-choice
task requires the use of two thresholds; the accumulated evidence crossing
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one threshold corresponds to a specific behaviour from the animal whilst the
crossing of the other threshold corresponds to another behaviour. For a har-
nessed insect responding to odour presentations from the left and right, this
may translate as a head turn in one direction or the other. For the go/no-go
task, only one threshold is required, corresponding to a response (for example,
a proboscis extension) or lack thereof. A drawback to using this paradigm
is that it is unclear if a lack of response is due to the evidence accumulation
process not yet terminating or if the individual has actively made the decision
not to respond. Nonetheless, the go/no-go task is still suitable as the drift-
diffusion model may be adapted to suit it (using one threshold) and still keep
the underlying assumptions.
An alternative theory to be considered is that the responses to compound
odours should not be marked as errors (however, even when the data are
analysed with this criteria, the hungry bees are still significantly less accurate
than satiated bees). Instead, those which respond should be deemed more
accurate, since they are responding to the presence of the rewarded odour.
With this theory in mind, it could instead perhaps be concluded that hungry
bees are significantly more likely to generalise than satiated bees. However,
seeing as significantly more hungry bees responded to the punished odour
here, this most certainly allows us to draw the conclusion that hungry bees
are making more errors. With the concept of generalisation in mind, however,
it would be interesting to replicate the experiment of (Guerrieri et al. 2005) and
examine how two different internal states impact the rates of generalisation.
This is another possibility for future work.
All the data obtained from these experiments heavily suggest that honey-
bees are using a drift-diffusion process for evidence accumulation, and further-
more that the level of satiation can mediate the level of the decision threshold
and in turn cause behavioural changes. This is in contrast to another theory of
why response probability in bees changes according to hunger, which instead
proposes that hunger causes a change in sucrose responsiveness (Page Jr et al.
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1998). If we conclude that satiation can mediate the decision threshold, we
can ask the following questions: where might this process take place within the
bee brain, and can we imagine the olfactory system to act as a network that is
integrating evidence over time? Furthermore, what sort of circuit is required
to implement this efficiently, and could a computational model provide any
insight into what properties such a network might need?
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Figure 4.14: Complete data analysis for both motivational groups responding to
the 70:30 (top), 50:50 (middle) and 30:70 (bottom) compound odours. Data presen-
ted as in Fig 4.13. Medians denoted by white lines, averages denoted by white (or
black) crosses. Asterisks denote significance values. *: p < .05. See Appendix A for
statistical tests used.
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Figure 4.15: Complete data analysis for both motivational groups for the punished
odour. Data presented as in Fig 4.13. Medians denoted by white lines, averages
denoted by white crosses. Asterisks denote significance values. *: p < .05. See
Appendix A for statistical tests used.
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Chapter 5
A Computational Model of
Decision-Making
How do animals make fast and robust decisions? Previous research has at-
tempted to answer this question through a combination of behavioural and
neurobiological experiments in conjunction with computational modelling. In
particular, sequential sampling models that focus on the decision accuracy and
decision time of an agent have been used to infer what neural mechanisms may
be driving choice behaviours. Originating from psychology, the first and most
well-known of these models is the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff 1978). Since
this model was developed a multitude of others have built upon it which vary
in their complexity and biological plausibility (see Ratcliff and Smith 2004).
One model in particular, the leaky competing accumulator model (LCA, Usher
and McClelland 2001), introduces an important biological mechanism which
was introduced in Chapter 3. We here use the LCA model, and an extension of
it (Brown and Holmes 2001) which is described in detail later in this chapter,
as inspiration for a biologically inspired model of decision-making. To give
an idea of where the model fits in comparison with other sequential sampling
models, a chart of the different models and their categories is given in Fig 5.1,
though there are many others which are not depicted here.
Sequential sampling models have been successfully fitted to the behavi-
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Figure 5.1: A range of sequential sampling models with the LCA model highlighted.
Adapted from Ratcliff et al. 2016 with permission.
oural data obtained from experiments within a range of decision-making tasks
(Ratcliff et al. 1999, Ratcliff and Rouder 2000, Ratcliff and Smith 2004, Ratcliff
et al. 2004). They are usually developed with three underlying assumptions
about decision-making processes (Bogacz et al. 2006): the first assumption is
that evidence for each choice is being accumulated over time by the decision-
maker, and that the evidence presented is in favour of each choice. Second, it
is assumed that the accumulation process is noisy. Finally, sequential sampling
models employ the mechanism of the decision threshold to ascertain when a
decision has been made. The decision threshold determines the level of evid-
ence that is required for the initiation of a response. As such, a decision can
only be made when the decision-maker has sampled a sufficient amount of
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evidence. A low decision threshold invokes a fast response and typically yields
a reduction in accuracy. A high threshold allows for a slower response but
a gain in accuracy since the model will be acting upon a level of evidence
which is not so limited. This is known as the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT),
a behavioural phenomenon which has been shown to manifest in a variety of
animals (Chittka et al. 2009).
In choice behaviour, the speed-accuracy trade-off has been shown to be
ubiquitous. For example, it has been demonstrated in human (Bogacz et al.
2010a, Starns and Ratcliff 2010) and primate decision-making (Heitz and
Schall 2012, Shadlen and Kiani 2013), as well as insects such as monarch
butterflies (Rodrigues 2016), bumblebees (Chittka et al. 2003, Dyer and Chit-
tka 2004b) and honeybees (Wright et al. 2009). The SAT has furthermore
been demonstrated in collective insect decision-making, governing the beha-
viours of ant and honeybee colonies (Franks et al. 2003, Marshall et al. 2009).
Although the concept may seem trivial, the fact that it is so prevalent across
species suggests that it is very much worthy of being studied. Indeed, it has
been argued to be the ‘benchmark’ for the decision process (Heitz 2014) and so
understanding the neural mechanisms that govern this phenomenon may so-
lidify our understanding of decision-making. Sequential sampling models offer
insights into these mechanisms. As such, they play an invaluable role in de-
coding the decision-making process, at least for simpler, perceptual decisions
where an animal’s ability to discriminate between alternatives will impact their
accuracy and speed.
What kind of mechanisms might a successful decision-making system em-
ploy? Already mentioned is that of lateral inhibition: a circuit especially
researched in the visual domain (Goldstein and Brockmole 2016). Empirical
evidence for this mechanism can be traced back to experiments with the horse-
shoe crab, wherein experimenters took advantage of the organisation of the
eyes in order to record activity from individual receptors (Hartline et al. 1956).
They demonstrated that stimulation of one receptor would cause it to respond,
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however, the stimulation of the receptor’s neighbours would cause a reduction
in its activity. Importantly, the experiment brought forward the proposal that
the receptors were not independent of each other, instead they were coupled
such that each receptor could directly inhibit those surrounding it. Lateral in-
hibition is also a well-known circuit in classical decision-making models, used
for introducing competition within competing integration channels and for
implementing a winner-take-all output (Usher and McClelland 2001, Brown
and Holmes 2001, Bogacz et al. 2006). The circuit has been shown to improve
decision-making in a behavioural switching context (Marshall et al. 2015) and,
remarkably, it has also been observed in collective decision-making in honey-
bees (Seeley et al. 2012, Pais et al. 2013), acting as a stop signal for bees
which are opting for inferior choices. Recently, this circuitry has been sug-
gested to exist in the invertebrate antennal lobes as another form of contrast
enhancement, and it has been proposed that this mechanism should be dy-
namic and dependent on the similarity of the odours presented, such that
inhibition is increased when the odours are similar (Linster et al. 2005). This
hypothesis introduces the concept of an inhibitory mechanism which is robust
and dependent on the composition of the presented stimuli.
To fully answer the question of what other mechanisms might be in place
to ensure robust discrimination, it is necessary to study neurobiology. It may
be tempting to use human or primate brains as the ‘gold standard’, however,
the neural circuitry behind decision-making behaviours at this level is remark-
ably complex (Sporns et al. 2005, Azevedo et al. 2009). Instead, it is more
reasonable to turn to a simpler animal which is fully capable of solving dis-
criminatory problems. An increasing amount of research over the years has
pointed to the honeybee as an ideal model for the study of decision-making
and cognitive-like behaviours (Menzel and Giurfa 2006, Giurfa 2007, Menzel
2012). Indeed, this is an animal which has a rich behavioural repertoire and
is capable of solving complex problems despite its relatively small brain. It is
clear that this animal has evolved to solve decision-making problems efficiently,
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making use of simple yet powerful neural circuits which are more amenable to
study. It is for this reason that we use the honeybee for inspiration for this
model. A particularly well studied domain within the honeybee brain is that
of olfaction; a higher-level map of several olfactory circuits has been identified
such that information flow from one centre to another can be traced. Indeed,
honeybees have been shown to be very good at olfactory discrimination tasks
(Guerrieri et al. 2005) and the simplicity of the honeybee olfactory system
allows us to examine what is contributing to such a robust decision-making
circuit.
The Honeybee Olfactory System
The olfactory system of the honeybee (and other invertebrates) has been well
studied (e.g., Galizia 2014). In the honeybee, detection of olfactory stimuli
begins at the antennae, where olfactory receptor neurons (ORNs) encode in-
formation about the presented odours and then innervate the antennal lobes
(AL), which are sites dedicated to the processing of olfactory information.
Within the antennal lobes are structures known as glomeruli, which collate
odour information. Within the glomeruli are local interneurons (LNs) which
project to multiple other glomeruli, and both inhibitory and excitatory projec-
tion neurons (iPNs and ePNs, respectively). The projection neurons project
to higher-order brain regions such as the mushroom bodies (MB) and lateral
protocerebrum (LP), both of which are regions thought to play important
roles in decision-making. For a more in-depth review of the olfactory system,
see Chapter 2. Within the antennal lobes, an inhibitory mechanism referred
to as lateral inhibition has been shown to exist. This mechanism is thought
to act as a decorrelator of neural signals, aiding in discriminatory behaviours
and introducing contrast enhancement into the system.
Indeed, inhibitory circuits have been shown to be of great importance to
decision-making and action selection circuits, both biologically and theoretic-
ally (Hensch et al. 1998, Bogacz et al. 2006, Hergarden et al. 2012, Pool et al.
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2014, Marshall et al. 2015, Barron et al. 2015). In honeybee neurobiology,
the function of the iPNs within the olfactory circuit has only recently been
quantified. Recent studies have shown that they act as a form of gain control
or contrast enhancement, increasing the differences between neural response
maps in order to aid in discrimination (Parnas et al. 2013). This is hypo-
thesised to be implemented by a ‘high-pass filter’ such that iPN inhibition
selectively blocks low-frequency spike trains but allows high-frequency spike
trains to pass (Parnas et al. 2013). Additionally, recent work by Liang and
colleagues (Liang et al. 2013) suggests that iPNs regulate olfactory informa-
tion in the lateral horn by suppressing the responses of a specific population
of neurons (vlpr neurons) to some odours but not others. Thus, it can be
concluded that iPNs target some, but not all, higher-order neurons (i.e., are
selective)
Task Difficulty
One parameter that is often manipulated in discrimination tasks is that of task
difficulty. An intuitive result obtained from behavioural experiments is that
the harder the task, the more a decision-maker’s accuracy will decline. Within
the olfactory domain, this is thought to be caused by overlapping response
profiles within the pre-processing areas of the brain (both in vertebrates and
invertebrates), with the neural mechanisms employed to aid in discrimination
(e.g., lateral inhibition) unable to sufficiently decorrelate neural signals (for the
drift-diffusion model, more difficult choices will have a low signal- to-noise ratio
(SNR), as such the model should also be less accurate). For example, it was
found in Drosophila that the overlap between neural representations of odours
could be described in terms of the Euclidean distance between neural activity
vectors; similar odours were found to invoke similar response profiles (and
thus shorter Euclidean distances) whereas dissimilar odours invoked dissimilar
response profiles (and thus larger Euclidean distances) (Parnas et al. 2013).
The derived Euclidean distances could be used to predict the discrimination
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abilities of the animals within a strict two- alternative forced-choice paradigm.
The study used behavioural chambers which were developed such that the
left and right sides could present odours simultaneously, which allowed for
choice behaviours to be evaluated based on what side animals preferred. When
presented with an odour that fruit flies exhibit innate preferences for on one
side and a dissimilar odour on the other, fruit flies show a clear bias for the
side of the chamber which presents the preferred odour. Instead, if a similar
odour is presented with the preferred odour, fruit flies will pick one side over
another by chance, showing no preference for either side. As the Euclidean
distance between the preferred odour and an alternative increases, fruit flies
begin to show an increased bias for the side of the chamber which presents the
preferred odour.
It is quite simple to control the similarity of odours, and honeybee choice
behaviour in binary olfactory discrimination tasks has been studied quite pro-
fusely (Guerrieri et al. 2005). Previous experiments have shown that more
similar odours induce a higher degree of generalisation in bees (or causes them
to misidentify the ‘correct’ choice and thus make a higher proportion of errors).
From these experiments, it can be concluded that task difficulty (or stimuli
similarity) is highly influential on the choice behaviours of decision-makers
and so it is a parameter which we factor into our model.
Classical decision-making models have historically struggled with the case
of being presented with two alternatives that are very similar or the same
perceptually. In the case of the DDM, the presentation of two equivalent
stimuli results in the model integrating noise over time. The model thus
remains in a deadlock and is unable to choose one option or the other. This
is behaviourally implausible. There have been several methods proposed to
overcome deadlock, for example, implementing a mechanism known as the
‘urgency signal’ such that the decision thresholds collapse over time (Cisek
et al. 2009, Hanks et al. 2011). Whilst this does indeed break deadlock, a recent
study found that models with static or fixed thresholds are better suited to
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fit experimental data (Hawkins et al. 2015). We here make use of the Brown
& Holmes model (Brown and Holmes 2001) as a deadlock breaker, which
introduces accumulator biases and a saturation function on the inhibitory
mechanism of the LCA. The dynamics of the model are such that, in the case
of two equivalent alternatives, the model picks one or the other at random.
The reason for this is described within the following section. We make use of
the deadlock breaking parameters in our own model, as such it serves as an
extension to the Brown & Holmes decision-maker.
Brown & Holmes
The Brown & Holmes model of decision-making (Brown and Holmes 2001) was
developed as an extension to the original LCA model. As with most sequen-
tial sampling models, neural populations are accumulating noisy evidence over
time, with each population integrating for one stimulus or the other (since this
is a binary decision-making model). Like the original leaky competing accu-
mulators, the neural populations are in competition with each other through
laterally inhibitory connections and have a decay constant through which ac-
tivation decreases (their definition of activation being ‘a population-averaged
analogy to membrane voltage’ (Brown and Holmes 2001, p. 1). External stim-
uli are denoted as ρi in the original publication but are here adapted to Ii,
such that they are consistent with the Bogacz et al., (2006) notation, which we
also use for our own model definitions. The input stimuli are normalised such
that when Ii 6= 0, I2 = 1− I1. Two forms of ‘priming biases’ are introduced to
the model which are not present in the original leaky competing accumulators.
The first type of bias, denoted bi, affects the neural populations independently.
These biases may also be removed (as such bi = 0). The second type, denoted
as i0, affects both populations. Lateral inhibition is modified such that it is
implemented via a sigmoidal activation function:
f(x; g, b) =
1
1 + e−g(x−b)
(5.1)
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where g, the ‘activation gain’, denotes the slope of the function, and an increase
in this parameter results in a steeper curve. The ‘activation bias’, b, denotes
the midpoint of the function, and thus when x = b the slope is at a maximum.
In the original publication, b = 0.5. To visualise the function and observe the
changes in respect of activation gain g, the curve is plotted in Fig 5.2.
Figure 5.2: The Brown & Holmes activation function plotted for different values of
g, the ‘activation gain’ or slope of the function. The red circle indicates the midpoint
of the function curve where x = b.
Model Definitions
We now detail the definitions which describe the accumulator dynamics. The
activation function f(x; g, b) is from this point forward shortened to f(x).
As with other classical decision-making models, the model is described using
differential equations:
dx1 = (I1 + b1 + h0 − kx1 − wf(x2))dt
dx2 = (I2 + b2 + h0 − kx2 − wf(x1))dt (5.2)
where Ii denotes the input stimuli, bi the individual accumulator biases, h0
the joint accumulator bias (originally i0 in the Brown & Holmes model), k the
decay constant (leak) and w (originally β) the strength of lateral inhibition.
111
A Computational Model of Decision-Making
To understand the deadlock breaking mechanisms of this model, the phase
plane for equivalent values of Ii is illustrated in Fig 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Phase plane for the Brown & Holmes model. Stable points denoted by
closed circles, unstable points denoted by open circle. Accumulator activities converge
at one stable point or the other. Parameters: h0 = 0.5, b = 0.5, g = 5, k = 0.2, w =
0.75, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, I1 = 0, I2 = 0.
The phase plane serves as a visual representation of the fixed points in rela-
tion to the accumulator activities, as such we can see how the neural dynamics
will change according to the state the system is in. Both the accumulators
begin integration at the baseline activation, which is 0, and so from the ori-
gin they begin to increase. They will initially be drawn to an unstable fixed
point which is close to the baseline. They are then repelled from this point,
and the direction in which they go is determined by a small perturbation in
the system. After this perturbation, the activities converge onto one of the
stable points. The benefit of this is that, at these fixed points, one accumu-
lator has a higher activation than the other, which is a crucial dynamic for
decision-making. Exactly which stable point the accumulators will converge
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at is random - this corresponds to the decision-maker selecting one alternative
or the other without bias. This result is compatible with biological choice
behaviour and thus solves the problem that other classical decision-making
models faced when presented with two equivalent alternatives.
In order to see how these dynamics contribute to changes in neural activity
over time, we simulated the model computationally in binary decision-making
tasks. A single trial may last for any predetermined number of seconds, here
the maximum has been set to 50 (it should be noted that this is a simulation
of the free-response paradigm, where the decision-maker responds whenever
the decision threshold has been crossed and as such it responds in its own
time). We also set dt = 0.01, as in the (Bogacz et al. 2006) analysis. We here
run simulations with the parameters according to the standard parameter set
outlined in (Brown and Holmes 2001). Simulation results for a single choice
task are shown in Fig 5.4. Additionally, since this model is an extension of
the leaky competing accumulators, we also simulate the LCA model alongside
the Brown & Holmes one. This is to further emphasise how the additional
parameters are changing the decision process, such that the extended model
is now able to make a choice at random.
Fig 5.4 makes it clear how the neural dynamics of the Brown & Holmes
model aid in decision-making for two equivalent alternatives (where the dif-
ference in alternatives, ∆v, is set to 0). Although the process of evidence
accumulation is noisy in these decision-making models, here noise has been
removed in order to emphasise the dynamics. Both of the leaky competing
accumulators are stuck at the baseline level of activation and consequently the
model never makes a decision. In contrast, the Brown & Holmes accumulators
eventually diverge such that one of the accumulators is suppressed below the
baseline whilst the other is accelerated beyond the decision threshold. Which
accumulator reaches the threshold is random, and running multiple simula-
tions will yield situations where the y2 accumulator (where y2 represents the
activity level of the second accumulator, which is integrating evidence for the
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Figure 5.4: Accumulator activities of the Brown & Holmes model (black) compared
with those of the original LCA model (blue). The decision threshold is denoted by
the dashed red line. Note that noise has been removed (see main text). Parameters:
h0 = 0.5, b = 0.5, g = 5, k = 0.2, w = 0.75, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, I1 = 0, I2 = 0.
non-preferred alternative) will instead ‘win’ the trial.
It is important to note that these dynamics are dependent on the model
parameters being used. In some cases, a difference in accumulator activations
is never induced. This is demonstrated in Fig 5.5. Ideally, the difference in
activities should be larger in order to aid in discrimination tasks; as such para-
meter sensitivity must be taken into consideration when running simulations.
From Fig 5.5 we can see that setting the joint bias (h0) to 0.1 or 0.2
will result in the Brown & Holmes model behaving effectively like the leaky
competing accumulators, where there is no difference between the activities
of the two accumulators and as such the model is unable to make a decision.
The best performances are obtained when h0 > 0.4, and we use h0 = 0.5 for
our own simulations.
From this analysis we can conclude that the Brown & Holmes model is
able to perform well in decision-making tasks where previous classical decision-
making models failed. It builds upon the biologically plausible leaky compet-
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Figure 5.5: Examination of how the performance of the Brown & Holmes model
changes according to parametric setup. Plotted is the difference in accumulator activ-
ities (y1 − y2) at the end of a trial, for systematically varied values of g (the slope
of the activation function) and h0 (the joint accumulator bias). Darker blue areas
denote larger differences in accumulator activities and thus better performance. Yel-
low areas denote where the two accumulator activities are the same at the end of the
trial, which is undesirable. Parameters are reproduced from the standard set.
ing accumulators and serves as a good approximation to the antennal lobe
part of the decision-making circuit, where lateral inhibition is thought to be
employed. We can think of these neural populations as the computational
equivalent of the excitatory projection neurons of the antennal lobes, connec-
ted via lateral inhibition, the strength of which is mediated by the similarity of
the odours presented. With this part of the decision-making circuit in place,
we must now look to model the connections between the antennal lobes and
the lateral protocerebrum. As mentioned previously, within the invertebrate
olfactory system, ePN and iPN connections run in parallel, with ePN projec-
tions being excitatory and iPN projections being inhibitory, and pooled across
glomeruli. The secondary part of the circuit can thus be imagined as a ‘pooled-
feedforward’ model, which has been hypothesised to aid in discrimination by
increasing the difference in the population activities (Parnas et al. 2013).
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Weighted Lateral Inhibition
In the Brown & Holmes decision-maker, and indeed in other decision-making
models, the strength of lateral inhibition between neural units is set to a con-
stant value. However, there is evidence to suggest that inhibitory connections
between antennal lobe neurons are dependent on glomerular response profiles,
that is, a change of input brings about a change in inhibitory strength. As
such, lateral inhibition should be mediated according to the stimuli that are
presented.
In 1999, it was demonstrated in honeybees that usage of the GABA re-
ceptor antagonist picrotoxin impaired discrimination of similar odours but
not dissimilar ones, suggesting that lateral inhibition is engaged to decorrelate
similar odour response profiles but not dissimilar ones (Laurent et al. 1999).
The authors noted that the neuronal responses to stimuli are often ‘temporally
structured’ and suggested that the temporal dynamics of spike trains may be
encoding information about stimuli. More recently, a study in Drosophila sug-
gested that temporal patterns in the brain are dependent on the odours that
have been presented (Wilson and Laurent 2005). The results demonstrated
that GABAergic inhibition is employed to decorrelate the neural representa-
tions of odours, such that the differences between projection neuron activation
levels are increased over time. That is, the similarity of neural representations
decreased with GABA B-mediated inhibition. This study also proposed that
neural temporal patterns are a direct consequence of antennal lobe processing,
as such patterns are not found in ORN responses to odourants.
Finally, research conducted by Linster and colleagues examined how tem-
poral differences in neural responses may be taking place within the honeybee
brain (Linster et al. 2005). Their study built upon older studies on both
mammalian olfactory bulb and insect antennal lobe, where, as mentioned be-
fore, it has been shown that inhibitory networks are important for olfactory
processing. Their work suggests that it is the response profiles of the glom-
eruli that determine the lateral connectivity between these neural structures.
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Their computational model of the honeybee antennal lobes points to lateral
inhibition being mediated by the response profiles of the glomeruli. Their
network, wherein lateral inhibition is proportional to the similarity of the re-
sponse profiles, was able to produce experimentally observed results (namely
the output of PNs) more accurately than other networks. The study reiter-
ates the point that odour representations in the brain are both spatially and
temporally defined since representations are more dissimilar when leaving the
antennal lobes than when entering them as ORN input.
Taken together, the results of these studies heavily suggest that lateral
inhibition should not be constant between neural structures. It should be
noted that, although the evidence for weighted lateral inhibition has been
obtained from studies which have used different invertebrates, we here assume
it can be generalised across groups (Galizia 2014). From these results we
conclude that inhibitory strength should be dependent upon odour input, more
specifically the similarity between odours (∆v in our model). As such, we
modify the Brown & Holmes model to take the stimuli presented into account.
Pooled Feedforward Inhibition
The second ‘layer’ of the model has been designed to replicate the connectivity
from the antennal lobe iPNs to the lateral protocerebrum. We thus employ a
mechanism which has not been explored in sequential sampling models before,
where input from the first layer of accumulators is summed and the total used
as inhibition on the following layer of accumulators (Fig 5.6).
This inhibition is selective and it targets only one accumulator, represent-
ing the selective inhibition in the honeybee lateral protocerebrum (see Fig 5.9,
in the model this layer is composed of the xi and z populations. For the full
definitions, see ‘Materials & Methods’). Biologically, this denotes either an
innate preference for one stimulus over another, or, a learned preference. The
model can thus represent the state of a decision-maker post learning.
To see how this part of the model will aid in decision-making, as before
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Figure 5.6: Schematic for pooled-feedforward inhibition part of the model.
with the Brown & Holmes model, we can analyse the phase plane. This is
shown in Fig 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Phase plane for the pooled-feedforward layer of the model. Demonstrated
is an unstable star node (unstable point denoted by open circle). Parameters: I1 =
0, I2 = 0, h0 = 0.5, w
′′ = 0.4, k′′ = 0.1, g = 5, b = 0.5, k = 0.2 w = 0.75, k¯ = 0.2.
We assume that the neural activities have settled into one stable point or
another from the dynamics of the first layer (see Fig 5.3). At either of the
stable points, the dynamics of the second layer will enhance the differences in
accumulator activities, allowing one to increase whilst inhibiting the other. As
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Figure 5.8: The pooled-feedforward inhibition model is unable to decorrelate when
two equal alternatives are presented. Parameters: I1 = 0, I2 = 0, h0 = 0.5, w
′′ =
0.2, k′′ = 0.3, g = 10, b = 0.5, k = 0.2, w = 0.75, k¯ = 0.2.
such, the phase plane indicates that pooled-feedforward inhibition may indeed
be acting as a decorrelator for neural signals, which agrees with the hypotheses
put forward by previous research. This idea is tested in our simulations.
It is worth noting that this model, on its own, suffers fom the same problem
as other classical decision-making models. With two equal alternatives, it is
unable to separate the population activities and simply integrates noise over
time. This is shown in Fig 5.8.
The figure shows the Brown & Holmes model (blue) and the pooled-
feedforward inhibition model (black) implemented separately. In the presence
of equal alternatives, the pooled-inhibition model hovers around the baseline
level of activation and never reaches the decision threshold (red). However,
since the model has been developed on the basis of honeybee neurobiological
data (with the assumption that features of the honeybee olfactory system can
be generalised to other invertebrates) it would make sense that such a model
needs the first layer, where lateral inhibition is applied to introduce competi-
tion into the circuit and provide the initial decorrelation, in order to perform
well. Because this model builds upon the dynamics of the first, it is not a
problem that it is unable to decorrelate the signals of equal alternatives when
implemented alone.
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5.1 Materials and Methods
Our decision-making network is based on classical models of decision-making
(Bogacz et al. 2006) and is composed of leaky accumulating units which are
organised in a manner inspired by that of the invertebrate olfactory system
(Fig. 5.9). It extends the Brown & Holmes model of decision-making (Brown
and Holmes 2001) which makes use of priming biases as well as a neural activa-
tion function in order to invoke random choice behaviour upon the presentation
of two alternatives equal in value. Taking inspiration from previous biological
and computational studies, we alter lateral inhibition so that it is mediated
according to the similarity of the alternatives presented.
We use our model of decision-making to simulate a T-maze olfactometer
task. Here, two odours are presented to the network and it must discriminate
between them and respond to the correct one (the one it would have been
trained to prefer, as the network is in the post-learning state) within a given
amount of time. Since we are simulating a two-alternative forced-choice task,
the network is composed of two competing evidence accumulation channels;
the first channel (denoted by integer 1 in the unit labels shown in Fig. 5.9)
accumulates the preferred olfactory input and is thus the ‘preferred’ chan-
nel. In simulations, odours presented to the model invoke responses from the
ORN populations and their mean firing rate is used for odour encoding. The
odour which invokes a higher mean firing rate is denoted the preferred option,
thus I1 > I2, and a greater difference in the means corresponds to a greater
Euclidean distance within the neural representations (and therefore an easier
task).
The pre-motor accumulator of the first channel, corresponding to neural
units in the honeybee lateral protocerebrum, must reach the decision threshold
in order for the network to respond to the preferred odour. At the end of each
simulated trial the decision time is recorded, as well as whether or not the
network made the correct decision.
We use this model to examine the impact of two inhibitory circuits to
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Figure 5.9: A biologically constrained network for binary decision-making. Right:
frontal section of the honeybee brain, adapted from Perry and Barron 2013b with
permission, with modelled brain regions highlighted in colour. A single olfactory
tract, which bypasses the mushroom bodies and projects directly to the lateral proto-
cerebrum, is shown in blue. Left: the network schematic. The decision network is com-
posed of external sensory units which provide input to the system (dotted circles) and
leaky accumulating units which integrate sensory information (solid circles). Neural
pools are defined as follows: Ii populations denote ORNs, yi denote antennal lobe
neurons (both LNs and ePNs), z denotes the iPNs and xi denote the pre-motor units
in the lateral protocerebrum. Excitatory connections between units are denoted by
solid black arrows, inhibitory connections by red filled circles, and neural leak by
dashed arrows.
quantify their role in robust decision-making. Furthermore, we alter specific
parameters to see how decision accuracy and time changes within a binary
task. In particular, we vary the difficulty of the task (such that the presented
odours are similar or dissimilar), the decision threshold (the level of which
represents the internal state of the bee, discussed in the previous chapter),
the strength of pooled inhibition arising from the iPN population and the
plasticity of lateral inhibition within the antennal lobes.
Precisely what determines the level of the decision threshold, and causes
some agents to respond more quickly than others, is currently unknown. Un-
doubtedly such a mechanism will be subject to individual differences, indeed,
such was seen to be the case with bumblebees in a discrimination task using
virtual flowers (Chittka et al. 2003). The level of training given to an agent
prior to a task may also impact response time, however, it would be unreas-
onable to assume that agents completing the task will behave in the same
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manner simply because they have received the same training. One factor that
is often overlooked, perhaps due to the fact that it is difficult to control exper-
imentally, is motivational state, and it is this factor that we wish to explore
by means of the decision threshold within the model.
We now describe our network of accumulators for our model of decision-
making, using ordinary differential equations to update the accumulator activ-
ity. The equations are defined as follows (cf Fig. 5.9)):
dy1 = (I1 + h0 − ky1 − ( w
∆v
)f(y2))dt
dy2 = (I2 + h0 − ky2 − ( w
∆v
)f(y1))dt (5.3)
where dyi denote the activity of the antennal lobe accumulators, Ii denote
the activity of the olfactory receptor neurons, h0 represents a bias presented
to both accumulators (otherwise known as the baseline activation), k denotes
the strength of accumulator leak, w denotes the strength of lateral inhibition,
∆v denotes the difference in chemical structure of the two presented odours,
and f(yi) denote the neural saturation function used when implementing lat-
eral inhibition (see Brown and Holmes 2001). Here, the strength of lateral
inhibition is weighted according to the similarity of the two presented stimuli,
∆v.
The group of inhibitory projection neurons are described as follows:
dz = (y1 + y2 − k˜z)dt (5.4)
where k˜ denotes the leak of the iPN population. Finally, the pre-motor accu-
mulators are described by the following:
dx1 = (y1 − k′x1)dt
dx2 = (y2 − k′x2 − w′z)dt (5.5)
where w˜ denotes the leak of the pre-motor accumulators and w′ denotes the
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strength of the inhibition from the iPN population.
The inputs of the model are normalised (Brown and Holmes 2001) and are
determined as follows:
I2 =

1− I1, if I1 6= 0
0, otherwise
(5.6)
This model does not have the capacity to learn as the mushroom bodies have
not been modelled here. Instead, we assume that the odour preference is a
result of a training phase, thus the agent has been pre-trained and prefers one
odour over the other as it is associated with a reward. Alternatively, it could
be assumed that the odour preference is innate and evolutionarily determined.
Innate odour preferences within a binary decision-making task have been ex-
plored quite recently with Drosophila (Parnas et al. 2013) and we can assume
that this concept extends to honeybees. Here, the first odour (input from I1)
is considered the preferred stimulus and thus a correct decision corresponds
to the first pre-motor accumulator, x1, reaching the decision threshold first.
All results from the model are generated using what we refer to as the
standard parameter set unless specifically stated otherwise. These parameters
are in Table 5.1 and were derived from simulation results in order to produce
good model performance in decision-making tasks.
Table 5.1: The standard parameter set.
Value Function
b 0.50 midpoint of saturation function
g 5.00 slope of saturation function
w 0.75 weight of lateral inhibition (static)
k 0.20 neural leak of antennal lobe units
i0 0.50 baseline neural activation; joint bias
w′ 0.40 strength of pooled inhibition
k′ 0.10 neural leak of pre-motor units
k˜ 0.20 neural leak of iPN population
dt 0.01 time step used in Euler method
z 0.01 - 0.5 decision threshold
∆v 0.1 - 0.9 chemical difference / task difficulty
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5.2 Results
We ran simulations of binary decision-making tasks using this model. In or-
der to examine the full impact of the two inhibitory circuits (weighted lateral
inhibition and pooled-feedforward inhibition), we first simulated the model
with and without these circuits intact. We obtained an accuracy matrix for
decision-making performances for the full model, under different task diffi-
culties and levels of decision threshold (corresponding to the motivational
state of the modelled animal). Finally, we then used the results obtained to
infer how an animal’s choice behaviours may differ according to task difficulty
and motivational state, and we compared the theoretical data with our behavi-
oural experiments performed in Chapter 4, as well as with another experiment
performed by (Parnas et al. 2013) using Drosophila.
Inhibitory projection neurons enhance discrimination
We first investigated the role of pooled feedforward-inhibition in the decision-
making process. In the model, a single accumulator (z) pools the antennal lobe
activity and propagates the combined total forward as inhibition to a single
channel in the lateral protocerebrum. This corresponds to the multiglomerular
inhibitory projection neurons (iPNs) of the honeybee brain and functionally
achieves selective attenuation of the non-preferred channel (see Fig 5.9, where
only the non-preferred pre-motor accumulator is inhibited).
We thus compared the performance of two models: one with and one
without the iPN population. We term the complete model ‘WiPN’ (with iPN)
and the alternative model ‘NiPN’ (no iPN). We then ran decision-making
tasks with these two models under the same conditions such that their neural
dynamics could be compared. Analysis of the simulations showed that pooled
inhibition enhanced the decorrelation of the neural signals and produced a
greater difference in neural activity by the end of the trial. This is shown for
several different simulations in (Fig. 5.10).
From the accumulator plot in Fig. 5.10, it is clear that both models are
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Figure 5.10: Pooled inhibition improves discrimination by decorrelating neural sig-
nals. Top-left: accumulator plot to show how the integrated evidence (neural activity)
changes over the course of an easy discrimination trial for the pre-motor units. Solid
lines denote preferred accumulator activity, dashed lines denote non-preferred accu-
mulator activity. Black lines denote WiPN model, blue lines denote NiPN model.
Top-right: the discrimination performances of the two models compared across ten
thousand trials for tasks of varying difficulty and allowed integration time. Plotted is
the percentage of trials where the WiPN model improves discrimination (thus, at 50
%, the WiPN model is performing as well as the NiPN model). Bottom: plots to show
the absolute difference between the pre-motor units at the end of an easy decision-
making trial (lasting for five seconds), for the WiPN model (right) and NiPN model
(left), for varying baseline activation (h0) and neural saturation (g) parameters. A
higher absolute difference (blue areas) denotes enhanced decorrelation.
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able to decorrelate the two neural signals. In this particular simulation, both
models also make the correct choice, with the WiPN model selecting the pre-
ferred alternative slightly faster. However, by the end of the trial, the model
with pooled inhibition was able to decorrelate its signals to a greater extent.
Further investigation showed that decorrelation was enhanced more con-
sistently for easier tasks (performance plot in Fig. 5.10). Furthermore, en-
hancement was also dependent on the time allowed for the task: when the
model was given more time to accumulate evidence the iPN population im-
proved discrimination to a greater extent (Fig. 5.10). Although the perform-
ance curves for five and ten seconds are very similar, suggesting that five
seconds is plenty of time for the pooled-feedforward model to decorrelate the
signals, there is quite a large difference between one and two seconds. When
allowed two seconds for evidence accumulation, and when given an easy task,
the WiPN model successfully outperformed the NiPN model (in terms of de-
correlation) around 95% of the time. For harder tasks, this percentage drops
to around 60 - 70%. When five seconds are allowed, the difficulty of the task
becomes less detrimental to performance.
We then performed a sensitivity analysis on the two models to see how
decorrelation performance changed under varying parametric conditions. We
varied two parameters of the original Brown & Holmes model, the slope of
the neural saturation function (g) and the baseline activity or joint accumu-
lator bias (h0). The results are shown in the bottom row of Fig. 5.10. We
found that, for all cases, the WiPN model was able to enhance decorrelation,
with improvements being especially pronounced when h0 was set to a higher
value. As such, this model was able to outperform the NiPN model across
parametric setups. Taken together, these results suggest how multiglomerular
iPNs could act as an effective decorrelator of similar neural signals to improve
discrimination.
We then investigated whether or not pooled inhibition would impact the
overall decision accuracy and decision speed of the model. Since we hypothes-
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ise that the motivational state of an animal will impact the speed-accuracy
trade-off, we recognised that the level of the decision threshold would need to
be taken into account, thus we ran simulations for tasks of varying difficulty
with different decision thresholds. As with the results in Fig 5.10, we com-
pared the results with the NiPN model to quantify the benefits of the iPN
neurons.
The results are shown in Fig 5.11. The WiPN model tended to be slightly
more accurate in decision-making, with particularly superior performances
manifesting when the strength of pooled inhibition was increased beyond that
of the standard parameter. However, pooled inhibition had little to no effect
on the average decision speed of the WiPN model, even when the strength of
inhibition was increased. The model took longer to make a decision in harder
tasks than easier tasks, and this slowdown was enhanced by the implementa-
tion of a higher decision threshold. With a lower threshold, the model made
decisions very quickly regardless of task difficulty. Taken together, these res-
ults may indicate that this mechanism will not impact the decision speed of
an animal despite giving it a slight increase in accuracy. However, such a res-
ult also implies that the mechanism may be sub-optimal. As discussed before,
drift-diffusion theory predicts that the speed-accuracy trade-off is unavoidable
for optimal decision-makers.
Weighted lateral inhibition enhances discrimination for more
difficult tasks
We next investigated the role of weighted lateral inhibition in the decision-
making process. Within our full model, we varied the weight of the inhib-
itory connections according to the difficulty of the task such that a more
difficult task resulted in stronger lateral inhibition between the antennal lobe
populations. We compared this model to another which had static inhibitory
connections. We refer to this as the SI model (static inhibition) and the model
with weighted inhibition as the WI model. We ran comparisons akin to the
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Figure 5.11: Pooled inhibition can improve decision accuracy without impacting de-
cision speed. Left: average decision speeds for tasks of varying difficulty and threshold
levels. Right: average decision accuracies for respective tasks. Averages in this figure
were calculated from ten thousand trials. Low decision threshold: 0.1, higher decision
threshold: 0.5.
ones for the feedforward-pooled inhibition part of the model, and the results
are shown in Fig 5.12.
Analysis of the accumulator plot in Fig. 5.12 shows that, in contrast to the
SI model, the WI model is able to effectively decorrelate its neural signals. It
should be noted that this was a ‘bad’ simulation for the SI model, and that
the performance shown here is not representative of the overall performance
of the model. However, this emphasises the difference that weighted lateral
inhibition can make.
Additional investigation showed that decorrelation was enhanced more
consistently for harder tasks (performance plot in Fig. 5.12). As with the
pooled-feedforward part of the model, enhancement was dependent on the
time allowed for the model to integrate evidence. When the model was given
more time, the introduction of weighted inhibition improved discrimination to
a greater extent for more difficult tasks. Again, the performance curves for five
and ten second trials are similar. The difference in performance between two
and five seconds is here quite large, with the WI model in these cases being
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Figure 5.12: Weighted lateral inhibition gives rise to enhanced decorrelation. Top-
left: accumulator plot for a single trial. Black lines denote the WI model, blue lines
denote the SI model. Solid lines denote preferred accumulator activity, dashed lines
denote non-preferred accumulator activity. Top-right: percentage of trials where the
WI model improves discrimination. As before, a percentage of 50 % means that the
WI model performs just as well as the SI model. Bottom: plots to show the absolute
difference between the pre-motor units at the end of a harder decision-making trial,
for the WI model (right) and SI model (left), for varying baseline activation (h0) and
neural saturation (g) parameters. A higher absolute difference (blue areas) denotes
enhanced decorrelation.
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able to outperform the SI model around 90 - 100 % of the time. For easy tasks,
this performance drops, and the SI model instead is outperforming in terms
of decorrelation. Interestingly, for pooled-feedforward inhibition, allowing five
seconds or more for evidence accumulation results in the task difficulty hav-
ing less impact on performance, however, for the lateral inhibition part of the
model, the inverse is true. Here, when five seconds or more are allowed for the
model to accumulate, it becomes increasingly sensitive to task difficulty, and
easier tasks have a greater negative impact.
Finally, we then performed a sensitivity analysis on the two models to see
how decorrelation performance changed under varying parametric conditions.
As before, we varied two parameters of the original Brown & Holmes model,
the slope of the neural saturation function (g) and the baseline activity or
joint accumulator bias (h0). The results are shown in the bottom row of
Fig. 5.12. We found that, in most cases, the WI model was able to enhance
discrimination. Improvements were especially pronounced for higher values of
g and h0, with the best performances being obtained for h0 = 0.5, g = 20 (top
right of matrix in bottom-right plot of Fig. 5.12). For the WI model, using
smaller values of g reduced decorrelation performance. Regardless, this model
was able to outperform the SI model across many parametric setups, and these
results suggest that weighted lateral inhibition is particularly effective as a
decorrelating mechanism for difficult decision-making tasks. However, since it
is detrimental for easier tasks, this mechanism should perhaps be disengaged
(neurobiological results suggest that this is the case, see brief discussion of
weighted lateral inhibition above.)
A Model of Decision-Making can Predict Choice Behaviour
In this model, we used the level of the decision threshold to represent the
motivational state of an animal, thus we make the assumption that internal
state can directly impact the evidence accumulation process and change how
much evidence is needed to initiate a response. This assumption was ex-
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Figure 5.13: The full model, with both weighted lateral inhibition and pooled-
feedforward inhibition, completed discrimination tasks of varying difficulties with dif-
ferent decision thresholds. Our underlying assumption is that a change in motivation
causes an animal to alter its decision threshold, thus lower thresholds correspond to
‘hungry’ states and higher thresholds ‘satiated’ states. Dark blue areas denote high
decision accuracy. Pixels highlighted with an asterisk signify data that have been
used for comparison with data from the accompanying behavioural experiment.
plored in Chapter 4, where we used a well-known behavioural paradigm to
test how honeybee choice behaviour differed in satiated and hungry bees. Be-
fore performing this experiment, we first used this model to make behavioural
predictions. We ran decision-making trials where the decision threshold and
task difficulty were systematically varied and performed ten thousand trials
in each setup. We then recorded the average decision accuracy. The results
are given in Fig 5.13.
The model results show that the accuracy of the decision-maker is de-
pendent on task difficulty as well as motivational state. For task difficulty,
the model predicts that the decision-maker will be more accurate in easier
trials where the two odours presented are very dissimilar. For harder trials,
the model suffers a reduction in accuracy. For two odours that are almost
equivalent, the model picks the correct odour by chance. These results are in
agreement with those of the study of (Parnas et al. 2013), which examined
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Drosophila choice behaviour in a two-alternative forced-choice task.
Intuitively, the implementation of a low decision threshold caused a reduc-
tion in decision accuracy. In trials where the threshold was particularly low
(corresponding to a very hungry animal), the model performance was reduced,
even in tasks where two dissimilar odours were presented and should have been
easy to discriminate between. As such the model predicts that hungry animals
will make more mistakes than satiated animals when they are discriminating
between alternatives, regardless of how easy the task is. The model performs
the best when satiated and when discriminating between dissimilar alternat-
ives (easier tasks), in some cases achieving 100% accuracy (thus choosing the
correct option in each trial).
We here refer back to the behavioural data from Chapter 4. Although
the results of this model cannot be directly applied to the experiments (as
they were not true two-alternative forced-choice tasks), the model predictions
can still be used to infer behavioural changes under the assumption that the
process of evidence accumulation remains the same and that the underly-
ing mechanisms still apply (noisy evidence accumulated over time, decision
reached upon crossing the decision threshold, etc). In both our behavioural
experiments, we saw that hungry honeybees were significantly less accurate
than satiated bees. Furthermore, in our first experiment, this result was ob-
tained from a choice task which used two dissimilar odours, as such they should
have been easy to discriminate between. As such, these behavioural data are
in agreement with the model.
5.3 Discussion
We developed a sequential sampling model which has connectivity based on
honeybee neurobiology. Based on previous research in invertebrate olfactory
systems, we here held the assumption that the principles of olfactory pro-
cessing in honeybees can be generalised to other invertebrates. We replicated
part of the olfactory system using a higher-level approach, focusing on pop-
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ulations of neurons and how they interact with other brain centres. Using
this model, we examined how two different inhibitory mechanisms may con-
tribute to the discrimination abilities of an animal. We furthermore inferred
how these two mechanisms might interact with other parameters which im-
pact the evidence accumulation process, such as the decision threshold and
task difficulty.
The results suggest that pooled-feedforward inhibition, a mechanism which
is implemented in the honeybee brain via the multiglomerular iPNs, decorrel-
ate neural representations of odours as they reach the pre-motor region of the
brain, allowing for enhanced discrimination. This is achieved by means of tar-
geted or selective inhibition, where the signal for the non-preferred odour is
suppressed. We assume that this connection can be strengthened or weakened
as a result of further learning. The results also suggest that the decision accur-
acy of the animal should improve due to the presence of these inhibitory neur-
ons, since the accumulation channels integrating evidence for non-preferred
options are being driven below the decision threshold.
Although selective inhibition could be a mechanism that arises due to
learning or training, it could also be a consequence of evolutionary adaptation,
resulting in the animal developing innate preferences for some odours over
others. Previous research has suggested that this is the case. It has been
shown, for example, that the aldehydes invoke responses (proboscis extensions)
from bees more than other chemical groups (Guerrieri et al. 2005). Indeed,
our preliminary data with honeybees show that untrained bees were more
likely to respond to Hexanal, one of the aldehydes, than 1-Heptanol, on their
first learning trial (around 20% of bees). Furthermore, honeybees have been
shown to exhibit innate preferences for specific attributes of visual stimuli, for
example, symmetrical or ‘flower-like’ patterns (Lehrer et al. 1995) and colour
(Giurfa et al. 1995), as such it is reasonable to assume that they will have
innate preferences for some odours over others.
We investigated whether lateral inhibition, a mechanism also implemen-
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ted in the antennal lobes through the interactions of ePNs and LNs, would
improve the decision-making process by being weighted according to odour
similarity as opposed to being static. The results suggest that weighted lat-
eral inhibition may have evolved to enhance neural decorrelation for harder
discrimination tasks. For easier tasks, however, this mechanism eventually
becomes detrimental and does not perform well as a decorrelator. As such, it
may be the case that lateral inhibition is only ‘switched on’ for harder tasks,
when decorrelation within the antennal lobes becomes crucial. Alternatively,
there may be a minimum weight that inhibition cannot drop below.
Our sequential sampling model holds the assumptions that noisy sensory
evidence is accumulated over time and that a response is triggered when the
sampled evidence crosses the decision threshold. We further proposed that
the decision threshold should be mediated by motivational state. As such, it
is here predicted that the decision speed and accuracy of an animal within
a choice task should be dependent on motivational state. The results of the
model suggest that animals with low decision thresholds (corresponding to
being hungry) should be more prone to error. The behavioural data presented
in Chapter 4, which was obtained from real honeybees within a proboscis
extension reflex paradigm task, agree with the model predictions (although it
is important to note that they cannot be matched precisely, as the bees were
not in a two-alternative forced-choice task). In our experiments, we found that
hungry bees were indeed less accurate in their decision-making. This suggests
that evidence accumulation is directly impacted by motivational state and that
this state can thus alter decision accuracy and speed. Importantly, choice
behaviours can differ between animals, even if they have been through the
same training, if their motivational states are not controlled in some manner.
We found that the model results also agree with the behavioural data
obtained by (Parnas et al. 2013). Their study, which used a T-maze to exam-
ine Drosophila choice behaviours within a two-alternative forced-choice task,
demonstrated that odour similarity, or task difficulty, directly impacted the
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way the flies behaved. More specifically, when the flies were presented with two
dissimilar odours, one of which they innately preferred, they would exhibit a
very clear bias for the preferred odour. Within the model, this corresponds to
the decision-maker consistently choosing the correct odour over the incorrect
odour. However, when the flies were presented with an odour that was very
similar to the preferred odour, no preference was shown. This corresponds to
the trials where the model chose the correct odour around 50% of the time,
indicating no preference for either option.
It has also been suggested that fast and inaccurate decision-making may
be a foraging strategy implemented by bees, such that they can maximise
their nectar collection rate (Burns 2005). When a bee has depleted its food
resources, mediation of the decision threshold may cause it to switch to imple-
menting this strategy. In this state, waiting to accumulate more evidence is a
time cost that the bee cannot afford, thus quick decision-making is perhaps the
optimal strategy to implement. In the wild, honeybees (and other animals)
face predatory threats and inaccurate decisions may increase the likelihood of
an encounter, however, such an encounter will remain a possibility whilst star-
vation would be absolutely certain. In this situation, it can be inferred why
speed should be favoured, and a change in foraging strategy is advantageous.
From these results it is suggested that more attention is given to evidence
accumulation processes in decision-making and discrimination studies, and
that motivational state should be controlled where possible. In many cases
this may be too difficult, however, in tasks where animals are being trained
to respond to food rewards, the level of satiation is relatively easy to control.
Here, despite receiving the same training, honeybees in different motivational
states responded differently during the testing phase: hungry bees struggled
to discriminate in easy tasks which posed no problem for partially satiated
bees. We recognise that other motivations, for example thirst and stress, are
also likely to impact the decision-making process, however we do not model
them here. Instead, we use the model to emphasise that decision-making is a
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robust and dynamic process which can be influenced by internal states as well
as external parameters (such as task difficulty).
Our model does not encompass every mechanism that has been implemen-
ted by the honeybee brain to aid in discrimination tasks. However, it has
stressed the importance of two inhibitory mechanisms which are functionally
different but achieve similar results: the decorrelation of neural signals, res-
ulting in improved discrimination. The model has also suggested that these
inhibitory mechanisms may interact with the motivational state of the bee
to give rise to adaptive decision-making. From our network, we can infer
how the brains of honeybees and other invertebrates may operate using these
mechanisms.
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Future Work and Conclusions
This research has approached perceptual decision-making from the perspect-
ive of sequential sampling models, which assume that action selection rests
upon the accumulation of evidence. Over the years, a tremendous amount of
research has focused on the behaviours resulting from decision-making, and
it is clear that it is a robust and dynamic process. The model that was de-
veloped here was based upon previous models of decision-making, the results of
which emphasise the role of inhibitory networks within the invertebrate brain.
Furthermore, the results of the biological experiment suggest that the crucial
mechanism of the decision threshold is mediated by motivational state. Whilst
the results are encouraging, it is important to keep in mind that the model
that was developed here is no doubt an oversimplification of real decision-
making mechanisms that ignores many of the aspects that will impact choice
behaviour. Furthermore, the behavioural experiment used honeybees within
laboratory settings wherein they were harnessed; as such, the conditions of
the bees will have been affected. Nonetheless, these results may still give an
insight into how certain neural circuits in the brain impact decision-making
and how motivation can influence it. This research has presented several novel
ideas that will hopefully be built upon in future projects.
The model of decision-making that was developed for this research attemp-
ted to replicate some of the olfactory pathways within the honeybee brain. It
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is in no way, however, a complete picture of what is happening. A few of the
limitations encountered with both the model and the biological experiment
are here explored, and proposals for future work presented.
6.1 Level of Abstraction
When implementing biologically-plausible computational models, the question
of how much detail to include within the model should always be considered.
Some models, for example, will include tens of parameters for the sake of
biological realism, whereas others will take a more ‘black box’ approach. The
latter approach will be simpler, and often it is the case that such a model
can still replicate real world data. More specifically for neural models, the
complexity can range between modelling groups of neurons as a single unit, as
was done for this research project, or individual neurons and their properties.
Although it may seem intuitive to include as much detail as possible, this does
not always produce more accurate results. Furthermore, more complex models
require more computational power, and they may also introduce a drawback
with regards to comprehensibility.
A typical neuron, at the most basic level, will be composed of a cell body
(or soma), dendrites for input into the cell body and an axon to deliver outputs
(Arbib 1995). Although there are many different types of neuron, computa-
tional models often simplify the matter and model neurons with as little com-
plexity as possible, which is important for networks built up from hundreds
or thousands of them. Of all the neuron models that exist, the point neurons
are the simplest (for example, rate neurons which do not spike and integrate-
and-fire neurons which do), although they are not used for many simulations
as they are often assmed to be too simplistic to produce reliable results. On
the other end of the spectrum is the Hodgkin-Huxley model (Hodgkin and
Huxley 1952), inspired by data from the giant squid axon, which incorporates
far more parameters which must be measured from biological experiments in
order to replicate real world data.
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With any of these models, what must be taken into account is how com-
putationally expensive the model is and whether or not higher levels of detail
will produce more accurate results or provide greater insight. For this research
we decided to develop a decision-making model using a higher-level approach,
which involved modelling neurons as populations. We thus assumed that each
population could be representative of a region within the brain. For this kind
of model, the details of the individual neurons must be ignored, which allows
for a focus on the connectivity between the populations and how different
regions might impact each other. Additionally, this kind of model assumes
that all the neurons within a single population will function in an equival-
ent manner. This is not always the case. Furthermore, there was no spiking
in the model, rather, activity was measured in terms of the mean firing rate
of the populations. The end result was a model that was computationally
inexpensive, which in turn meant that simulation results could be obtained
quickly. Although the simulations presented in this work are not computa-
tionally intensive, searching the parameter space for model performance can
quickly become a problem, certainly for searches comprising of three paramet-
ers (to show within a 3D performance plot, for example). If these searches
are being performed for tasks wherein the decision-maker is given more time
to make a decision (twenty or more seconds, for example), the time required
for these simulations to finish will increase rapidly. As such, a model of this
simplicity is beneficial.
It should also be noted that it is easier to start from a higher-level ap-
proach and add more biological detail to future versions of the model, rather
than start with a more detailed model that is made increasingly abstract. In-
deed, the former avenue has already been explored with quite a famous model
of mammalian action selection. In 2001, Kevin Gurney and colleagues im-
plemented a biologically-plausible population-level model of the basal ganglia,
which is able to perform action selection (Gurney et al. 2001a, Gurney et al.
2001b). The model used leaky-integrator neurons and simulated neural inter-
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action between regions of the mammalian basal ganglia. The model was able
to reproduce some forms of action selection seen in animals with results that
match neurobiological data, also incorporating dopaminergic modulation such
that dopamine levels impacted choice performance. A few years later, this
model of the mammalian basal ganglia was expanded upon (Humphries et al.
2006). This time, instead of using populations of neurons, the study imple-
mented spiking neurons, a move that aimed to increase biological plausibility
of the model. Here, the model was able to replicate some experimental data
obtained from rats (the mean firing rates of certain brain regions) and indeed
was able to reproduce the results of the original model. For example, setting
dopamine to a low value resulted in the model not selecting any action, and
higher levels of dopamine resulted in the model choosing more than one action.
As such, it was shown that a higher-level model which focuses on populations
of neurons can achieve the same results as one that incorporates individual
spiking neurons. This model thus serves as a good example of one which was
first developed to be a population model but was later successfully adapted to
include a greater amount of biological detail.
6.2 Multi-Alternative Decision-Making
For this research we have focused on binary decision-making, however, choos-
ing between only two alternatives is a simplification of real world situations.
Within their natural environments, animals are far more likely to encounter
multi-alternative choice tasks. Although binary decision-making tasks, such
as the two-alternative forced-choice paradigm, can be well studied in laborat-
ory settings, manipulated and adapted to suit different scenarios, they will not
be as representative of real world decision-making as multi-alternative tasks.
That said, it has been argued that binary decision-making is still worth study-
ing: ‘... it is representative of many problems faced by animals in their natural
environments (e.g., whether to approach or avoid a novel stimulus)’ (Bogacz
et al. 2006).
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In light of this limitation, there are models which have been developed to
build upon the original binary sequential sampling models and include more
than two alternatives (Bogacz et al. 2007, Tsetsos et al. 2011). It is assumed
that there are more than two integrators and, as with the two-alternative
models, that each integrator is accumulating evidence for a single alternative.
Tsetsos, Usher and McClelland develop multi-alternative extensions for the
race model, LCA model and DDM in a recent publication (Tsetsos et al.
2011). As the model developed here is an extension of the LCA model, it
should be possible to make a multi-alternative variant. It would be interesting
to see how the model performed when asked to discriminate between more
than two stimuli. A drawback to this approach, however, will be incorporating
the added complexity into behavioural experiments (as well as an increase in
computational power required for the model).
6.3 Honeybee Mushroom Bodies
The honeybee has a high capacity for learning and memory. This insect is
required to navigate large distances in order to forage for food and return to
the hive safely, detect rewarding flowers during foraging flights, communicate
the whereabouts of available food sources to other hive mates, and contribute
to collective decision-making. Furthermore, even though the honeybee does
indeed have a brain the size of a grass seed, it has a rich behavioural repertoire
(Menzel et al. 2001, Giurfa 2003a, Menzel and Giurfa 2006, Srinivasan 2010)
Indeed, behavioural and neurobiological studies indicate that the honeybee
is important to research in learning, memory and decision-making, despite
its relatively simple nervous system. It has been shown to be able to learn
abstract properties, such as orientation or colour, of stimuli (Van Hateren
et al. 1990, Horridge et al. 1992, Horridge and Zhang 1995, Giurfa et al. 1996)
and other concepts such as ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’ (Giurfa et al. 2001), learn
two concepts simultaneously (Avargue`s-Weber et al. 2012), navigate through
complex mazes using visual cues (Zhang et al. 1999, Zhang et al. 2000) and
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solve contextual problems (Collett and Kelber 1988, Zhang et al. 2006). Since
decision-making can be influenced by learning, it is intuitive that it is beneficial
to incorporate into a model. In particular, the learning of abstract properties
of enables an agent to apply its knowledge to a decision-making task which
introduces novel stimuli.
The model of decision-making that has been developed for this research
is a higher level approach to modelling the honeybee brain. However, it is in
no way a complete model and it does not incorporate all of the brain centres
that are involved with decision-making and action selection, for example, the
mushroom bodies and central complex. Furthermore, we here focus only on
the olfactory centres. The model aimed to replicate some of the more well
studied olfactory pathways, however, since there are no mushroom bodies,
it cannot model them all. Another impact of this is that the model in its
current state is unable to demonstrate any form of learning. The decision-
maker is wired to exhibit a preference for one stimulus over another as a result
of training, however, this preference cannot be changed. Since the model is
making a choice within the proboscis extension reflex paradigm, a choice task
that is traditionally used to study honeybee learning and memory, it would be
desirable to incorporate aspects of learning into the model in order to replicate
the learning curves that are derived from real PER experiments. It would be
possible, for example, to adapt the model such that specific neural connections
are strengthened in the presence of positive reinforcement or reward. Indeed,
this has shown to be an effective method of implementing learning (Vasilaki
et al. 2009).
During this project, work on such an extended model already began but
currently remains in the theoretical stage. The more complete version includes
the mushroom body kenyon cells and the extrinsic neurons which connect
to other higher level brain centres, and has the capacity to learn to prefer
one stimulus over another, or to reverse this preference. Since the theoret-
ical foundations are in place, the computational implementation is the next
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stage. This extended model would perhaps be the first thing to work on in
future research, as it would give a more complete picture of the olfactory path-
ways within the brain. Indeed, since two of the more well-known pathways
travel through the mushroom bodies, full decision-making behaviours cannot
be modelled unless these brain regions are included. It would be interesting
to examine the contribution of these pathways to choice behaviours, as this is
still being studied.
6.4 Computational and Experimental Comparisons
Much of the previous research in decision-making makes use of the two-alternative
forced-choice task. Indeed, our sequential sampling model also aims to replic-
ate behaviours for such a task. In this paradigm, both stimuli are presented
to the animal at the same time. The biological experiment, which was devised
to accompany the computational model, cannot strictly be an example of a
two-alternative forced-choice task since the odours are presented sequentially
as opposed to simultaneously. As such, the model predictions and behavioural
data cannot be directly compared. This is quite a large drawback, however,
it does produce two avenues for possible future research:
• Modification of the computational model so that the two odours are
presented sequentially, as in the experimental paradigm
• Modification of the behavioural experiment so that the two odours are
presented simultaneously. This involves a change in experimental appar-
atus, such that each of the odours are presented to one antennae of the
bee only, and a choice is determined by movement of the head in one
direction or another
Of these two options, the former is perhaps the easier avenue as it involves
an adaptation of the model code, which will undoubtedly also invoke a change
in the parametric setup. However, computational simulations are easy to run
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and data can be obtained rather quickly. The latter option involves modifica-
tion of the device used for odour delivery as well as how the bee is harnessed,
since the traditional harnessing methodology for PER was devised to restrict
movement of the head. The olfactory controller used for gathering the ex-
perimental data is not programmed to deliver two odours at once, as such
this will also require modification. Changing the experimental equipment and
gathering new behavioural data will perhaps be a slower process, however, it
would be necessary in order to examine honeybee decision-making within a
true two-alternative forced-choice task.
6.5 Decision Boundaries
We here suggested that an animal’s decision boundary or threshold can be
directly influenced by the motivational state of the animal, thus inducing ob-
servable behavioural changes in the animal’s choice behaviour. This theory
was supported by our experimental results. In our computational model, the
threshold is a parameter which can be modified, however, the neural circuitry
which actually sets the level of this threshold is yet to be identified. Further-
more, we do not know where in the invertebrate brain this circuitry might
exist. In human decision-making, the subthalamic nucleus (STN) has been
recently identified as a brain region which modulates the decision threshold
(Herz et al. 2016) during perceptual decision-making. The STN is a brain
region which has previously been identified to play a role in action selection,
also featuring in the basal ganglia model by Gurney and colleagues mentioned
above. This result is very encouraging, and since recent studies also bring
to light the parallels between mammalian and invertebrate brain structures
(Strausfeld and Hirth 2013), perhaps it can be assumed that an invertebrate
equivalent can be found. The central complex and lateral protocerebrum are
two higher level brain centres in invertebrates that are known to play a role
in action selection but are currently rather understudied; it would be interest-
ing to see whether or not a mechanism which mediates the decision threshold
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exists in either of these regions.
6.6 Conclusions
This research has presented an examination of decision-making and action
selection using both experimental and theoretical approaches. An underly-
ing theme throughout this work has been the honeybee, an animal which has
evolved to solve decision-making problems efficiently. Specifically, we have
explored the role of inhibitory mechanisms and how they might benefit a
decision-maker within two different models, one of which was inspired by hon-
eybee neurobiology. Further, we have explored the role of motivation in hon-
eybees, and quantified how an animal’s satiation level may impact their choice
behaviours. We have also attempted to describe the observed behavioural data
using the classical drift-diffusion model of Ratcliff (Ratcliff 1978).
In Chapter 3, we presented an abstract model of action selection within a
foraging context, based upon a previous model of behavioural switching de-
veloped by Houston and Sumida (Houston and Sumida 1985). The results
showed that using lateral inhibition to couple the two competing motivations
of the modelled animal improved action selection as the animal reduced its
costly behavioural switching. We found that mediation of the inhibitory circuit
provided further benefits to the animal and allowed it to decrease its foraging
bout lengths consistently over time, a result which is more biologically plaus-
ible. However, in order to exhibit this behaviour, the animal began switching
between alternatives more frequently and consequently incurred more costs,
in some cases. This may indicate a trade-off between bout length reduction
and behavioural switching.
In Chapter 4, we investigated the role of satiation in honeybee choice be-
haviours using the proboscis extension reflex (PER) paradigm and found that
they can be described by a drift-diffusion process. In our two experiments,
we found that there was a clear difference in the decision-making behaviours
of hungry and satiated animals. In both experiments, we found that hungry
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bees were more inaccurate than satiated bees. We furthermore analysed their
reaction times and found that, for some odours, hungry bees were responding
significantly faster than satiated bees. In our second experiment, we expanded
on these results and analysed the behaviours of honeybees in more detail. We
found that, in some cases, hungry bees would respond before stimulus present-
ation significantly more than satiated bees. We furthermore found that, in
the event of an error, satiated bees would withdraw their proboscis signific-
antly quicker than hungry bees. We found that all these differences in their
behaviours are compatible with a drift-diffusion process, if we assume that
the decision threshold is lowered according to level of satiation. A reduced
threshold would make a decision-maker more inaccurate, quicker in respond-
ing and slower in correcting errors. Thus, from these results we suggest that
differences in behaviours are caused by a mediation of the decision threshold,
according to level of satiation. This is an additional theory to that put forward
by Page and colleagues, which suggested that a change in response probability
was caused by a change in sucrose sensitivity (Page Jr et al. 1998). If the
sucrose sensitivity of an individual is defined by the decision threshold, an in-
crease in sensitivity would reflect a lower threshold and thus a higher response
probability.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we presented a novel computational model of decision-
making, the connectivity of which was based on the honeybee brain and
inspired by the previous decision-making models of Ratcliff (Ratcliff 1978),
Usher and McClelland (Usher and McClelland 2001), and Brown and Holmes
(Brown and Holmes 2001). We used this model to further investigate the role
of inhibitory mechanisms in decision-making, and to see if this model could
match the behavioural data from our experiments as well as others. We found
that the mechanisms of lateral inhibition and pooled-feedforward inhibition,
both of which have been identified as circuits within the invertebrate antennal
lobes, were beneficial to aiding in discrimination tasks. Our results agree with
previous theories that lateral inhibition should not be static, rather, it should
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be robust and dependent on stimuli similarity. We found that weighted lateral
inhibition was more beneficial to harder decision-making tasks, whilst pooled-
feedforward inhibition was more beneficial to easier tasks. Our model also
demonstrated that increasing the similarity of two stimuli presented within a
two-alternative forced-choice task should make a decision-maker increasingly
more inaccurate. We found that, for two stimuli that are almost equivalent,
the decision-maker will exhibit no bias in picking one stimulus or the other.
This result is in agreement with the results in the study of Parnas et al.,
(2013). Finally, we found that a reduced decision threshold caused the model
to make more mistakes, even for easier tasks that should have been easy to
solve. Although this result cannot be directly matched with our experimental
study (since they use two different paradigms), the results indicate that a
hungry animal should make decisions faster and be more inaccurate.
This research, which utilised both computational neuroscience and biology,
has further emphasised the benefits of using the honeybee as a model for
decision-making, and has also demonstrated the power of abstract and higher-
level computational models.
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Statistical Tests
All statistical tests were carried out using R. For the decision accuracy data
the test of given proportions was used. For all other data, normality was first
tested using the Shapiro-Wilks normality test. If the data sets to be compared
were both normal, a two sample t-test was performed, and if normality could
not be assumed, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was performed. The full
results from the statistical analyses are presented here.
A.1 Experiment One
We first present the tests for the original experiment.
A.1.1 Decision Accuracy
prop.test(c(12,31),c(41,43), correct=FALSE, alternative = "less")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
data: c(12, 31) out of c(41, 43)
X-squared = 15.405, df = 1, p-value = 4.337e-05
alternative hypothesis: less
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.0000000 -0.2660136
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
0.2926829 0.7209302
Result: p < .001; hungry bees significantly less accurate than
satiated bees.
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A.1.2 Reaction Time Data: Shapiro-Wilks Normality Tests
Before presenting the statistical tests, we first determine whether or not the
data sets are normal.
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.86824, p-value = 0.0004324
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.83631, p-value = 0.0004027
Result: This data set is normal.
Unrewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.88542, p-value = 0.2949
Result: This data set is not normal.
Unrewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.82289, p-value = 0.01292
Result: This data set is normal.
A.1.3 Reaction Time Statistical Tests
Rewarded odour
t.test(..., paired=FALSE)
Welch Two Sample t-test
t = 0.751, df = 60.038, p-value = 0.4556
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.4124763 0.9083943
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
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1.828649 1.580690
Result: For the rewarded odour, hungry bees were not signific-
antly faster than satiated bees.
Unrewarded odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="greater", correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 59, p-value = 0.03964
Result: p < .05 for the unrewarded odour, hungry bees were
significantly faster than satiated bees.
A.2 Experiment Two
A.2.1 Decision Accuracy (Overall)
prop.test(c(12,27),c(40,41), correct=FALSE, alternative = "less")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
data: c(12, 27) out of c(40, 41)
X-squared = 10.425, df = 1, p-value = 0.0006216
alternative hypothesis: less
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.0000000 -0.1881172
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
0.3000000 0.6585366
Result: p < .001; hungry bees significantly less accurate than
satiated bees.
A.2.2 Decision Accuracy (100:0)
prop.test(c(36,32),c(40,41), correct=FALSE, alternative = "greater")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
data: c(36, 32) out of c(40, 41)
X-squared = 2.1464, df = 1, p-value = 0.07145
alternative hypothesis: greater
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.01237078 1.00000000
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
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0.9000000 0.7804878
Result: p > .05; the proportion of hungry bees responding to this
odour is statistically the same as the proportion of satiated bees
responding.
A.2.3 Decision Accuracy (70:30)
prop.test(c(16,8),c(40,41), correct=FALSE, alternative = "greater")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
data: c(16, 8) out of c(40, 41)
X-squared = 4.076, df = 1, p-value = 0.02175
alternative hypothesis: greater
95 percent confidence interval:
0.04179288 1.00000000
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
0.400000 0.195122
Result: p < .05; significantly more hungry bees responded to this
odour than satiated bees.
A.2.4 Decision Accuracy (50:50)
prop.test(c(12,5),c(40,41), correct=FALSE, alternative = "greater")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
data: c(12, 5) out of c(40, 41)
X-squared = 3.8706, df = 1, p-value = 0.02457
alternative hypothesis: greater
95 percent confidence interval:
0.03220594 1.00000000
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
0.3000000 0.1219512
Result: p < .05; significantly more hungry bees responded to this
odour than satiated bees.
A.2.5 Decision Accuracy (30:70)
prop.test(c(5,2),c(40,41), correct=FALSE, alternative = "greater")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
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data: c(5, 2) out of c(40, 41)
X-squared = 1.4898, df = 1, p-value = 0.1111
alternative hypothesis: greater
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.02605422 1.00000000
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
0.12500000 0.04878049
Result: p > .05; the proportion of hungry bees responding to this
odour is statistically the same as the proportion of satiated bees
responding.
A.2.6 Decision Accuracy (0:100)
prop.test(c(16,4),c(40,41), correct=FALSE, alternative = "greater")
2-sample test for equality of proportions without continuity
correction
data: c(16, 4) out of c(40, 41)
X-squared = 9.9597, df = 1, p-value = 8e-04
alternative hypothesis: greater
95 percent confidence interval:
0.1539698 1.0000000
sample estimates:
prop 1 prop 2
0.40000000 0.09756098
Result: p < .001; significantly more hungry bees responded to
this odour than satiated bees.
A.2.7 Reaction Time Data: Shapiro-Wilks Normality Tests
Before presenting the statistical tests, we first determine whether or not the
data sets are normal.
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.90861, p-value = 0.0119
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.91056, p-value = 0.007696
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Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.96126, p-value = 0.822
Result: This data set is not normal.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.67751, p-value = 0.0002182
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.85499, p-value = 0.2108
Result: This data set is not normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.84844, p-value = 0.05565
Result: This data set is not normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.7936, p-value = 0.07179
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.76024, p-value = 0.04793
Result: This data set is normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.75913, p-value = 0.00461
Result: This data set is normal.
A.2.8 Reaction Time Statistical Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="greater")
Welch Two Sample t-test
t = 2.2001, df = 53.013, p-value = 0.01609
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
0.2270901 Inf
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
2.779355 1.829429
Result: p < .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees were signi-
ficantly faster than satiated bees.
70:30 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="greater", correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 74.5, p-value = 0.1032
Result: p > .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees were
not significantly faster than satiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="greater", correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 25.5, p-value = 0.4756
Result: p > .05 for the 50:50 compound odour, hungry bees were
not significantly faster than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="greater", correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 4, p-value = 0.7143
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Result: p > .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees were
not significantly faster than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
t.test(rt13, rt14, paired=FALSE, alternative="greater")
Welch Two Sample t-test
t = 0.43671, df = 7.3036, p-value = 0.3375
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.821249 Inf
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
2.71 2.16
Result: p > .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees were not
significantly faster than satiated bees.
A.2.9 Number of Bouts: Shapiro-Wilks Normality Tests
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.79285, p-value = 3.816e-05
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.8455, p-value = 0.0001502
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.6412, p-value = 0.0004791
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.83177, p-value = 0.007431
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.73872, p-value = 0.02332
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.79416, p-value = 0.007882
Result: This data set is normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.8494, p-value = 0.2242
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.80788, p-value = 0.003473
Result: This data set is normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.90769, p-value = 0.01128
Result: This data set is normal.
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A.2.10 Total Number of Bouts: Statistical Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE)
Welch Two Sample t-test
t = -0.0046458, df = 60.198, p-value = 0.9963
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.7733468 0.7697626
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
2.387097 2.388889
Result: p > .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees did not show
significantly more proboscis extensions than satiated bees.
70:30 compound odour
t.test(..., paired=FALSE)
Welch Two Sample t-test
t = -2.6881, df = 20.477, p-value = 0.01396
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.9966898 -0.2533102
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
1.375 2.500
Result: p < .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees
showed significantly more proboscis extensions than satiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
t.test(..., paired=FALSE)
Welch Two Sample t-test
t = -0.30484, df = 6.8666, p-value = 0.7695
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.875908 2.221363
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
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2.400000 2.727273
Result: p > .05 for the 50:50 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 2, p-value = 0.1949
Result: p > .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 16, p-value = 0.1231
Result: p > .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees did not show
significantly more proboscis extensions than satiated bees.
A.2.11 Total Time Responding: Shapiro-Wilks Normality Tests
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.90769, p-value = 0.01128
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.92864, p-value = 0.02277
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.67974, p-value = 0.001326
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.92242, p-value = 0.1845
Result: This data set is not normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.82294, p-value = 0.123
Result: This data set is not normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.8821, p-value = 0.1106
Result: This data set is not normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.87007, p-value = 0.2667
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.94213, p-value = 0.6673
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.88526, p-value = 0.0469
Result: This data set is normal.
A.2.12 Total Time Responding to Odour: Statistical Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE)
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = -1.6043, df = 64.367, p-value = 0.05677
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf 0.0654051
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
5.539355 7.164722
Result: p > .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees did not
spend significantly more time responding than satiated bees.
70:30 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 34, p-value = 0.03511
Result: p < .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees spent
significantly more time responding than satiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 21, p-value = 0.2548
Result: p < .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
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Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 2, p-value = 0.1905
Result: p < .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE)
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 11, p-value = 0.02497
Result: p < .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees spent signi-
ficantly more time responding than satiated bees.
A.2.13 Total Time Responding Before Odour Onset: Shapiro-
Wilks Normality Tests
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.32314, p-value = 7.331e-11
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.51805, p-value = 1.025e-09
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
Cannot perform test as all values are the same.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.66715, p-value = 7.5e-05
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
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Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.58678, p-value = 0.0004144
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.71299, p-value = 0.0006876
Result: This data set is normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.62978, p-value = 0.001241
Result: This data set is normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.87446, p-value = 0.03184
Result: This data set is normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.9109, p-value = 0.01364
Result: This data set is normal.
A.2.14 Total Time Responding Before Odour Onset: Statist-
ical Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = -1.9206, df = 44.326, p-value = 0.03061
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
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0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf -0.08297658
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.1896774 0.8519444
Result: p < .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees spent signi-
ficantly more time responding before the odour onset than satiated
bees.
70:30 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 44, p-value = 0.0423
Result: p < .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees spent
significantly more time responding before the odour onset than sa-
tiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = 0.16746, df = 5.4361, p-value = 0.5635
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf 3.54847
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
1.624000 1.347273
Result: p > .05 for the 50:50 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding before the odour on-
set than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
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W = 44, p-value = 0.0423
Result: p > .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding before the odour on-
set than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = -1.9156, df = 9.18, p-value = 0.04352
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf -0.1032791
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.870 3.155
Result: p < .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees spent signi-
ficantly more time responding before the odour onset than satiated
bees.
A.2.15 Total Time Responding After Odour Onset: Shapiro-
Wilks Normality Tests
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.9109, p-value = 0.01364
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.96957, p-value = 0.414
Result: This data set is not normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.67974, p-value = 0.001326
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.92954, p-value = 0.2398
Result: This data set is not normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.90261, p-value = 0.4245
Result: This data set is not normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.91518, p-value = 0.2805
Result: This data set is not normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.89867, p-value = 0.4245
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.89867, p-value = 0.4245
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.96026, p-value = 0.6665
Result: This data set is not normal.
A.2.16 Total Time Responding After Odour Onset: Statistical
Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 461.5, p-value = 0.1125
Result: p > .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees did not
spend significantly more time responding after the odour onset than
satiated bees.
70:30 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 37, p-value = 0.05282
Result: p > .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding after the odour onset
than satiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 19, p-value = 0.1676
Result: p > .05 for the 50:50 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding after the odour onset
than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
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W = 2, p-value = 0.1905
Result: p > .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees did
not spend significantly more time responding after the odour onset
than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 14.5, p-value = 0.04904
Result: p < .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees spent signi-
ficantly more time responding after the odour onset than satiated
bees.
A.2.17 Number of Bouts Above the Plane: Shapiro-Wilks
Normality Tests
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.72593, p-value = 2.872e-06
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.7913, p-value = 1.099e-05
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.6412, p-value = 0.0004791
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.81401, p-value = 0.004205
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.55218, p-value = 0.000131
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.34499, p-value = 2.243e-08
Result: This data set is normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.89867, p-value = 0.4245
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.68403, p-value = 0.00647
Result: This data set is normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.45449, p-value = 9.106e-07
Result: This data set is normal.
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A.2.18 Number of Bouts Above Plane of Head: Statistical
Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = -0.96385, df = 64.564, p-value = 0.1694
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf 0.1441808
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.5806452 0.7777778
Result: p > .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees did not show
significantly more proboscis extensions above the plane of the head
than satiated bees.
70:30 compound odour
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = -1.9496, df = 18.837, p-value = 0.03314
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf -0.05634282
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.375 0.875
Result: p < .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees
showed significantly more proboscis extensions above the plane of
the head than satiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = 2.7116, df = 23.885, p-value = 0.9939
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
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-Inf 1.130629
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.8750000 0.1818182
Result: p > .05 for the 50:50 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions above the plane of
the head than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 3, p-value = 0.1636
Result: p > .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions above the plane of
the head than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 24, p-value = 0.139
Result: p > .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees did not show
significantly more proboscis extensions above the plane of the head
than satiated bees.
A.2.19 Number of Bouts At the Plane: Shapiro-Wilks Nor-
mality Tests
Rewarded odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.86153, p-value = 0.0009008
Result: This data set is normal.
Rewarded odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.89081, p-value = 0.001932
Result: This data set is normal.
70:30 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.84891, p-value = 0.09288
Result: This data set is not normal.
70:30 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.81087, p-value = 0.003811
Result: This data set is normal.
50:50 compound odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.85991, p-value = 0.2279
Result: This data set is not normal.
50:50 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.76023, p-value = 0.002828
Result: This data set is normal.
30:70 compound odour (satiated bees):
Sample size too small to perform test.
30:70 compound odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.96086, p-value = 0.814
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (satiated bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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W = 0.8494, p-value = 0.2242
Result: This data set is not normal.
Punished odour (hungry bees):
shapiro.test(...)
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
W = 0.77026, p-value = 0.001126
Result: This data set is normal.
A.2.20 Number of Bouts At Plane of Head: Statistical Tests
Rewarded odour (100:0)
t.test(..., paired=FALSE, alternative="less")
Welch Two Sample t-test, alternative="less"
t = 0.53941, df = 60.517, p-value = 0.7042
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is greater than
0
95 percent confidence interval:
-Inf 0.8002629
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
1.806452 1.611111
Result: p > .05 for the rewarded odour, hungry bees did not show
significantly more proboscis extensions at the plane of the head than
satiated bees.
70:30 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 54, p-value = 0.2551
Result: p > .05 for the 70:30 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions at the plane of the
head than satiated bees.
50:50 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
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W = 22.5, p-value = 0.2756
Result: p > .05 for the 50:50 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions at the plane of the
head than satiated bees.
30:70 compound odour
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 3, p-value = 0.2085
Result: p > .05 for the 30:70 compound odour, hungry bees did
not show significantly more proboscis extensions at the plane of the
head than satiated bees.
Punished odour (0:100)
wilcox.test(..., paired=FALSE, correct=FALSE, alternative="less")
Wilcoxon rank sum test
W = 19, p-value = 0.1045
Result: p > .05 for the punished odour, hungry bees did not show
significantly more proboscis extensions at the plane of the head than
satiated bees.
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PER Training Data Sheets
B.1 First Experiment
Figure B.1: Data sheet used for the first experiment.
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B.2 Second Experiment
Figure B.2: Data sheet used for the second experiment.
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